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Letter from the Editor
 Hello! I am proud and honored to have served as the Editor-in-Chief of the twenty-first volume of  The 
Park Place Economist for the 2012 to 2013 school year. This student-run publication still remains  one of the few 
undergraduate economic journals in the nation. The increase in submissions has risen tenfold, as well as the size 
of editorial board. The Park Place Economist Staff has expanded to all years of students from diverse academic 
backgrounds who participate in the publishing process. In addition, the journal brings valuable insights and exposes 
all students to upper-level undergraduate research. One significant change in the journal’s recent history is that 
the publication is now a registered as a Registered Student Organization (RSO). With the help of being a RSO, 
the publication of the journal will continue for many years to come because funding will be allocated by Student 
Senate. I would like to thank Derek Lindgren, this year’s treasurer, for accompanying Mark Giannis, Assistant Editor-
in-Chief, and I to the Student Senate financial advisory board meeting.
 The journal continues to acknowledge students’ economic research at Illinois Wesleyan University by 
publishing a variety of topic areas and methodologies used for empirical research. This year thirteen articles have 
been published from the Economics’ Senior Seminar classes and other economic electives. Topics within the United 
States include assessing happiness, unemployment of minorities, crime rates, temporary immigrant labor, NASA 
funding, immigrant assimilation, and stock performance. Internationally, other articles examine developing countries 
such as India and Brazil, the determinants of growth in the Former Yugoslavia, and water quality and sanitation in 
Africa. We are also fortunate enough to publish an article in the field of environmental economics that conducted 
an experiment simulation on Illinois Wesleyan’s campus. 
 The high caliber of this year’s The Park Place Economist would not have been possible without every single 
contributor. Firstly, I would like to recognize and thank all of the authors who allowed their economic research 
to be published because without their work there ultimately would be no journal. Secondly, I would like to thank 
my staff for completing their tasks on their own outside time and meeting all of my demands. Thirdly, I would like 
to thank Mark Giannis and Elizabeth Liubicich for putting in many hard hours of work on this volume. Fourthly, I 
would like to thank Sijia Song, the Editor-in-Chief of the Undergraduate Economic Review, for his moral support. 
Lastly, I would like to thank Gary Schwartz for printing this year’s publication and Professor Robert Leekley for his 
kind words of wisdom.
 Please enjoy the twenty-first volume of The Park Place Economist!
Tara Gracer
Editor-in-Chief
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Experimental Economics Comes to
Life – Prior Appropriations in the
Mimbres River Basin
Melissa Seeborg
 Early in the 2012 fall semester, a group of thirteen seniors gathered in the CLA lab, knowing nothing more 
than that they had signed up for an incentivized experiment under Professor Broadbent’s direction. It was quickly 
learned that they were blind subjects in a study searching to understand how water-leasing markets operate under 
the legal framework of prior appropriations, in which senior users have priority of water use over junior users. Each 
student was assigned a user on the Mimbres River, and logged into a computer program specially designed for the 
experiment. Professor Broadbent versed participants on the concept of prior appropriations, the landscape of the 
area in study, and what the main goal for each user was. However, once the software began running, the students 
were on their own to decide the allocation of their water and the price of trades with other members. No one 
user had the same amount of water rights in the market, and trading quickly became heated as students tried to 
make the most of the limited resource. 
 The making of this project was not a simple task. The design process of the interface began in 2009, 
with final results obtained in October of 2012. Collaborators worked together across the country and included 
economists from the University of New Mexico and University of Chicago, programmers from the University 
of Texas, and a group of hydrologists from the Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque. Preliminary results 
indicate that during times of drought junior users do not have access to water and are entering the market to 
effectively lease water from senior users. There is also evidence of crop protection through stacking, which is the 
idea of increasing crop yields by allocating more water to them. 
 Hayley Harroun, a 2012 December economics and environmental studies graduate, had the opportunity 
to focus her economics senior seminar paper on Professor Broadbent’s experiment to see whether or not price 
differentials occurred in the water leasing market tested. She concluded that during times of a drought when a 
price differential did occur between the oldest water rights and the junior users. Hayley viewed the experiment as 
beneficial to all, stating: “My laboratory experiment, creating a hypothetical water leasing market, used test subjects 
from the senior class in the economics department at IWU. Because of this I wasn’t the only student learning about 
experimental economics and the real world application of resource economics, the students that participated in 
the experiment were as well. I believe that provided a real learning opportunity for all of us.”
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 In the economics of developing countries, there often emerges the question of how one can take an 
abstract theory and transform it into a functional policy or project.  During her sabbatical in the Spring of 2013, 
Professor Durbal is tackling this question and making the connections more fruitful for her students. The purpose 
of her work is to compile a series of different projects to create a supplemental reader for her ECON 355 
Economics of Developing Countries course, which will then be utilized in assignments throughout the year.
 ‘The Green Revolution’ in Asia serves as an example of one of these projects.  Here, a number of economic 
and technological initiatives were implemented to commercialize agriculture and increase food production. 
However, criticisms over the true value of increased production and fears have emerged over the abundant use of 
fertilizer and its long-run effects on the soil.  By incorporating examples similar to ‘The Green Revolution’, Professor 
Durbal’s supplement will force students to take a critical look at the material and see how projects in developing 
countries are panning out in reality. 
 
 Current examples of development projects will be compiled using information from The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Bank, and other agencies. 
Professor Durbal will also be researching and keeping up with think tanks in developmental economics.  Her final 
product is sure to provide a fuller picture of economics outside of the more traditional realm, and will be beneficial 
for many future classes to come. 
 In addition to research and the creation of the supplement, Professor Durbal took time out of the office 
for travel, which included an tiger safari in India! 
 Students and faculty look forward to welcoming Professor Durbal back next fall!
Professor Ilaria Ossella-Durbal’s
Sabbatical Adventures
Melissa Seeborg
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I. INTRODUCTION
 In recent history, Brazil’s economy has featured 
the typical boom and bust cycle. In the “boom” phases 
of this cycle the nation has been deemed “The Country 
of the Future.” Unfortunately, Brazil has never been 
called “The Country of Now” because its booms are 
inhibited by culprits such as the bust in the cycle, a 
global downturn, or a lack of sufficient systems and 
infrastructure to continually support growth.
 
 Brazil is situated in the northern part of South 
America, and covers 47.3 percent of the continent 
(United Nations, 2013). It ranks fifth in the world both 
in terms of area and population with 196,655,014 
people (World Bank, 2011). Careful examination 
of Brazil’s economic data indicates that it is moving 
towards a service-based economy, an indication that the 
economy is becoming similar to those of high-income 
nations. However, high inequality remains a problem as 
evidenced by its high GINI coefficient.
 
 Throughout the years, Brazil has suffered from 
political turmoil and changes of regime. Since stabilizing, 
the main problem plaguing Brazil’s political realm is 
corruption. In order for Brazil to change and become 
the country of today, two main economic issues must 
be addressed immediately. The first is that business 
conditions that are more conducive to completing 
transactions must be created. To accomplish this, 
Brazil must aim to improve its Ease of Doing Business 
rating by loosening its protectionist trade policies and 
reforming its archaic labor code. Furthermore, Brazil 
should address the problem of its ever-increasing 
urban population by providing more opportunities in 
the agricultural sector. If such ends could be achieved, 
Brazil may finally be able to change its status from “The 
Country of the Future” to “The Country of Now”.
II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
 Despite suffering from the economic recession 
during the global financial crisis in 2008, Brazil is now 
South America’s regional economic power. Though the 
country faced economic collapse due to diminished 
demand for exported goods, Brazil’s natural resources, 
the sizeable labor force and international interest 
allowed it to recover. Classified by the World Bank as 
a middle-income country, Brazil’s 2011 GNI per capita 
was 10,720 United States dollars. In 2011, Brazil’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) was 2.477 trillion (measured 
in current United States dollars). Brazil’s average annual 
per capita GDP growth rate from 1990 to 2000 was 
0.369 percent. During the 2000 to 2011 timeframe, 
the growth rate was 2.47 percent, indicating that Brazil 
is beginning to grow faster despite the economic 
downturn of 2008.
 
  A breakdown of Brazil’s GDP by sector reveals 
that the country is becoming more akin to high-income 
countries. 2011 data from the World Bank shows slight 
shrinkages in agriculture, which now accounts for 5.5 
percent down from 5.6 percent in 2000, and in industry, 
which is now responsible for 27.5 percent down from 
27.7 percent. The service sector, on the other hand 
has increased its contribution from 66.7 percent to 
67.01 percent. Though these changes are slight, they 
are indicative of the overall trend of Brazil’s economy 
becoming focused on service. Brazil’s manufacturing 
exports as a percentage of its total exports have 
declined from 52 percent in 1990 to 34 percent in 
2011 (World Bank). This contraction can be attributed 
to two things: the global recession and the growth of 
Brazil’s service sector.
 The GINI Index, a measure of the degree 
of income inequality with 0 being absolute equality 
and 100 being absolute inequality, was 53.9 in 2009 
for Brazil (World Bank). While the nation has shown 
improvement from previous indices of 59.0, 60.6, and 
59.2 for years 1985, 1990, and 1995 respectively, it is 
still among the most unequal countries in terms of 
Brazil: The Impact of Business Conditions and
Hyper-Urbanization on Development in the
Country of the Future
Nicholas Desideri, Drake Hill, 
Elizabeth Liubicich, & Claudia Petcu
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income inequality. The headcount index, based on the 
1.25 dollar per day poverty line, is 6 percent of the 
population (.06).
 
 Despite Brazil’s rapidly fluctuating economic 
fortunes, Brazil’s unemployment rate has remained 
relatively stable, below 10 percent during the same time 
period. The government tried to stimulate hiring with the 
Employment and Income Generation Program of 2003, 
offering credit to “small businesses and microenterprises” 
to motivate entrepreneurs (Gonzalez, 2010). Brazil’s 
average annual inflation rate in terms of Consumer 
Price Index has changed drastically over the past two 
decades. The average annual inflation rate first spiked in 
the late 1980s and continued to vacillate until the mid 
1990s when it finally remained consistently under 15 
percent. In the early 1990’s it drastically fell from 2947.73 
percent in 1990 to 432.78 percent in 1991. Following 
the plummet, the average annual inflation rate began to 
climb steadily until its peak in 1994 at 2075.88 percent. 
It dropped to a comparatively low 66.01 percent in 
1995 and continued to fall to a low of 3.19 percent in 
1998. The average of the individual annual inflation rates 
for the 1990s is 767.26 percent. Since then, the rate has 
remained low; it has fluctuated minimally between the 
1995 low of 3.19 percent and a high of 14.72 percent in 
2003 (World Bank). The average of the individual annual 
average inflation rates for the 2000’s was 6.72 percent. 
Despite its numerous economic challenges, Brazil does 
seem to be improving economically over all. With a few 
key economic changes, the country could be well on its 
way to being the “Country of Now”.
III. POLITICAL BACKGROUND
 Since the country’s independence, Brazil has 
lived under seven different constitutions. This exemplifies 
the political instability of the country, as each document 
signifies a regime change. Brazil has suffered a history 
of strongmen and authoritarianism. Other than the 
military junta that ruled from the 1964 to 1985, the 
most famous of these men is Getulio Vargas. Ruling 
Brazil from 1930 to 1954, Vargas implemented an 
import substitution plan for Brazil that many consider 
to be populist (Rabello de Castro and Ronci, 1991). 
Though he committed suicide in 1954, Vargas remains 
one of Brazil’s most loved and in some circles, revealed 
of Brazil’s politicians.
 
 Brazil suffers from a low level of party fidelity, 
meaning its legislators switch political parties at a 
very high rate. This need to form broad coalitions 
among squabbling legislators enables Brazil’s greatest 
institutional problem: corruption. Transparency 
International ranks Brazil as the 73rd most corrupt 
nation out of 173, and the Christian Science Monitor 
calls corruption “endemic… and rarely prosecuted” 
(Corruption Index, 2011; Downie, 2012). While the 
stability of Brazil’s democracy is not in question, current 
president Dilma Rousseff ’s coalition could collapse if 
she is unable to play her cards right.
 
 Political instability was a major issue for Brazil 
until Fernando Collor de Mello won the first direct 
presidential election since 1960. The victory was short-
lived, as a corruption scandal led to his impeachment 
in 1992. The resulting political instability and resulting 
absence of economic policy likely contributed to the 
wavering of the average annual inflation rate. Since 
the mid 1990s Brazil has been politically stable and 
consistently growing. The government has been diligent 
about implementing policies, like tightening government 
spending, to keep inflation down, as they did in 2010 
(CIA World Factbook, Brazil Government, 2012).
IV. EASE OF DOING BUSINESS 
A. International Trade
 The Ease of Doing Business ranking, compiled 
by the World Bank, ranks countries from 1 to 185 based 
on how conducive conditions in the country are to do 
business operations. Lower numbers indicate the most 
business-friendly conditions. Countries such as Singapore, 
Hong Kong, New Zealand, and the United States have 
climates that are favorable for business transactions. At 
the other end of the spectrum of rankings, the Central 
African Republic, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo have some of the worst business conditions in 
the world. The Ease of Doing Business index is calculated 
by averaging the country’s ranking in the following ten 
categories: starting a business, dealing with construction 
permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting 
credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across 
borders, enforcing contracts, and resolving insolvency. 
Brazil’s rank for fiscal year 2013 is 128, and though 
Brazil experiences significant problems in each of the 
measured categories, trading across borders is currently 
one of their weakest areas.
 
 Despite having significant exports such as 
soybeans, orange juice, ethanol, commercial aircraft, 
automobiles, and coffee, Brazil lacks efficient trading 
policies and procedures (Brazil Exports 2012, 2012; 
Brazil Economy). Brazil ranked 123 for trading 
across borders in fiscal year 2013. The ranking for 
this category is determined based on the number 
Desideri, Hill, Liubicich, & Petcu
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of documents necessary to import and export, the 
costs associated with trade, and the time it takes for 
completion of the process. Brazil was ranked 123 in 
fiscal year 2012, as well, indicating that they have not 
experienced any significant improvement or decline 
(DoingBusiness.org Brazil). In addition to its poor 
rating by the World Bank, the International Chamber 
of Commerce’s Open Markets Index ranked Brazil 68 
out of 75 countries with a score of 2.3, indicating below 
average openness (Open Markets Index, 2011). Brazil’s 
protectionist trade policies and lack of infrastructure 
and technology are the key factors preventing the 
country from becoming a more open economy. 
 Recently, Brazil has enacted new taxes and 
policies that are notably protectionist in nature. 
Protectionism is essentially the establishment of barriers 
to trade to protect domestic goods, and it was one 
of the primary causes of the world economic disaster 
of the 1930s (Protectionism Alert, 2012). It is one of 
the major reasons for difficulty of importing in Brazil. In 
January 2012, a tax increase of thirty percentage points 
was levied on imported cars, which already face a high 
import tariff, in response to stagnant economic growth 
(The Economist, September 24, 2011). The government 
has responded to strong economic relations with China, 
with whom friction is also quickly increasing, with “short-
term protectionist measures combined with modest 
steps towards more constructive longer-term policy 
changes” (The Economist, September 24, 2011). The goal 
of this policy is to protect domestic industry in Brazil, 
and it is working. However, Brazil must be careful about 
protecting trade with China at the expense of its trading 
relationships with other Latin American countries, which 
are also suffering as a result of these protectionist policies. 
 
 The customs process that all imported good 
must go through is extremely convoluted and time 
consuming, and it is one of the mechanisms that 
accomplishes the protectionist agenda. It takes seventeen 
days to import a product in Brazil, eight of which are 
spent on document preparation and four of which are 
spent on customs clearance. The process of exporting 
goods is simpler, cheaper, and less time consuming than 
importing, but not by a significant amount. There are eight 
documents necessary for importation, and the cost of 
document preparation alone is 275 United States dollars 
(DoingBusiness.org Trading Across Borders). During 
2009, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) was 
reviewing Brazil’s trade procedures and policies, Brazil 
implemented a modified import declaration process, 
which has improved the number of rejected import 
declarations, but has not significantly reduced the 
number of documents or amount of preparation time 
necessary for the process (Trade Policy Review, 2009). 
 
 A lack of technological progress is another major 
contributor to the length of time necessary for goods 
to clear customs. As of the WTO Trade Policy Review 
in 2009, scanners, which allow non-invasive inspection 
of imported cargo, have been installed at only nine of 
the border entry and inspection points in Brazil. While 
these nine locations are responsible for 90 percent of 
the cargo imported to Brazil, the recent technological 
updates have had little impact in speeding up the 
customs process (Trade Policy Review, 2009). Though 
the implementation of this technology was expected to 
cut down customs clearance time significantly, it still takes 
an average of four days for imports to clear customs in 
addition to the three days that are spent on port and 
terminal handling (DoingBusiness.org Trading Across 
Borders). As the report notes, Brazil has been taking 
“gradual steps to simplify and modernize its customs 
procedures.” However, these improvements have not 
had a significant enough impact on Brazil’s trading 
efficiency, as their ranking has not changed in recent years. 
 
 In addition to a lack of sufficient technology, 
Brazil also lacks the infrastructure necessary to facilitate 
faster trade. In 2012 the World Economic Forum ranked 
Brazil’s quality of infrastructure 104 out of 142 surveyed 
countries. It is also estimated that only 14 percent of the 
roads in Brazil are paved, contributing to the problem of 
inefficient inland transportation (The Economist, August 
11, 2012). Unpaved roads are not the only infrastructure 
problem that plagues Brazil. The airports in the nation 
are ill equipped to handle the ever-increasing passenger 
and cargo traffic that they face, and are in need of 
updates and expansion (Centre for Aviation). Although 
promises to invest in and improve infrastructure have 
been made repeatedly by the government, Brazil lacks 
the necessary follow-through to fix this broken system.
 
B. Solutions to International Trade Issues
 Brazil’s trade problems are deeply entrenched, 
and will require much more than a simple fix. The 
WTO Trade Policy Review notes the importance 
of repairing trade in Brazil: “Brazil needs to press on 
with its efforts to give additional impetus to trade and 
investment, […] by […] reducing the use of import 
prohibitions and providing greater predictability to 
the foreign investment and trade regime” (Trade 
Policy Review, 2009). The protectionist mind set in the 
country will be hard to overcome, as it stems from a 
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desire to protect the domestic industries in the country, 
namely the manufacturing industry. Fortunately, Brazil 
is already taking steps to improve its industries, such 
as cutting payroll taxes for local businesses, while these 
protectionist policies are in place (The Economist, 
September 24, 2012). Brazil has also been attempting to 
implement policy changes that will facilitate faster trade, 
such as the aforementioned streamlining of the customs 
and documentation processes. Unfortunately, they have 
not successfully changed their trade situation enough to 
improve the difficult business conditions in Brazil, making 
the current changes arbitrary. One of the simplest and 
most concrete ways that Brazil can effectively shorten 
the time it takes to move goods across the border is to 
invest in new technologies and improved infrastructure, 
specifically the high-tech scanners that have been 
implemented in a few of the busiest border entry points. 
 
 Brazil’s infrastructure is among the worst in 
the world. With the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 
Olympics on the horizon, the government knows that 
it must move quickly and invest heavily to improve 
the roads and airports. Unfortunately, what they have 
promised to do will not be nearly enough to catch up 
with countries of similar standing. Between 2011 and 
2014, the government intends to invest 163 billion 
reals, or about 80 billion United States dollars on 
infrastructure (The Economist, August 11, 2012). The 
intended amount is equivalent to 1 percent of Brazil’s 
GDP, but it is not enough. According to a 2010 report 
by Morgan Stanley, “Brazil would need to spend 6 to 8 
percent of GDP annually to catch up with South Korea 
in 20 years and 4 percent per year to catch up with 
Chile” (The Economist August 11, 2012). Chile has the 
best infrastructure in Latin America with a Logistics 
Performance Index (LPI) sub score of 3.18 while 
South Korea scores a 3.74 (World Bank). The LPI is a 
tool created to help countries identify strengths and 
weaknesses in categories such as customs, infrastructure, 
international shipments, logistics competence, timeliness, 
and tracking and tracing. Germany has the highest 
infrastructure rating of all countries measured with a 
score of 4.26 (World Bank). The Latin American and 
Caribbean Transport Association recently highlighted 
Brazil’s inadequate airport infrastructure, suggesting 
that they need to invest 4.9 billion United States dollars 
before 2014 in the already existing airports and must 
construct nine additional airports that are at least the 
size of Guarulhos, one of the nations largest and busiest 
international airports (Centre for Aviation). Investing 
more heavily in infrastructure will help Brazil catch 
up to similar nations more quickly in terms of their 
infrastructure ratings. Improvements in infrastructure 
will aid their poor trade situation by shortening the 
time it takes to transport products within the country. 
 
 Improving technology is another critical 
improvement that Brazil must make if it hopes to 
improve its trading across borders and ease of doing 
business ratings. According to the Trade Policy Review 
in 2009, nine border entry points have been equipped 
with scanners that are supposed to shorten the time 
it takes to clear customs. Unfortunately, Brazil has not 
implemented enough of this technology. Countries 
with more advanced trading procedures and better 
technology, such as the United States, clear imports in 
one day, and in Brazil it takes an average of four days 
(DoingBusiness.org Trading Across Borders). Brazil can 
remedy this problem by improving the technology in 
other border entry points and redirecting the location 
of import receipts so that each location is responsible 
for a smaller percentage of the country’s imported 
good. This, in combination with increased spending on 
infrastructure will allow Brazil to hasten the process of 
bringing goods into and out of the country.
 
C. The Labor Code
 Another factor contributing to the difficulty of 
doing business in Brazil is the labor code, which is archaic, 
inefficient, and has little relevance in today’s workplace. 
The labor code dates back to the time of Getúlio Vargas, 
a noted populist dictator, and was inspired by Mussolini’s 
labor laws (Rohter, 2001). The labor code fosters high 
labor costs and low worker productivity, making Brazil 
an unfavorable place for entrepreneurs to invest. 
 
 The labor code unfairly protects the employees 
at the expense of employers. This is seen in the justice 
system when employers are taken to court because of 
unfair laws and the courts rarely rule in their favor (The 
Economist, March 10, 2011). Employers are taken to 
court on charges such as insufficient overtime pay and 
payroll records despite the fact that the employees are 
responsible for these tasks. In most, court cases employers 
are responsible for paying exorbitant settlements to 
their employees. In the labor code foreign investors 
often state salaries in a foreign currency forgetting that 
exchange rates are flexible. If the actual rate is less than 
the wage stated in the labor code charges can be filed 
against the employer (The Economist, March 10, 2011). 
The laws are set up in a way that makes it necessary 
for most claims to be taken to court, when in fact the 
employees may get a favorable long-term deal through 
negotiations. By taking their employers to court the 
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employees may get a high settlement sum, however 
it will not improve future workplace conditions. 
 
 The employer is also responsible for additional 
costs such as the high cost associated with firing 
workers without just cause and paid leave, both of 
which are guaranteed by the labor code (Gonzaga, 
2003). At first glance this policy may seem as though 
it offers much needed protection to workers; however, 
low productivity and workplace truancy are not 
considered just causes for terminating a worker. Fundo 
de Garantia por Tempo de Servico (FGTS) is a program 
in which employers are required to put 8 percent of 
the employee’s earnings monthly earnings in a bank 
account and when they terminate that worker, he gains 
access to the account. The employer must also pay a 
fine for firing the worker to both the worker and the 
government (Gonzaga, 2003). According to the code 
workers are entitled to three months maternity leaves 
and one month paid vacation (Gonzaga, 2003). These 
laws obligate the employers to pay their workers even 
when they are not productive at all. Unfortunately, 
the political party in power does not see how these 
laws are unfavorable to the economic health and 
the Minister of Labor is pushing for termination of 
workers to become more expensive for employers 
than it already is (The Economist, March 10, 2011). 
 Brazil ranks 15th out of 17 Latin American 
countries in terms of worker productivity, which was 
measured through a survey where the Conference 
Board was responsible for collecting data. Bolivia and 
Ecuador are the only two nations ranked lower than 
Brazil (Brazilian Bubble, 2012). Unfortunately, workers 
actually have incentives to be less productive such as 
the FGTS program (Gonzaga, 2003). Employees earn 
interest on the money saved for them under the FGTS 
program and only gain access to it if they are fired for 
an unjust cause. The interest rate that they receive 
while employed is lower than the rate of return they 
would earn in the money market. So, workers have an 
incentive to lose their jobs due to low productivity in 
order to gain access to these accounts and to deposit 
the funds in a private bank where they will earn higher 
yields (Gonzaga, 2003). Another piece of legislation 
requires the employer to provide one month’s advance 
notice before a worker is fired (Gonzaga, 2003). If a 
worker knows that they will be jobless in a month, 
their productivity drops causing losses for the firm. The 
essential flaw of this system is that workers are better 
being fired without justification than if they performed 
their job functions at their maximum productivity level. 
Low worker productivity is undesirable for an employer 
because non-productive workers would make the 
company as a whole less productive. There is also 
evidence that Brazil has high turnover rates meaning 
employees change jobs frequently. For firms this means 
that they lack human capital and that they frequently 
have to train new workers. Low human capital prevents 
businesses from expanding.
 
D. Reforming the Labor Code 
 A more lenient labor code will ultimately 
improve the business conditions in Brazil and will help 
improve their Ease of Doing Business Index. Reforming 
the labor code and eliminating some of its rigid laws 
is one possible proposal to improve labor productivity 
and reduce costs. First and foremost, the code itself 
should be reformed, as it would not be possible to 
implement unions without doing so. Removing the laws 
that prevent just firing of employees as well as those 
that mandate high firing costs would give power back 
to the employers. Some of the clauses in the code, such 
as the fact that a lazy employee does not constitute 
a reasonable cause for firing, should be eliminated. 
 
 In order to address the problem of employees 
taking their employers to court often, unions could be 
instituted so that employees could have a channel other 
than the court system to reach mutual agreements 
with their employers. Unions should be implemented 
in Brazil so that employees can remain protected, while 
giving employers more room to negotiate and to foster 
higher productivity levels among workers. This would 
better facilitate negotiations between employers and 
employees, and would make industries more productive 
(Rohter, 2001). To prevent arbitrary employer power, 
unions would be helpful in negotiating laws between 
employees and employers specific to their industries. It 
would be less costly for the employers to settle deals 
with the employees through unions rather than in 
court. However, solving Brazil’s productivity problems 
by implementing unions may also have costs for 
businesses, as unions are often associated with hindered 
economic growth. Nevertheless, they would be a 
better alternative to the current restrictive labor code. 
 Since Brazil is faced with high job turnover and 
no accumulation of human capital, a reform of the FGTS 
system would also be appropriate (Gonzaga, 2003). The 
incentives associated with FGTS must be eliminated 
in order for worker productivity to rise. The rate of 
return on each worker’s account should be based on 
how long they have worked in their current position, 
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rather than on one interest rate across the board. 
Reforming the interest rate alone would prevent the 
high turnover rate, which creates an additional burden 
on the employers, as they have to continually hire 
and train new workers, an added supplementary cost. 
Long-term financial incentives to stay on the job would 
ultimately decrease the turnover rate and improve 
human capital of a firm because they would have more 
experienced and productive workers making the firm 
more successful overall. It is possible that a reform of 
this nature would not improve worker productivity 
because there is a chance that the relationship between 
the program and high turnover merely correlate. Also, if 
the workers are more productive but the money stays 
in the hands of the employers income inequality in the 
country would increase, as the bulk of the money would 
stay concentrated in the hands of only a few people. 
Although aware of its shortcomings, a reform of the 
FGTS system would be necessary to encourage human 
capital accumulation in order to promote business 
expansion.
IV. THE URBANIZATION EPIDEMIC  
A. The Current Situation and Its Implications
 One of Brazil’s major problems is its 
urbanization rate. With 85 percent of its population 
living in urban areas in 2011, Brazil surpasses other 
industrializing nations like India at 31 percent, South 
Africa at 62 percent, China at 62 percent, and Russia 
74 percent. A main Latin American competitor, 78 
percent of Mexico’s population resides in urban 
centers. Surprisingly, Brazil’s urbanization rate has been 
decreasing, reaching 3 percent in 1990 but dropping 
to 1 percent by 2011. In the same time period, the 
percentage of Brazil’s population in urban areas has 
jumped by 11 percent, from 74 percent to 85 percent 
(World Bank). Meanwhile, Brazil’s rural population 
has been shrinking, dropping from 26 percent of the 
country’s total population to 15 percent between 
1990 and 2011 (World Bank). This suggests that Brazil’s 
rural population expects higher returns from life in the 
cities than they do from working in the agricultural 
sector. They migrate to the cities based on these 
perceived assumptions, which can be modeled using 
the Harris-Todaro Model. The migration phenomenon 
is understandable as the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB) notes that rural-dwellers “account for 
46 percent of total extreme poverty nationwide,” 
whereas only 5 percent of the urban population is 
considered “extremely poor” (IADB, 2012). Of the 
extremely poor rural dwellers, “46 percent are landless, 
unemployed laborers,” according to the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD, 2011). 
 
 Unfortunately, Brazil’s cities are simply unable 
to accommodate the influx of migrants from the 
countryside. Usually these individuals settle in Brazil’s 
famous favelas, or shanty-towns. These favelas, usually 
built on un-owned land, often lack formal infrastructure. 
While access to sanitation in urban areas has increased 
from 80 percent in 1990 to 85 percent in 2010, 15 percent 
are still without access to proper sanitation (World 
Bank). Even worse, 57 percent of the sewage in urban 
areas is disposed of improperly (Seligmann, 2012). Crime 
is also a problem; despite falling by nearly 75 percent 
over the past decade in Sao Paulo, one of Brazil’s biggest 
cities, violent crime is now projected to reach “epidemic 
levels” by 2013 (Mean Streets, Revisted, 2012). The 
preparation for the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janiero has 
highlighted the crime problems Brazil’s favelas face. On 
December 4th, Brazilian law enforcement arrested 63 
police offices for alleged collusion with drug traffickers 
in Rio’s low-income favelas (Associated Press, 2012). 
 Though overall urban unemployment 
continued to fall to 6.4 percent from 6.7 percent in 
2011, the percentage of urban youth unemployment 
has been fluctuating over the past decade, peaking at 
26 percent in 2000, dropping to a low of 17 percent in 
2007, and rising to 18 percent in 2009 (World Bank). 
Add to this Brazil’s increasing problem with creating 
jobs in the formal sector since the 2007 economic 
downturn, and Brazil’s falling urban unemployment rate 
seems far less peachy (International Labor Office, 2010). 
As of 2007, Brazil’s informal sector employment at 50.6 
percent was expected to grow, especially considering 
Brazil’s falling formal job creation rate (Maurizio, 2012). 
 Overall, excessive urbanization creates many 
problems for Brazil. Even though urban growth rates 
are falling, decreasing rural population rates suggest 
continued migration to cities. Brazil’s already bustling 
metropoli are having problems incorporating migrants, 
despite falling urban unemployment. Favela growth 
exacerbates sanitation issues and crime problems. 
Crime, ahead of the 2016 Olympic Games, is especially 
touchy for Brazil; a rise in crime before such an event 
could discourage international investment. Also, the 
youth unemployment rate’s past fluctuations and more 
recent rise suggest that young individuals are having 
problems finding jobs in the cities, whether due to 
lack of education or lack of opportunities. Increasing 
urbanization can aggravate both, whether by increasing 
the amount of surplus labor or by putting more stress 
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on schools, lowering their effectiveness.
 
B. Causes of the Epidemic
 Multiple factors contribute to the migration 
of rural dwellers to Brazil’s urban areas. While the 
deforestation of the Amazon Rainforest earns the 
most headlines, its effect on rural-urban migration 
needs to be explored in order to better understand 
its true impact. In 2010, the Brazilian government sold 
off multiple logging permits to companies, designating 
certain areas of the rainforest as “off limits” to industry 
(Pyne, 2010). The deforestation rate dropped 27 
percent in the first half of 2012 (BBC, 2012 Nov 22). 
 This willingness to grant concessions to logging 
industries in order to stimulate local rural in Brazil 
economies ignores the increasing mechanization of 
Brazil’s logging industry. Though specific figures are 
unavailable, the country’s logging industry experienced 
a seismic shift in 1993, when Brazil’s government lifted 
tariffs on heavy machinery (Murakami 2002). Though 
the cost of labor decreased overall between 1990 
and 1995 from 21 United States dollars to19 United 
States dollars, firms had to respond to “increasing 
market pressures…” with “increases in the volume 
of production” with “…significantly intensified” 
mechanization (Murakami, 2002; Stone, 1996). As a result, 
many laborers found themselves out of a job and moved 
to the cities. In short, Brazil’s logging industry, as a result 
of mechanization, contributes to rural-urban migration. 
 Another contributor to rural-urban migration is 
a convergence of various problems, mostly concerning the 
farming industry in Brazil. Most of these issues crystallize 
in the Sertao, a semi-arid region in Northeastern Brazil 
that covers 1 million square kilometers. As such, the 
analysis will focus there. 67 percent of the Sertao’s rural 
population is poor. Years of cattle ranching and has led 
to desertification of the region 20 percent of the total. 
Furthermore, land tenure is incredibly unequal; though 
“smallholder farmers make up more than 84 percent” of 
the region’s agricultural sector. Most of these individuals 
are able to export around 50 percent of their output, 
but are forced to subsist on the remaining half (IFAD). 
Much of these problems are due to poor irrigation in 
the region. Unlike other portions of Brazil, irrigation 
infrastructure would require pipelines to run uphill, 
making it far more expensive to implement (Cline, 1973). 
The Brazilian government has attempted to address 
these problems through expanding irrigation canals/
pipelines, but Damiani (1999) notes that the agencies 
in charge of such projects “…have been paternalistic, 
not even enforcing the payment of subsidized land and 
water fees.” Also, the lack of effective irrigation means 
that most farmers in the area grow subsistence crops 
like corn instead of more “high value crops like fruits 
or vegetables” that would earn them more profit 
due to the produce’s higher price (Damiani, 1999). 
 Besides irrigation, the region also lacks basic 
opportunities for economic advancement. The region 
suffers from an overall lack of investment; after all, 
who would want to invest in Brazil’s poor rural areas 
as opposed to its increasingly cosmopolitan cities? And 
as investment floods urban areas, the rural poor will 
become increasingly attracted to them.
 
C. Curing Over-Urbanization
 The solutions to Brazil’s high urbanization rate 
is to increase opportunities for economic growth in 
the rural areas and agricultural sector. The first is to 
recognize that developing industry in the logging industry, 
especially through deforestation concessions, probably 
will not result in significantly increased opportunities for 
rural Brazilians. Cameroon, which also sold off permits 
to logging companies in the 1990s, provides an example. 
International investors poured money into the central 
African country and were required to invest in local 
infrastructure; however, the infrastructure was often 
shoddy, and the companies provided far fewer jobs 
than expected (Pyne, 2010; Karsenty, 2007). Instead, 
Brazil must look to other engines for rural growth. 
 Brazil can foster rural economic growth, 
and thus decrease incentives for urban migration, by 
improving infrastructure in rural areas, especially the 
semi-arid North East. Irrigation is the most needed 
amenity. While Brazil’s infamous corruption has inhibited 
the effectiveness of government-funded irrigation 
infrastructure, Damiani (1999) proposes a solution. Since 
large private firms often short-change the Northeastern 
rural poor with poor irrigation infrastructure, and public 
work encourages graft, the Brazilian government should 
fund middle-size firms to undertake the projects. These 
firms would be far easier to work with in the sense 
that the government could withdraw subsidies or level 
other punishments if the firm did not meet production 
targets than larger conglomerates (2012). Later, Damiani 
(2003) cites the state of Petrolina-Juazeiro as Northeast 
Brazil’s success story. Plagued by abject poverty in the 
1960s, the Brazilian government’s appropriation-cum-
development of the region’s irrigation infrastructure 
turned the state into an exporting powerhouse by 
1990. Grape exports jumped from 0 hectares in1970 
Desideri, Hill, Liubicich, & Petcu
The Park Place Economist, Volume XXI 19
to 6,000 in 1990; the percentage of wage workers 
jumped from 5.9 percent to 37.8 percent, and “by 1996, 
irrigated agriculture in Petrolina-Juazeiro employed 
nearly 40,000 wager workers 30 percent of the rural 
labor force in the region” (Damiani, 2003). A smart mix 
of private and public investment enabled the state to 
export more valuable crops at a higher yield, raising 
wages by 21.7 percent higher than Brazil’s minimum 
wage and creating jobs. However, it is worth noting 
that as the number of individuals growing valuable 
export crops increases, the supply would increase, thus 
lowering the world price. Brazil would have to be careful 
to avoid oversaturating the market with valuable crops. 
 An expansion of effective infrastructure would 
also aid rural areas in the development of other 
industries. Since 1980, IFAD has loaned Brazil 211.6 
million United States dollars in loans for programs to 
“improve rural people’s access to off-farm employment 
and other income-generating business activities” (IFAD, 
2010). However, as detailed previously, Brazil’s poor 
roads and river transit systems inhibit efficient trade. 
Businesses cannot get their goods in or out of rural 
areas cheap enough to warrant the investment. By 
investing in better infrastructure, more investment 
could be encouraged. However, there is a drawback; 
improved infrastructure would most likely result in 
increased deforestation rates as logging companies take 
advantage of lower transportation costs (Lind, 2010). 
But in terms of reducing rural-urban migration, better 
infrastructure would result in better rural opportunities, 
decreasing the desire to migrate to urban areas. 
 The Brazilian government also needs to 
expand the Bolsa Familia conditional cash transfer 
program, which currently covers one-third of Brazil’s 
children (Soares, et. al., 2012). Bolsa Familia pays eligible 
families under the poverty line roughly 68 United 
States dollars per month if their children miss less 
than 15 percent of their classes; “12.4 mil households 
are now enrolled” (The Economist, 2010 July 29). At 
a mere cost of 0.5 percent of GDP, some experts 
expect the program to “increase enrolment rates by 
about 18 percent” (Glewwe, 2010). Bolsa Familia has 
reduced Brazil’s poverty gap by 12 percent, and was 
21 percent responsible for a GINI index drop by 4.7 
percent between 1995 to 2004 (Soares, et. al, 2010). 
The Economist (2010) notes that Bolsa Familia has 
been specifically more successful at addressing rural 
poverty, with 41 percent of rural households covered. 
Not only does this provide rural families supplementary 
income that might help discourage migration, but it also 
increases the human capital potential of rural areas. 
The Northeast state of Pernambuco understands this 
need well. Increased cash flow from the Bolsa Familia 
program brought a host of new opportunities, such as 
car dealerships and restaurants (The Economist, 2012 
Oct. 27). But as these industries grow, the state finds 
its populace ill-suited for non-agricultural work. This has 
created an “acute skills shortage” as illiteracy and other 
deficiencies constrain productivity (The Economist, 2012 
Oct. 27). Though Brazil’s 10 percent illiteracy rate, last 
measured in 2008, is not particularly high, encouraging 
poorer students to go to school through Bolsa Familia 
also encourages the accumulation of human capital in 
areas that are beginning to require it.
V. CONCLUSION
 Brazil’s economic concerns go beyond 
their ease of doing business rating and hyper-
urbanization. However, both of these issues have 
far-reaching consequences, and it is evident that 
Brazil should address these problems in order to 
stabilize its economy and country status in the world. 
 Brazil has a long way to go, in terms of its Ease 
of Doing Business ranking, until it can compete with 
high-income countries such as the United States. Brazil 
must reduce its reliance on protectionist trade policies 
by cutting out the red tape in the process across all 
industries if it is to gain favor on the international market. 
Technological progress and updated infrastructure are 
also musts, especially in light of the imminent World 
Cup and Olympics that will be hosted in Brazil. If Brazil 
is to improve its business conditions, the nation must 
also seek to foster worker productivity and longevity by 
reforming its labor code. Overcrowding in Brazil’s urban 
centers must also be addressed. Though it is a social 
problem in nature, lack of adequate infrastructure and 
job opportunities in the cities have a negative economic 
impact on Brazil. Increasing funding to programs that 
increase wealth and opportunities in rural areas can 
help alleviate the strain on cities. 
 Brazil has proven to be resilient through decades 
of political and economic turmoil; it has bounced back 
from the most recent recession with impressive speed 
and strength. With a mixture of radical and relatively 
simple reforms to its policies, it is likely that Brazil will 
become a top international contender in the not-too-
distant-future as the “Country of Today”. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
 Transitional economies are special occurrences, 
which often contribute to their significance and need 
for analysis. The purpose of this study is to assess the 
determinants of economic growth in the recently 
independent transitional economies of the former 
Yugoslavia while using Slovenia as the main comparison 
country. Slovenia is deemed throughout the literature as 
the most successful state after transition, which is why 
it is used as the main comparison state. The countries 
included in this study are Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Kosovo 
has been excluded due to the instability created by its 
recent independence and its involvement in the Kosovo 
War. The time range of this study is from 2000 to 2011 
due to the limited availability of data for all the countries 
since they are recently independent and the data is 
from the World Bank Database.
 This study will first establish background 
knowledge of the Yugoslav region in order to set the 
stage and explain where economic growth was apparent 
before independence. Then, literature on the most 
successful state, Slovenia, will be discussed as well as the 
relevant information on the statuses of each country 
prior to the transitional period. This study adds to the 
overall literature about the former Yugoslavian countries 
by examining the components of economic growth to 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita growth. 
After the theory section, the data and methodology 
sections state the two methodologies used: descriptive 
statistics and means hypothesis testing to determine 
what factors are similar to Slovenia’s means. Results 
and discussion will conclude the study where Slovenia 
is ranked highest in terms of future success with Croatia 
and Serbia following in second and third.
II. BACKGROUND
 This study includes only countries that 
once belonged to a socialist economy and that have 
transitional to a capitalist economy for a significant 
reason. The Yugoslavian War in 1991 produced five 
states, Slovenia, Croatia, former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republic of 
Yugoslavia (which included the current territories of 
Serbia and Montenegro). These states, unlike other 
transitional states, had to fight for their rights and 
independence to create a separate state. For example, 
Slovenia broke first in 1991 and reached its independent 
status before the other former countries in 1992. A list 
of each country’s independence year can be found in 
Table 1. Similar transition states from the Soviet Union 
also changed their type of economy from a planned 
economy to a capitalistic one; however, obtaining their 
independence was relatively more peaceful with political 
demonstrations in 1989. The countries of the former 
Yugoslavia became independent as a result of war, which 
differed greatly from the former Soviet Bloc. The former 
Soviet bloc also received assistance from Russia and 
other foreign influences to transition while the former 
countries of Yugoslavia did not. This suggests that the 
countries of the Former Yugoslavia were by themselves 
and did not receive help once they broke off; their state 
resources were damaged or missing, which significantly 
halted economic activity and growth. Additionally, Russia 
was the main state which countries broke free from. 
In the case of former Yugoslavia, there was and is no 
main state with satellite states. No main state resulted 
because Yugoslavia was formed after World War I from 
different empires and because “Yugoslavia was not like 
other communist states, since it pursued its own course 
of economic development” (Rogel, 2004, p.12). Having 
no main state to send financial support, as in the case of 
the Soviet Union, led countries of the former Yugoslavia 
to be alone in reestablishing their new economies and 
government. Therefore, there is a significant difference 
between the types of transitional countries and their 
struggles to regenerate their economies. This is why 
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only the former Yugoslavian countries are examined 
here.
In Figure 1.1, GDP per capita growth is 
exemplified during the transition years of 1990 to 
2000. GDP per capita growth was calculated using GDP 
per capita levels in constant 2005 international dollar 
terms to account for inflation. The year 1990 has no 
growth because no countries reported GDP per capita 
levels for the year 1989, and therefore, growth for the 
year 1990 is unable to be calculated. It can be seen 
that GDP per capita growth is negative during the war 
period. However, several countries increase GDP per 
capita growth after 1994. Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
the highest spike in GDP per capita growth in 1995 
and 1996. Other countries never grow above 0.2 
percent. The initial conditions of each country could 
demonstrate why some countries have been more 
successful in increasing their GDP per capita following 
the years after independence and war.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
 This literature review covers a range of 
information from initial conditions, the most successful 
country, general studies on the former Yugoslavia, and 
the components of growth theory. This study adds to 
the overall literature by examining the components of 
economic growth to GDP per capita growth individually 
for each country.
A. Initial Conditions
This section lays out the initial conditions of all 
the republics of the Former Yugoslavia in order to better 
understand each country prior to independence. It also 
explains where economic growth was most prevalent.
Physical geography is one example of how 
and why the former Yugoslavia was so economically 
different across all regions (Boduszynski, 2010). Access 
to natural resources, the coastline, good soil, and other 
prosperous Western economies of Europe were some 
of the reasons for successful transitions. The fertile 
hills of Croatia and Slovenia led to their successful 
development because they contained skilled labor, 
modern productions like machinery and electrical 
appliances, proper infrastructure for trade, and were 
closer to western European capitals (Boduszynski, 
2010). According to Boduszynski (2010), the least 
developed regions were the mountainous “Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Montenegro, southwest Serbia, the 
Dalmatian hinterlands of Croatia, and northern Kosovo” 
because they were isolated and had infertile land (p.51). 
The most fertile land is located along the Danube River ; 
therefore, the Danube Plain supplies Slovenia, Croatia, 
and Serbia with the most fertile cropland. Macedonia, 
on the other hand, in the Vardar Valley, grew cotton 
and tobacco, which are cash crops. This land is also 
highly irrigated in order to compensate for the hot and 
dry summer climate (Singleton, 1991). Central Serbia 
and Macedonia have fertile soils however, “remained 
undeveloped due to poor economic planning and 
geographical isolation” (Bodusynski, 2010, p. 51). 
Croatia, having a coastline on the Adriatic Sea (which 
has mild winters), allows for it to grow citrus and olive 
trees as well as to have hills of vineyards. In addition, the 
coastline provides significant levels of tourist and trade 
revenue (Singleton, 1991; Boduszynski, 2010). However, 
with the increase in tourism along the coast, agriculture 
has declined due to alternative employment in the 
tourism sector (Singleton, 1991).
 
 The amount of infrastructure and investment 
of each region could clearly be seen by the North 
and South divide of the former Yugoslavia (Singleton, 
1991). Since the South was seen as less profitable, and 
therefore lacking in development, business investments 
left it underdeveloped. Therefore, “newly globalizing 
countries must be able and willing to open up their 
foreign markets in goods, services, and investments” in 
order to attract wealthy foreign investors (Kiggundu, 
2002, p.141). The republics also invested in their own 
production to avoid dependence on other republics 
with which they had tensions (Singleton, 1991). 
However, capitals were interlinked such as Belgrade, 
Zagreb, Ljubljana, and Sarajevo. The first three had a 
rail and highway system that ran along the Sava River. 
The largest industrial area of the Former Yugoslavia 
in the early 1990s was Belgrade, located in present 
day Serbia. It produced transportation equipment, 
agricultural machinery, and consumer products such 
as clothing, television sets, and food products. Second 
was Zagreb , Croatia which produced electrical-
engineering equipment, petrochemicals, machine tools, 
and consumer products such as textiles, paper products, 
and furniture. Thirdly, the area of Ljubljana and Maribor 
in Slovenia was ranked as the next largest industrial area 
which produced goods from aluminum and high-quality 
steel for trucks, electrical appliances, cotton fabrics, and 
shoes. Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina was ranked 
last because of its small industrial sector size and recent 
development in the 1990s, however it is known for its 
heavy industry use of iron and steel (Singleton, 1991).
 Unemployment was a chronic problem in 
Yugoslavia before the 1990s because it reached over 
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17 percent (Boduszynski 2010). Underemployment was 
even higher, at 20 percent (Boduszynski 2010). Wherever 
development was lacking, there were dangerous levels 
of unemployment, such as in Macedonia, Kosovo, and 
Serbia, where rioting and strikes were common. As 
one moved from the north to south unemployment 
worsened. Slovenia and Croatia, therefore, had the 
lowest unemployment rates in 1990 while Serbia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and Montenegro were in the middle. 
Kosovo and Macedonia had the worst unemployment 
rates, as high as 37 percent (Boduszynski 2010). This, 
therefore, had a serious effect on the competition for 
jobs and wages, which enabled a rise in infrastructure 
and demand for separation from the whole of Yugoslavia 
(Boduszynski 2010).
B. The Most Successful: Slovenia
 The initial conditions provided Slovenia with the 
upper hand in transitioning from a socialist economy to 
a capitalist system. Slovenia had a homogeneous, socially 
stable population, a diversified manufacturing sector, 
private agriculture, partly private service sector, well-
established trade links with Western European markets, 
and an advantageous geographic position (Mencinger 
2001).
 
 During the transitional period, Slovenia was 
most successful for several different reasons over 
the other former Yugoslav states. The trade surplus in 
1992 resulted from a decrease in domestic demand 
and increase exports (Mencinger 2001). After 1992, 
GDP increased by 2.8 percent in 1993 and later to 5.3 
percent in 1994. In 1993, Croatia had a negative GDP 
growth rate of 8 percent which increased to a positive 
growth rate of 5.9 percent in 1994. Serbia, in 1993, had 
a severe negative growth rate of 30.5 percent which 
also increased to a 2.5 percent growth rate in 1994. 
Macedonia, on the other hand, remained at a negative 
GDP growth rate for both 1993 and 1994 at 7.5 percent 
and 1.8 percent respectively (World Bank). Montenegro 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993 were not yet 
declared independent states. Slovenia’s secession also 
provided a great push for restructuring of the economy. 
It followed unemployment patterns of other European 
countries such as France and Germany. The prices 
remained stable and its government budget became 
balanced (Mencinger 2001). With the accumulation of 
these reasons, it is apparent that Slovenia has been the 
most successful state in transition and why it is being 
used as the frame of reference for this study.
C. General Studies on the Former Yugoslavia
 The volume of literature is not great, specifically 
in the sector of economic growth of the former 
countries of Yugoslavia. This is due to the fact that their 
independence is rather recent and not enough yearly 
data is available to observe significant findings. The war 
period and recessions after the war limited each country 
from recording figures due to a lack of resources and 
staff. The CIA Factbook only has economic figures for 
the most current year ; therefore, it cannot provide data 
for a series of years. Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia 
broke free first and, as a result, have more literature 
from the early 1990s. Montenegro and Kosovo, on the 
other hand, have little to no literature at all because they 
gained independence in the early 2000s. Therefore, this 
study is relatively new in comparison to the remainder 
of the literature.
Naghshpour and Sergi (2008) and Piatkowski 
(2002) are the most relevant available literature that 
examine the economic growth of the Former Yugoslavia 
with different methods. Piatkowski (2002) creates a 
New Economy indicator that ranks countries on how 
prepared they are to transition; therefore, Piatkowski’s 
study examines countries prior to their dissolution 
while this study examines post war effects. Piatkowski 
(2002) suggests, however, that the countries that are 
ranked lower are in a “technological trap”, which is due 
to insufficient quality of institutional infrastructure and 
lack of investment in newer technologies. Higher ranked 
countries, such as Slovenia, have had the advantage of 
the institutional infrastructure because of their accession 
into the European Union (in May of 2004).
Naghshpour and Sergi (2008) examine 
countries of South East Europe and perform a spline 
trend on the data, such as real GDP levels to test for 
significance of the economic growth slopes of each 
country. This study acknowledges that “Yugoslavia is 
the only country to disintegrate, while the rest of the 
countries in the region kept their national identity” 
(Naghshpour and Sergi, 2008, p. 126). In the conclusion 
of this study, both authors note that it is important 
to determine the factors that affected the economic 
growth in the South Eastern European countries in 
different ways. This is why the following section and this 
study focus on the components of economic growth of 
the former Yugoslavia.
D. Components of Growth Theory
Smith and Todaro (2012) introduce 
components of economic growth in their book Economic 
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Development. Appendix 3.1 in the book is broken down 
into three categories: capital accumulation, population 
and labor force growth, and technological progress. 
They state that these three components of growth “are 
of prime importance” for developing countries (Smith 
and Todaro, 2012). By examining each component 
separately to see its effect on the economy, ceteris 
paribus, it can be determined which component of 
economic growth will increase GDP levels and GDP 
per capita.
Capital accumulation increases both physical 
capital stock and human capital. Physical capital stock, 
known as machinery and technology, are used to 
create output and can help increase production if 
more physical capital stock is accumulated. Smith and 
Todaro (2012) suggest two methods for increasing 
physical capital stock by either using “a portion of 
present income to save and invest for future output 
and income” or increasing the “economic infrastructure 
and nation’s resources” (p.140). Therefore, an increase 
in physical capital stock can occur if there is an increase 
in investment and savings. The proxy for physical capital 
in this study is saving rates, more specifically, gross 
domestic savings, which is a percentage of GDP. This 
proxy is not a best fit because savings are not always 
used for investment since they could be used to fund 
retirement, education, or be spent in the present. When 
savings increase, more money is available to distribute 
for investment. If an increase in physical capital stock 
occurs, the productivity and production of businesses 
will increase. Therefore, if the savings rate increases, the 
availability of investment will increase, which in turn 
will allow for an increase in physical capital stock and 
output. Ciftcioglu and Begovic (2010) also agree that by 
increasing capital accumulation, economic growth will 
increase, especially in the case of Central and Eastern 
European countries. Therefore, by increasing the savings 
rate, economic growth will increase due to an increase 
in physical capital stock.
Population and labor force growth, as explained 
by Smith and Todaro (2012), can be “considered a 
positive factor in stimulating economic growth” (p. 141). 
Depending on the economic system of the developing 
country, the surplus of labor created by an increase 
in population might “exert a positive or a negative 
influence on economic progress” (Smith and Todaro, 
2012, p.141). However, the transitional economies of 
the former Yugoslavia were at war and their populations 
have been severely depleted and therefore need to 
restore their labor force to equal, if not higher, levels. 
Galor (2005) also concludes that population growth 
can be attributed to an increase in and sustain economic 
growth.  In order to restore the labor force and increase 
output, population growth must increase for the former 
Yugoslavian countries. By increasing the productive 
labor force, output will increase, allowing for economic 
growth due to a larger labor force.
 
 To Smith and Todaro (2012) and “to many 
other economists”, “the most important source of 
economic growth” is technological progress. There are 
three types of technological progress that Smith and 
Todaro (2012) discuss: neutral technological progress, 
laborsaving technological progress, and capital-saving 
technological progress. The first “occurs when higher 
output levels are achieved with the same quantity and 
combinations of factor inputs”, which can arise from 
simple divisions of labor. Laborsaving technological 
progress is “the achievement of higher output using 
an unchanged quantity of labor inputs as a result of 
some invention”, which can typically be seen through 
mechanization. Lastly, capital-saving technological 
progress is facilitated through “some invention or 
innovation that achieves higher output levels using the 
same quantity of inputs of capital” (Smith and Todaro, 
2012, p.142-143). Smith and Todaro (2012) state “in 
labor-abundant (capital-scarce) developing countries, 
capital-saving technological progress is what is needed 
most” (p.142-143). One of the reasons for using Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) as an explanatory variable is 
because “FDI is often used as a measure of a country’s 
overall openness, competitiveness, and globalization” 
(Kiggundu, 2002,p.152). It is also used because “it 
increases a country’s capital stock, creates employment, 
generates domestic income and savings, and facilitates 
technology transfer and management know-how”, which 
could therefore be used to increase GDP per capita 
(Kiggundu, 2002, p.152). When developed countries 
and corporations send their FDI, they also send their 
technological experiences and industrial methods to 
less developed countries. FDI inflow therefore helps 
less developed countries develop with the expertise 
of those countries already industrialized. The more FDI 
developing countries receive, the more experience they 
learn from developed countries because agreements in 
FDI often include less developed countries adopting 
capitalistic qualities in the economy and democratic 
systems. Therefore, an increase in the FDI means more 
economic growth for the transitioning economies.
By individually examining all components of 
growth, physical capital, population, and technology, 
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to see the effects on growth, it is hypothesized that 
countries similar to Slovenia’s economic growth patterns 
will have larger economic growth rates and have overall 
higher progress in the components of growth.
IV. DATA
The data collected is from the World Bank 
Databank from years 2000 to 2011 (World Bank 
Databank). Some countries, such as Montenegro, lack 
data entirely and will only be used in comparison when 
data is available. By acknowledging the lack of data, 
future studies must be conducted when data is more 
available.
V. RESEARCH DESIGN
 Two methodologies will be used to assess 
which country has the best average mean in comparison 
to other countries and if the means of the data set 
are significant enough to determine a similarity to 
Slovenia’s means. The dependent variable is GDP per 
Capita growth rates, calculated using 2005 constant 
international dollars. The explanatory variables are 
the domestic savings rate, foreign direct investment, 
population growth, and labor force participation rate.
A. Descriptive Statistics
 Since this dataset lacks large variation and 
figures, descriptive statistics will be used to examine 
how countries rank based on individual growth 
components. Descriptive statistics will examine the 
following problems:
1. Which country has the best (worst) average 
mean of the individual growth component?
2. Taking all rankings into account, which 
countries rank the highest/lowest?
B. Means Hypothesis Testing
 First, averages of each component are 
calculated for 2000 through 2011 using Slovenia as 
the main frame of reference. Every country will be 
examined individually relative to Slovenia.
 Hypothesis testing using t-tests on the means 
will look as follows for each mean growth component:
 • Ho: There is no difference between a country’s  
  mean and the Slovenian mean for that specific  
  growth component
 • Ha: There is a difference between a country’s  
  mean and the Slovenian mean for that specific  
  growth component
Compute the standard deviation with the 
following equation:
Next compute the standard error with the 
following equation:
The Critical Value Approach will be used to 
determine whether or not the null hypothesis should 
be rejected:
The z-value for the two-tailed test will 
determine the significance levels for the individual 
countries and their components of growth for alphas 
equal to 0.01 and 0.05 for all tests, so that z (alpha 0.01) 
= 2.326 and z (alpha 0.05) = 1.645.
VI. RESULTS
 The results section contains two sub-sections, 
descriptive statistics and means hypothesis testing, in 
order to analyze the components of economic growth 
for the former Yugoslavian countries relative to Slovenia.
A. Descriptive Statistics
The appendix contains Table 2 which 
summarizes the rankings of all five countries based on 
the means calculated in Table 3. The rankings provide 
a sense of which countries are doing the best in each 
component of growth category and overall economic 
growth.
Slovenia has the most top rankings, and Serbia 
and Croatia are next with three second rankings each. 
The rest have different ranking numbers for all the 
categories and do not follow any patterns. It is interesting 
to note, however, that Slovenia has two sixth rankings 
in GDP per capita growth and FDI inflows, although it is 
the top ranking country overall.
B. Means Hypothesis Testing
 Table 3 summarizes the results from the means 
hypothesis testing. The means that fail to reject the null 
hypotheses are indicated by a bold “accept” in the right-
hand columns.
 
 The first means that are accepted by hypothesis 
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testing are the GDP per capita growth rates of Croatia 
( 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels), Macedonia (0.01 
significance level), and Montenegro (0.01 significance 
level). This suggests that the countries listed above 
have similar GDP per capita growth means to Slovenia. 
If Croatia, Macedonia, and Montenegro have similar 
means, this also signifies that these countries are on 
track for economic growth because they are following 
the same mean for GDP per capita as Slovenia. The 
other countries, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, did 
not fail to reject the null hypothesis and are, therefore, 
not exhibiting similar economic growth patterns as 
Slovenia.
 
 The means hypothesis test for domestic saving 
rates found that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro 
both fail to reject the null hypothesis. However, by using 
descriptive statistics, this cannot be true. Both countries 
experienced negative rates of domestic savings rates, 
nowhere near the domestic savings rates of Slovenia. 
This could have resulted because the negative domestic 
savings rates were squared in order to find the z value. 
Therefore, no country has means similar to Slovenia’s 
means and are not following the domestic savings rates 
average means to increase overall economic growth.
 
 The only two countries to fail to reject the null 
hypothesis for FDI inflows were Serbia (0.05 significance 
level) and Montenegro (0.05 and 0.01 significance 
levels). This suggests that Serbia and Montenegro are 
receiving equal levels of FDI inflows or more to boost 
economic growth. Other countries, such as Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia, have lower mean 
FDI inflows than Slovenia and therefore are not going 
to exhibit economic growth patterns like Slovenia.
 
 The only country to fail to reject the null 
hypothesis for FDI outflows was Croatia (0.01 
significance level). This suggests that Croatia and 
Slovenia have similar FDI outflow means while the 
other countries are not significantly close enough to 
Slovenia’s means. Therefore, Croatia is the only country 
that follows an average mean of FDI outflow close 
enough to Slovenia.
 
 Several countries fail to reject the null 
hypothesis for the means of population growth. 
Croatia (0.05 significance level), Serbia (0.05 and 0.01 
significance levels), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (0.05 
and 0.01 significance levels) fail to reject the null 
hypothesis. Therefore, their population growth means 
are statistically similar to Slovenia’s population growth 
mean and are on the right track for economic growth 
by following Slovenia. Macedonia and Montenegro, on 
the other hand, are not following Slovenia in terms of 
this component of growth.
 
 No countries fail to reject the null hypothesis 
for the means of labor force participation rates because 
they either do not have the same average means as 
Slovenia or they do not report labor force participation 
rates.
VII. DISCUSSION
 Based on the results above, several conclusions 
can be made about which countries are the most 
successful and what components of growth added to 
their success. Slovenia, the reference country, is ranked 
first and outperforms the other countries in terms of 
domestic savings rates, FDI outflows, and labor force 
participation rates. Serbia and Croatia are next in rank. 
Serbia has good performance in GDP per capita growth, 
FDI inflows, and FDI outflows, but does not record 
its labor force participation rate. Croatia is second in 
real GDP per capita, domestic savings rates, and labor 
force participation; however, other components of 
growth are lacking. Regardless, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, and Montenegro are still countries that lack 
in increasing their components of growth and need to 
adopt policies that will promote these increases. For 
example, there is a need for more capital accumulation, 
since no countries exhibit similar domestic savings 
rates to Slovenia and should adjust interest rates to 
incentivize savings. Some countries, like Montenegro, 
were very successful in attracting FDI; however, they are 
not stable and developed enough to send FDI out such 
as Slovenia and Croatia. Other countries are increasing 
their population growth rates to replace their depleted 
populations, like Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Countries like Montenegro and Serbia 
need to record their labor force participation rates so 
that they know what kind of policies to implement to 
spur labor participation and ultimately productivity.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In order to transition successfully, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro have to 
increase their components of economic growth to reach 
Slovenia’s level. There are several ways these countries 
can do this. In order to increase GDP per capita growth 
rates, they have to produce more output. To increase 
overall output, components of economic growth must 
be increased, with the most significant being FDI inflows. 
To increase FDI inflows, the least successful countries 
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should open their borders to foreign investors who 
bring money and technology into the country to spur 
economic activity. Either way, the governments of the 
former Yugoslavia must provide policies that encourage 
and promote economic growth to increase so that they 
can be as successful as Slovenia in economic growth 
and transitioning.
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XI. APPENDIX
Table 1: Breakup of the Former Yugoslavia
Country Year of Independence
Slovenia June 1991
Croatia June 1991
Macedonia September 1991
Bosnia & Herzegovina January 1991
Montenegro June 2006
Serbia June 2006
*Montenegro & Serbia reported individual 
figures from 1997 onward to the World Bank
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Table 2: Country Rank
Country
Real GDP 
per Capita
GDP per 
Capita %
Domestic 
Savings Rate
FDI
Inflows
FDI
Outflows
Pop. Growth
Rates
Labor 
Force 
Part. Rate
Slovenia 1 6 1 6 1 3 1
Croatia 2 5 2 4 3 5 2
Macedonia 5 4 3 3 5 2 3
Bosnia &
Herzegovina
4 1 6 5 4 1 4
Montenegro 3 3 5 1 --- 4 ---
Serbia 6 2 4 2 2 6 ---
* Ranking based on means from 2000 to 2011 and are in Table 3
Table 3: Hypothesis Tests on Components of Growth
Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error Z-Value Alpha 0.05 Alpha 0.01
Real GDP per Capita (constant 2005 International $)
Slovenia 23505.32
Croatia 6489.77 962.08 290.08 -21.37 Reject Reject
Bosnia & Herz. 8442.45 1219.9 367.82 -21.95 Reject Reject
Macedonia 8165.00 912.23 275.04 -28.69 Reject Reject
Montenegro 8770.44 1348.82 406.68 -20.57 Reject Reject
GDP per Capita Growth Rates
Slovenia 0.0171
Croatia 0.0237 0.0395 0.0119 -0.9883 Accept Accept
Serbia 0.0367 0.0272 0.0082 -3.4722 Reject Reject
Bosnia & Herz. 0.0401 0.0307 0.0092 -3.3188 Reject Reject
Macedonia 0.0246 0.0305 0.0092 -1.676 Reject Accept
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Table 3: Hypothesis Tests on Components of Growth
Montenegro 0.0361 0.0409 0.0123 -1.9266 Reject Accept
Gross Domestic Savings Rates (% of GDP)
Slovenia 25.71
Croatia 20.57 2.61 0.79 -25.11 Reject Reject
Serbia 0.83 6.05 1.82 0.55 Reject Reject
Bosnia & Herz. -15.44 12.49 3.77 5.10 Accept Accept
Macedonia 4.12 2.16 0.65 -5.32 Reject Reject
Montenegro -4.08 6.29 1.90 3.15 Accept Accept
FDI Inflows
Slovenia 2.12
Croatia 5.08 2.45 0.73 -5.89 Reject Reject
Serbia 6.02 4.23 2.30 - Accept Reject
Bosnia & Herz. 4.68 3.39 1.02 -3.58 Reject Reject
Macedonia 5.10 3.32 1.00 4.10 Reject Reject
Montenegro 25.52 36.77 18.39 0.39 Accept Accept
FDI Outflows
Slovenia 1.33
Croatia 0.78 0.79 0.24 -2.26 Reject Accept
Serbia 1.27 1.27 0.38 -2.47 Reject Reject
Bosnia & Herz. 0.09 0.11 0.03 -23.99 Reject Reject
Macedonia 0.01 0.06 0.02 -4.07 Reject Reject
Montenegro 0 0 - - - -
Population Growth Rates
Slovenia 0.28
Croatia -0.27 0.25 0.25 2.10 Accept Reject
Serbia -0.31 0.04 0.04 9.77 Accept Accept
Bosnia & Herz. 0.34 0.25 0.25 -0.34 Accept Accept
Macedonia 0.26 0.02 0.02 -11.85 Reject Reject
Montenegro -0.05 0.07 0.07 1.64 Reject Reject
Labor Force Participation Rates
Slovenia 69.75
Croatia 64.65 20.45 6.47 -9.78 Reject Reject
Serbia - - - - - -
Bosnia & Herz. 52.16 16.54 5.23 11.36 Reject Reject
Macedonia 61.76 19.61 6.20 1 Reject Reject
Montenegro - - - - - -
Reject Ho if
                a = 0.5                                        a = 0.01
a > - 1.645 or 1.645 < a               a  > -2.326 or 2.326 < a
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I. INTRODUCTION
Among the developing countries in the world, 
India marks itself as being one of the fastest growing 
economies. India, the seventh-largest country in the 
world, borders the Indian Ocean to the south, the 
Arabian Sea to the south-west, the Bay of Bengal to 
the south-east, and shares borders with Pakistan, China, 
Bhutan, Burma, and Bangladesh. India is recognized by a 
long history of commercial and cultural wealth. India’s 
political and economic history has led it to become 
one of the fastest developing countries in the world. 
Despite being a newly industrializing nation, India 
continues to face challenges of over population, poor 
water and sanitation, and low adult literacy rates. These 
problems are addressed in this report along with the 
policy recommendations for India to overcome these 
challenges. 
II. POLITICAL & ECONOMIC HISTORY
India has 7,000 kilometers of costal access to the 
Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. The largest mountain 
range in the world, the Himalayas, separates India from 
Nepal and China. From the mountains, comes the most 
important fresh water source in the world. Both the 
Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers supply India’s 1.2 billion 
people with fresh water (CIA Factbook). The Deccan 
Plateau is in the south and is an up-land plain. The 
Thar Desert sits in the west where it crosses over into 
Pakistan. India’s climate varies throughout the region as 
it spans many different geographical areas. Climate can 
vary from tropical monsoons, hot temperatures in the 
desert, or to a mild temperate forest (CIA Factbook). 
All varying geographical features have had a significant 
effect on the country’s access to natural resources, such 
as water, for its population.
India received its independence from the 
United Kingdom on August 15, 1947. In order to 
succeed in its independence, the people of India had 
to fight for their freedom from British colonial rule. The 
Battle of Plassey in 1757 determined India’s colonial fate 
for many years. Finally, during and after World War II, 
demonstrations and violence took hold all over India 
between Hindus and Muslims. A resolution was met in 
June of 1947 when the Muslims moved into northern 
India and Pakistan while the Hindus and the Sikhs stayed. 
India’s constitution was passed on November 
26, 1949 and came into force on January 26, 1950. 
India’s independence allowed the government to 
become a federal republic, even though its full name is 
the Republic of India. The constitution states that Hindi 
is the official language of the Union. However, English 
can be used for official purposes as well (Statesman’s 
Yearbook).
Since independence, India has had several 
regional tensions with its neighboring countries such as 
China and Pakistan. In 1948 and 1965, India engaged in 
several wars with Pakistan over a territory known as 
Kashmir. India also lost a short border war to China in 
1965. Again in 1971, a third war began between Pakistan 
and India in which Eastern Pakistan was created into 
the country now known as Bangladesh. More territorial 
disputes arose in 1990 over Kashmir when Muslim 
separatist groups began using violence. In 1999, violence 
returned to the region where India and Pakistan went 
to war again. Tensions in Kashmir continued to rise into 
the 2000s until a ceasefire was called in 2003 (BBC). 
India has, therefore, undergone several war-like events 
in recent history, which has had a toll on its people and 
economy.
India is made up of 28 states and seven territories. 
Each state has its own Governor that is appointed by 
the President. The President is the head of the Union 
and is elected by an electoral college of the members of 
Parliament. The President appoints the Prime Minister. 
The Council of Ministers aids the President, and the 
ministers are appointed by the President with the advice 
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trade and direct investment inflows. After four years, 
India joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
on January 1, 1995. India’s primary exports include 
petroleum products, precious stones, machinery, iron, 
steel, chemicals, vehicles, and apparel (India, 2009). A 
decrease in the percentage of manufactured goods of 
the total exports was caused by more service exports, 
especially in the areas of software outsourcing. While 
India is an expert exporter of jewelry, gems, textiles, 
and chemicals, it lacks oil resources to meet its growing 
energy needs. The growth rate of India’s exports in 
1990 was 11 percent and increased to 18 percent in 
2000 (World Bank). Meanwhile, imports were growing 
at 3.4 percent in 1990 and 4.6 percent in 2000 (World 
Bank). Terms of trade in India were 127.20 in 2010, and 
it was much higher than Pakistan, China or even the 
United States (World Bank). India has managed to keep 
its export prices high, which implies that to maintain the 
same level of imports, India can trade fewer exports. 
Thus, India could save its scarce productive resources 
and import machinery, vehicles, raw materials to build 
up its capital. From a baseline of more than 236 million 
dollars of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 1990, India 
received more than 102 times that (over 24 billion 
dollars) from foreign investors in 2010 (World Bank). 
In 2010, India ranked approximately 16th in terms of 
inflows of FDI. India became the largest FDI recipient 
in South Asia and accounted for four fifths of total FDI 
inflows to the region. Also, a recent survey by United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) projected that India would become 
the second most important FDI destination after 
China. Highest FDI inflows were recorded in services, 
telecommunication, construction activities, computer 
hardware and software, and hospitality sectors. India has 
therefore exemplified significant economic measures to 
enlarge its economy and prosperity.
III. POPULATION
 One of the most pressing problems India 
is currently facing is its total population size and 
growth. India’s population in 2010 was 1.2 billion (CIA 
Factbook). It is predicted to exceed 1.63 billion by 2050, 
which would overtake China’s estimated population of 
1.44 billion (BBC News, 2004). This means that India’s 
population could become the largest in the world 
in the years to come. Population size, therefore, is a 
significant issue for India to address in order to ensure 
its prosperity and security on a national level.
 
 To address India’s population crisis, population 
growth rates should decline. Figure 2 demonstrates 
of the Prime Minister. Parliament is separated into three 
sections: the President, the Council of States, and the 
House of the People. The Council of States is known as 
the Upper House, which contains 245 members that 
are elected by the members of the Legislative Assembly 
of that State. The House of the People is known as the 
Lower House, which consists of 545 members that are 
elected based on their adult suffrage from territorial 
constituencies in both the states and territories. State 
legislatures can be divided into three sections: the 
Governor, the Legislative Assemblies and the Legislative 
Councils. Parliament has the power to abolish any existing 
Legislative Council members (Stateman’s Yearbook). 
The Indian government has developed, as a result, into 
a stable democracy that can enforce its policies, such as 
contraceptive and educational programs.
The current President is Pranab Mukherjee 
and the Vice-President is Hamid Ansari. Some of the 
political parties are Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Indian 
People’s Party/ Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD), Indian National 
Congress (INC), Indian National Congress-Indira Gandhi 
faction (INCi), People’s Party/Janata Dal (JD), and United 
Progressive Alliance (UPA). India has dozens of national 
and regional political parties. However, parties with four 
or more chairs are considered representatives in the 
People’s Assembly (Statemen’s Yearbook). Therefore, it 
can be said that India is the largest democracy in the 
world because of the vast number of political parties. 
In 2007, India even had a women become president, 
Phratibha Patil, for the first time in history (BBC).
 
 For economic growth, Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita in 1990 for India, Pakistan, and China 
was between 316 dollars and 449 dollars, with India at 
the lower end. Twenty years later the growth of China’s 
GDP has far surpassed that of India and Pakistan. In 
2011, China’s GDP per capita was approximately three 
times that of India’s. While India had a higher GDP per 
capita than Pakistan (837 dollars to 672 dollars) in 
2011, India’s government still has a lot of work to do 
in order to reach the same GDP per capita as China 
or the United States. The United States is not pictured 
in the appendix because it has a relatively higher GDP 
per capita throughout the time period which distorts 
the scale of the Figure 1. For comparison purposes, the 
United States GDP per capita in 1990 was 28,298 and 
37,691 in 2011.
India began to liberalize its economy in 
1991, and since then it has slowly moved towards a 
free-market system by emphasizing both foreign 
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that India is indeed experiencing a decrease in its 
population growth rate from 1990 to 2000, where 
the rate dropped below 2 percent. India, in relation 
to Pakistan’s population growth rate, has a lower rate. 
The United States and China, on the other hand, 
both have decreasing population growth rates, which 
are lower than India’s. Therefore, India is stuck in the 
middle between these three countries according to its 
population growth rate.
 From 2000 to 2010, the Indian population 
growth rate continued to drop under 1.5 percent, 
which is shown in Figure 3. Once again in Figure 3, the 
United States and China have lower population growth 
rates than India while Pakistan has higher population 
growth rates than India. All countries, however, have 
decreasing population growth rates from 1990 to 
2010. This decrease in population growth rates can 
be attributed to several policies that India and others 
have implemented in decades before. However, the 
population growth rates are still not as low as that 
of the United States and China, which pose a serious 
threat to scarce resources. 
 
 In 1952, India was the first nation to implement a 
national family planning program focused on supporting 
small family sizes and human development (WHO). 
India continued to implement policies in support 
of family planning. For example, in 1992, 1994, 1997, 
and 2000, several pieces of legislation and programs 
were passed. In 1992, new constitutional amendments 
were implemented to decentralize the family planning 
program to a new institution for control. The Indian 
Parliament, in 1994, even passed a law to “regulate 
and prevent the misuse of modern prenatal diagnostic 
techniques, largely for sex-selective abortion” (WHO). 
The 1997 policy created the Reproductive and Child 
Health (RCH) program where health services should 
be delivered with full satisfaction of the client. Finally in 
2000, the National Population Policy set up one goal 
to lower the average total fertility rate of 2.1 by the 
year 2010, which dissolved centrally fixed targets and 
created a target-free approach. India has not reached 
this national goal because its estimated total fertility 
rate is 2.58 (WHO).
Besides implementing legislation, India has 
adopted several methods to reduce total fertility 
through contraceptives, which are becoming more and 
more popular (WHO). In 2000, 48.3 percent of married 
women used contraception, which demonstrates that 
unwanted child bearing still occurs. Three out of four 
people in India rely on sterilization as a contraceptive 
because it is the preferred method by 85 percent of 
married women. Only 7 percent of married women 
use pills, IUDs, or condoms as modern contraceptive 
methods (WHO). Two more methods have been used: 
a shot that lasts up to ten years and an after pill that 
was expected to decrease the unwanted child bearing 
and unsafe abortions (WHO). However, contraceptives 
have not been entirely successful because of India’s poor 
literacy rates, little access to family planning information, 
poverty, and discrimination against the female sex. 
Access to family planning in rural areas is nearly non-
existent, in addition to the staffing shortages and proper 
health services. These reasons exemplify why India is still 
having problems with lowering their population growth 
rates to those of developed countries such as the 
United States.
A. Solution for High Population Growth
In order for India to solve its population 
problem, it should continue the same policies because 
they are having some positive effect on decreasing the 
overall population growth rate. In addition, these policies 
are boosting funds and access for contraceptives to 
areas with lagging fertility rates. By spreading a policy to 
provide equal access to contraceptives, India can help 
women lower unwanted births and unsafe abortions. 
Birth control and safe abortions can prevent women 
from having children beyond their family’s financial 
supportive capabilities. An increase in contraceptive use 
will therefore result in a decrease in population growth 
rates, which India is striving for.
The advantages of India continuously reducing 
its population growth rates are as follows: more capital 
per capita, an increase in output, less competition 
for jobs, unemployment decreases, and a drop in 
unnecessary births. Just by dropping the unnecessary 
births, India will stop a larger labor force from being 
born. If fewer workers are born, then fewer workers are 
competing for jobs and fewer workers are unemployed. 
Therefore, by reducing the number of unwanted 
births, unemployment in the future can be decreased. 
According to the Solow Growth Model, if India were to 
have an increase in population growth, it would result 
in a decrease in output and a decrease in capital per 
capita, which is shown by Figure 3. However, since India is 
implementing policies that have reduced the population 
growth rate from 1990 to 2010, the opposite will occur. 
Instead of moving from point A to point B, India is 
moving from point B to point A. The arrows in Figure 
3 showing output decreasing and capital per capita 
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decreasing both will increase if population growth rates 
are reduced. This means by lowering its population 
growth rates, India has the potential to make workers 
more productive because more capital per capita will 
be available as well as an overall increase in output of 
India’s economy. However, India has to decide whether 
or not these advantages outweigh the disadvantages.
Several disadvantages lay ahead if population 
growth rates continue to decline. Since fewer workers 
are being born, this signifies that the number of 
replacement births will decline. This has the potential 
to cause severe problems if population growth rates 
become negative and begin to harm the productivity of 
the workers and the output of the economy. In addition 
to negative replacement birth rates and population 
growth rates, the smaller new generations of workers 
will have to support the bigger older generations who 
move into retirement. This could put strains on the 
small new working generation because they would 
have to be more productive because there would be 
fewer workers to produce the same amount of output. 
This, however, can be overcome through technological 
changes and accumulating capital stock. Regardless, 
India will have consequences on output by reducing 
its population growth rate, but the severity can be 
dampened through technological research and foreign 
aid.
 
IV. WATER AND SANITATION
Water impacts every facet of human life. 
Improving access to safe drinking water can result 
in tangible health benefits. According to the United 
Nations, safe drinking water is defined as water whose 
consumption does not cause health problems over 
a person’s lifetime. Disruptions in water supplies and 
sanitation services increase the likelihood of children 
under five acquiring diseases such as diarrhea, cholera, 
typhoid, and respiratory and skin infections.
 
 Poorly developed storage capacity, a growing 
population, and a large agricultural industry, combined 
with a lack of rainfall, creates a devastating shortage of 
safe drinking water in India. Demand for water currently 
outweighs the supply and is likely to cause heightened 
food shortages in the futures. Aside from pollution and 
fecal contamination, the issue of water scarcity could 
in large part have been prevented by using better 
management with respect to legislation, conservation, 
efficiency, and investment in infrastructure. Issues of 
water management were placed on the back burner 
to issues of economic growth and food scarcity after 
India gained independence. In the absence of legislation, 
the people are able to draw any water that lies under 
their plot of land. Free access to water results in over 
pumping and provides no incentive for the user to 
conserve. With the government’s focus on growth, the 
more water a farmer pumps, the more he can grow, 
and the more income he can generate. Agriculture is, 
therefore,important since India has a constant increasing 
demand for food to meet its growing population.
The World Bank defines an improved water 
source as: 
“the percentage of the population with reasonable 
access to adequate amount of water from an improved 
source, such as a household connection, public standpipe, 
borehole, protected well or spring, and rainwater collection. 
Unimproved sources include vendors, tanker trucks, and 
unprotected wells and springs. Reasonable access is 
defined as the availability of at least 20 liters a person a 
day from a source within one kilometer of the dwelling.”
Unfortunately for India, there are regions in the country 
which lack an improved water source. India and China 
both had lower water accessibility levels than the 
United States and Pakistan in the 90s, but as of 2010, 
all four countries had accessibility levels in the 91 to 99 
percent range. 
 
 Poor sanitation, especially in rural areas, is the 
number one cause of death of children under the age 
of five (UNICEF). Children are highly prone to diarrheal 
diseases and respiratory infection which can greatly be 
reduced by washing hands with soap. Washing hands 
with soap before eating and after using the bathroom 
is the most effective way to prevent diarrheal disease. 
In 2008, only 31 percent of India’s population used 
improved sanitation (UNICEF).
 
 Much of the sanitation issues in the country 
deal with problems of open-defecation. According to 
UNICEF, 638 million people in India defecate in public 
and 44 percent of mothers dispose of children’s feces 
in the open. Over 50 percent of the population still 
defecates in the open. The widespread prevalence of 
this activity has direct impact on water contamination, 
which when used for drinking, causes diarrhea and other 
adverse effects on health. The root of this problem lies 
in the lack of private toilets. Without toilets, the only 
option to defecate is in the open. Women and young 
girls often wait until the night fall to defecate in order 
to maintain safety and preserve their dignity, by avoiding 
being seen by others during the daylight hours.  
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 Contracting disease makes it more difficult for 
children to attend school to obtain an education that 
would make them contributing members of society. 
Thus it is essential to invest in the maintenance of 
water supplies and sanitation facilities. Initiatives such 
as the Total Sanitation Campaign, along with the work 
of UNICEF have made improvements in water and 
sanitation for schools. This decreases the likelihood of 
contracting disease and infections, and increases regular 
attendance, subsequently making it more likely for them 
to achieve their educational goals. 
 The World Bank defines improved sanitation 
facilities as:
“the percentage of the population with at least adequate 
access to excreta disposal facilities that can effectively 
prevent human, animal, and insect contact with excreta. 
Improved facilities range from simple but protected pit 
latrines to flush toilets with a sewerage connection. To 
be effective, facilities must be correctly constructed and 
properly maintained.”
As seen in the graph in the appendix, India has not 
made significant progress towards improved sanitation 
conditions as China and Pakistan have over the last 
twenty years. 
Significant lags exist between the 
pronouncement of a policy and its subsequent 
implementation. These lags are heightened when data 
availability is limited. The responsibility for water and 
sanitation at the central and state levels is shared by 
various ministries. Central ministries, however, only 
have advisory capacity and provide limited funding for 
improvement initiatives. Thus the main responsibility for 
improvement falls upon state governments. 
In 1986 India implemented its first sanitation 
program, the Central Rural Sanitation Program. This 
program was restructured in 1999 and renamed the 
Total Sanitation Campaign (henceforth TSC). The 
restructured campaign moved from a high subsidy to low 
subsidy program, with the hopes of encouraging direct 
community participation in the program. The program 
emphasized information, education, and communication 
to generate demand for sanitation facilities. The program 
was launched in a few cities, with the goal sanitation in 
all households and schools. Local village leaders had the 
primary responsibility of spearheading the campaign in 
their respective communities. Often times these leaders, 
also known as Gram Panchayats, contributed their 
own income towards the projects. Non-governmental 
organizations are used to spread awareness about the 
significant health benefits of improved sanitation in rural 
communities as well as to ensure that people actually 
use the latrines built. Unlike the earlier program, the 
cost of building sanitation facilities lies completely with 
the communities. 
School Sanitation and Hygiene Education is a 
subsection of the TSC. The program promotes children’s 
rights to have a clean and healthy environment. It also 
provides the following facilities at school: toilets and 
urinals (separate for structures in co-ed schools), hand 
washing facilities, water supply facilities, garbage and 
soaking pit, and drainage systems. 
From the TSC imitative stemmed an incentive 
scheme in 2003 called Nirmal Gram Puraskar 
(henceforth NGP). Gram Panchayats, Blocks and 
Districts qualify for a monetary rewards and national 
recognition if they reach 100 percent sanitation 
coverage in households and schools, and that are open-
defecation free. The monetary rewards should be used 
for the maintenance of sanitation facilities. 
More recently, the government of India has 
implemented a similar program for urban cities called 
the National Urban Sanitation Policy. The goal is to 
create “totally sanitized cities.” These cities would ideally 
be open-defecation free, would safely collect and treat 
all wastewater, and collect and dispose of waste safely. 
The plan was launched with the hopes of generating 
awareness amongst households and institutions about 
sanitation and its linkages with public and environmental 
health, in the same manner as TSC. 
A. Solutions to Poor Water and Sanitation
With the low sanitation coverage shown in 
the “Improved Sanitation Facilities” graph located in 
the appendix, and the current policies in place, it is 
important to continue monitoring these programs. 
While sanitation is increasing, it is not increasing nearly 
as rapidly as it is in Pakistan or China, which were both 
at the same level of coverage in 1990. In addition to 
ongoing monitoring, implementing hygiene and health 
into grade school curriculum should be the top 
priority of schools. Early exposure to the links between 
sanitation and health, may lead to changing open-
defecation behavior. While latrines are being built, many 
people in India do not see a reason to change their 
behavior. A school curriculum on the matter may help 
change that idea. The future benefits of these initiatives 
greatly exceed the current costs needed to put them 
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in place. While costs of implementing new education 
programs may require training teachers and spending 
resources on developing a new curriculum, it would 
have long term positive effects of changing behavior. If 
people live healthier lives as a result of improving their 
hygiene practices, then their life expectancies increase. 
If their life expectancies increase they are healthier for 
longer periods of time and can obtain higher education. 
Higher education in conjunction to high life expectancy 
would increase the Human Development Index for 
India. Aside from the heavy initial outlay of funds, the 
only other side effect to this initiative would be that the 
results causing a change in behavior would take time to 
observe and measure.
V. LITERACY RATES
According the Word Bank Data, the adult 
literacy rate in India in 2006 was 62.75 percent. With 
this number, India belonged to the bottom group of 
lower middle income countries, along with its neighbor 
Pakistan which had a rate of 54.15 percent. At that 
time, China already had a 93 percent adult literacy rate. 
Compared with India, its number of just slightly over 60 
percent would clearly suggest a critical issue for India to 
cope with. 
Illiteracy in India also stems from high dropout 
rates, which was 52.79 percent in 2005 (Kondapalli). 
In 2008, the percentage of students entering primary 
school was 116 percent, according to the World Bank, 
while the percentage of students entering secondary 
schools was 60 percent (World Bank). However, the 
primary school enrollment figure is not reliable because 
it is recorded as over 100 percent. The dropout rate is 
more consistent. Children drop out of school regularly 
because of various reasons, including their families’ 
financial situations or quality of education.
Another problem is that India has a shortage 
of teachers. The average student-teacher ratio in India 
was 40:1 in 2004 (World Bank). This ratio was relatively 
high compared to Pakistan (37:1), China (21:1) and 
United States (14:1) (World Bank). Even though literacy 
rate and dropout rate have been improving through 
the years, the teacher to student ratio seems to be 
stagnant. More seriously, India also had to grapple with 
the challenge of teacher truancy because 25 percent 
of teachers in government schools failed to turn up for 
class every day which gives India one of the most dismal 
rates of teacher absenteeism in the world (Coulter, 
2004). A large number of teachers simply cut off their 
teaching time for private family earnings. Among the 
devoted teachers, most of them are often pulled out 
of classroom by the government for non-educational 
duties: taking census data, updating voter rolls, running 
vaccination programs, fetching rice for school lunch, or 
even counting cattle and sheep (L.A. Times, 2008). These 
flaws in the educational system have gravely worsened 
the attempt to improve the literacy of India. 
The issue of literacy does not only explain the 
underdeveloped society in India but it also captures one 
of the reasons that have held back India’s economic 
growth. Even though literacy demonstrates social value 
to the society, it is considered to be a key indicator 
of economic development in that country as well. 
Literacy leads to the enhancement of human capital, 
which is a part of the economic resources that make 
the prosperity of a country. School enrollment, which 
directly affects literacy rate, is proven to have positive 
correlation with GDP per capita. This is shown by 
Friedrich Huebler’s graph in the appendix (2005).
With a developing country like India, it is 
important to move from a traditional subsistence 
economy to an industrialized economy. However, like 
any developing country undergoing the industrialization 
process, India faces the underdevelopment trap in which 
the country remains stuck in subsistence agriculture. It 
happens when firms are not willing to enter the market 
or plant themselves in one area if workers do not 
possess the skills that firms need. Likewise, workers do 
not acquire skills if there are no firms to employ them. 
As no one makes the first move, the solution to get 
out of this trap could be government intervention in 
education. If the government trains the people, firms 
will have more incentive to invest in the area, and will 
catalyze industrialization. Thus, when a country is trying 
to find its way into development, it is essential that 
literacy should be emphasized in order to maximize the 
human capital of the country. 
In addition, literacy has proved to give better 
access to formal sector employment for poor households. 
With more education, people from rural areas have 
the incentive to migrate to urban areas for better jobs, 
higher wages and better prospects of life. Because of 
this, more people are coming into the manufacturing 
industry and leaving traditional agriculture. According to 
the Harris Todaro Model, this increasing labor entering 
manufacture helps both agriculture and manufacture 
laborers. The labor in agriculture decreases which leads 
to an increase in their wages (see Harris Todaro Model 
in appendix). With better education, migrating people 
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have better chance of getting into the formal sector as 
mentioned above. And informal sector in fact provides 
training for transitional phase to enter formal sector, 
which prepares them for future application. 
A. Solutions to Low Literacy Rates
In order to deal with this issue, India has 
implemented many acts and laws that help decrease 
illiteracy and promote school enrollment. The 
government started Right to Education Act in 2009 
to ensure that all children between the ages of 6 to 
14 have the right to free and compulsory elementary 
education. Besides encouraging children to go to school, 
the government makes sure to provide good health 
treatment to children, which eventually helps improve 
school participation. In 2000, UNICEF launched a 
project to address the absence of safe drinking water 
and toilets in many schools in India after acknowledging 
that students fall ill frequently because of poor sanitation. 
Also, the Indian government keeps reinforcing the ban 
on the employment of children, pushing more and more 
children to school while at the same time reducing 
the dropout rate. This law was amended to spread 
the range of prohibition from hazardous industries to 
domestic servants or roadside restaurants (Kazmin, 
2012). With so many policies boosting the number 
of children in schools, the government also tries to 
overcome the shortage of teachers by introducing the 
para-teacher scheme. These para-teachers are generally 
members of the same community in which they teach, 
and share many experiences and cultural practices with 
their students. The program has managed to gather 
more than 500 thousand para-teachers in a number of 
states, and this number is sure to rise more in the future 
(UNICEF India, 2006). 
After clearly recognizing India’s most critical 
problems with literacy, there are several possible 
solutions. Firstly, India should implement more effective 
legislation on the teacher retention issue in order to 
meet the demand for primary and secondary education 
in rural areas. In addition, the Indian government 
should increase the prestige attached to the teaching 
profession, making it more attractive to students 
entering that field. Raising salaries for teachers might 
be one solution. However, it is not enough to talk only 
about the quantity. What is most important is that the 
government improves the quality of teaching at Indian 
schools. According to a report, teachers’ declining 
morality and responsibility most commonly stem from 
the underequipped infrastructure of schools, the lack 
of a staffed system, and poor condition of teaching 
materials (Coulter, 2004). Thus, there should be greater 
incentives for teachers to perform their job well by 
improving the physical quality of schools and providing 
adequate school management. With a disciplined and 
organized system of schooling, teachers have more 
time to concentrate on their teaching instead of 
helping the government with unrelated tasks. Moreover, 
performance pay should be encouraged to motivate 
them to enhance their teaching quality. While these are 
ideal solutions, a poor country like India cannot easily 
get the funds to invest in improving school facilities 
while simultaneously raising teacher salaries. To do this 
would require additional foreign aid. 
In order to obtain more foreign aid to address its 
illiteracy issues, India should encourage the involvement 
of non-governmental organizations and international 
agencies like the United Nations. The difficulty that India 
faces with this solution is that external aid is small and 
governments have set a higher distributional priority for 
those funds. Thus, it is best to receive earmarked foreign 
aid. Also, in the long run, the country should not depend 
too much on outside help. Yet, the advantages that can 
be seen are evidently an increase in the rate of literacy, 
which, in the long term will help develop India both 
socially and economically.
VI. CONCLUSION
The critical challenges India faces today can only 
be overcome through communication and cooperative 
initiatives between the people of India and the current 
political administration. Once both parties recognize 
that these critical problems of population, water and 
sanitation, and literacy rates need to be addressed, 
only then can India truly begin to successfully develop. 
If these issues go unaddressed, India might encounter 
severe consequences that can result in potential and 
permanent damage to India’s chance of becoming a 
developed nation. 
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utility to increase. The assumption is that as a consumer 
obtains more goods, they will have more utility or 
happiness. An individual maximizes her utility when the 
highest possible utility curve correlates with her budget 
(Parkin, 2009). This microeconomic theory is limiting, 
because it only uses income and consumption as a 
means to assess happiness and generally assumes that 
the utility surface is given. However, the model serves 
as a starting point for the analysis of the study. A more 
well-rounded analysis of happiness is needed.
The neoclassical model of indifference curves 
neglects the opportunity cost of consuming and 
working. In order to have a budget line for the model, 
one must be working for wages. However, time is finite 
and scarce; therefore, any time allocated for work is an 
opportunity cost for other activities (Buchanan, 2008). 
Opportunity costs are subjective and dependent on 
how much an individual values a particular option. The 
allocation of time between work, consumption, and 
leisure is essential to this project because it may affect 
an individual’s happiness. Perhaps, working less generates 
more happiness which renders the neoclassical model 
of consumer choice with indifference curves incomplete. 
Happiness is subjective; hence, consumption and income 
cannot be its only determinants. 
Max Weber is a fundamental social and 
economic thinker that provides insight for my paper. 
In his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
(1930), Max Weber describes how religious asceticism 
eventually defers to the consumption of private goods. 
Asceticism refers to the renouncement of private 
goods and leisure because they do not serve God. 
However, Weber asserts that private goods became 
overwhelmingly appealing to individuals. This theory 
implies that obtaining or consuming goods influence 
happiness. Weber’s theory is consistent with the 
indifference curve theory mentioned above. Therefore, 
I. INTRODUCTION
The perception of economics as a dismal 
science for killjoys is challenged with the development 
of happiness economics. The economics of happiness 
refers to the study of subjective well being compared 
to income, unemployment, and other economic factors. 
In addition, the field expands the notions of happiness 
and welfare past basic measures of utility simultaneously 
posing serious policy implications. For example, if an 
economic policy is not contributing to the happiness of 
its constituents then what is its purpose? Furthermore, 
are policy makers catering to the needs of individuals 
or larger entities like corporations? The development 
of the economics of happiness is important when 
addressing the true well-being of people relative to the 
economy.
 This study will assess the relationship between 
happiness and economic factors. The project will have a 
microeconomic framework and focus on individual well 
being. Specifically, it questions if one’s standard of living 
has a meaningful impact on their happiness level given 
the scarcity of time. The study will also explore the 
possible non-pecuniary factors that are important in 
relation to happiness. It is expected that non-pecuniary 
factors will have significant effect on happiness levels 
along with economic factors.
II. THEORY & LITERATURE REVIEW
Since the project will focus on individual 
happiness, microeconomic theory is essential. Foremost, 
theories on consumer preferences and utility are helpful 
in the analysis. Indifference or utility curves are the basic 
measurement of happiness or well being in neoclassical 
economic theory. According to this theory, a consumer 
on a given indifference curve is indifferent to baskets 
of goods on that curve, because they create the same 
amount of utility. Further, the ability to consume baskets 
with larger quantities of goods causes a consumer’s 
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 Easterlin discovered the Easterlin Paradox in 
the 1970s. Since then, he has continued his research 
on happiness economics. Working with Sawangfa, 
Easterlin conducted research to analyze the cross-
sectional relation of happiness to socio-economic 
status (Easterlin & Sawangfa in Dutt, 2009). Easterlin 
and Sawangfa analyzed the net effect of satisfaction in 
different domains of life on overall happiness. Domains 
of life included family, job, education, and health. By 
studying the respondents’ subjective satisfaction in 
these domains, Easterlin is not reliant on objective 
measures of happiness. The results of the study report 
a positive correlation between socio-economic status 
and happiness. In addition, education level had a positive 
relationship to happiness. Overall, the model of domain 
variables estimated happiness well. Therefore, Easterlin 
and Sawangfa affirm that socio-economic status, family, 
job status, and health are important in measuring 
happiness subjectively.
 
 The simplistic neoclassical model of utility 
is missing other factors of well-being like age, gender, 
race, marital status, and education. According to 
Frey and Stutzer, a socio-demographic approach to 
happiness reveals that younger and older individuals 
are happier than middle-aged people. Young people 
have high aspirations and good health. Individuals lose 
these qualities over the life course resulting in lower 
life satisfaction. Prospects increase after the middle age 
period because older people tend to adapt better to 
their experiences (2002).
 
 Women on average are happier than men 
according Frey and Stutzer. The difference in happiness 
is small but may be a result of women experiencing 
more intense emotions. It is socially acceptable for a 
woman to express more feeling than men which may 
contribute to subjective well-being answers. However, 
women in the labor force report lower levels of 
happiness possibly due to discrimination and lower 
wages (Frey, et al., 2002).
 
 In the United States, African Americans are less 
happy than whites according to both psychological and 
sociological studies. This difference can be attributed to 
many blacks having lower incomes, less education, and 
lower social status.
 
 Health is another contributor of subjective well 
being. On subjective well-being tests, health is highly 
correlated with happiness levels. Yet, this observed effect 
decreases with objective health ratings by physicians 
his work also limits the contributing factors of happiness. 
Newer theories in the field of economics identify a 
problem of attributing happiness to only economic 
factors.
Another aspect to consider is patterns between 
absolute and relative happiness levels and their impact 
on well-being. There is an inherent difference in money, 
consumption, and how each can affect happiness levels. 
American money is green, rectangular strips of paper 
which is not intrinsically valuable or useful. In other 
words, individuals do not have a “scale” for money 
to convert to happiness because it is a medium of 
exchange. The feeling or satisfaction that consumption 
brings causes money to become valuable. This is 
apparent in neoclassical thought. When one has a larger 
budget, he or she consumes at a higher indifference 
curve. Yet, relative income is cited as an important 
determinant of happiness, not absolute income (Hsee, 
C. K., Yang, Y., Li, N., & Shen, L., 2009). Relative income 
refers to one’s income compared to their peers and 
coworkers. If one’s relative income is less than a peer’s, 
then it may cause discontent despite its absolute value 
ability to purchase goods. Social status affects subjective 
well-being. Therefore, the neoclassical model fails to 
account for this aspect of relative income as well. In 
addition, coupled with the Easterlin Paradox, it implies 
that absolute income may not have a significant effect 
on happiness.
  
 The Easterlin Paradox is widely associated 
with happiness economics. Richard Easterlin, a pioneer 
of the economics of happiness, found that increases in 
per-capita income had little or no impact on average 
happiness, across countries. After basic needs are met, 
changes in aspirations, relative income, and security 
of gains become more important (Graham, 2008). 
Therefore, wealthier countries are only happier than 
poorer ones to a certain extent. A possible explanation 
for this paradox is the ability of capitalism to turn 
luxuries into necessities which consumers begin to 
take for granted. People are stuck on a consumption 
treadmill where they become inured to the pleasures 
of a higher standard of living (Economist, 2006). This is 
a central detail of the Easterlin Paradox for this project, 
because it changes the focus from absolute income 
to more personal factors like rising aspirations. Also, 
relative income is said to be more important than 
absolute values, which affects the interpretation of 
the neoclassical model. The Easterlin Paradox will be 
an important guiding force for this project because it 
acknowledges other possible influences on happiness.
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for measuring happiness because it questions the same 
respondents over time. Aside from usual statistical 
problems, assessing happiness has its own errors. For 
example, personality and temperament are important 
influences on happiness that the study cannot 
reasonably quantify. Similarly, there is not an available 
proxy for personality. Therefore, using panel data is of 
utmost importance to control these sources of error. 
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL
Before diving into regression analysis, a bivariate 
analysis of the independent variables and happiness was 
utilized. The cross tabulation allows for the deciphering 
of the proportion of respondents in each independent 
variable category and their happiness level. Continuous 
variables like income were sorted into brackets for clarity. 
Chi-square tests are utilized to test for dependence 
between variables. By conducting the cross tabulation, 
there are some initial results regarding the influence 
of each independent variable on happiness. The cross 
tabulations are found in Table 3 of the appendix.
 
 To test the hypothesis that asserts the influence 
of non-pecuniary factors on happiness, the empirical 
model utilizes ordinary least square regressions. 
Happiness will be the dependent variable which is 
measured by a self esteem proxy. The survey question 
of self esteem in the NLSY79 questionnaire is an 
appropriate proxy for happiness, because it measures 
self-perceived well being. In the survey, respondents 
were asked to decide their level of agreement with 
the statement, “I am satisfied with myself.” Considering 
the nature of the question, the dependent variable is 
not a continuous measure. The possible answers were 
as follows: “Strongly Agree,” “Agree,” “Disagree,” and 
“Strongly Disagree.” To account for these four possible 
answer choices in analysis, the data set codes “Strongly 
agree” as the highest level of happiness and “Strongly 
Disagree” as the lowest. The answer choices rank from 
1-4, with 4 being the highest level of happiness. With a 
value of 4, the respondent is “Happy.” For values 3, 2, and 
1, the respondent is “Somewhat Happy,” “Somewhat 
Unhappy,” and “Unhappy,” respectively. The relationship 
between the possible answer choice, its numerical 
value, and its degree of happiness is essential to analysis, 
because it is an ordinal measure. Ranking answer choices 
is not ideal for measurement because numerical values 
cannot capture happiness wholly. Yet, this compromise 
is necessary in order to utilize ordinary least square 
regressions.
In the first regression model will only assess 
economic factors to assess happiness. This will allow me 
(Frey, et al., 2002). People demonstrate tremendous 
ability to cope, which does not affect their happiness 
significantly. Yet, other studies show individuals that have 
experienced adverse health conditions like paraplegics, 
show lower levels of happiness. Therefore, increases in 
the severity of the health condition will decrease one’s 
happiness levels.
 
 According to Frey and Stuter, married persons 
report greater subjective well-being than persons 
who have never married, divorced, separated, or been 
widowed (2002). Marriage also provides advantages in 
mortality, morbidity, and mental health (Lee, Seccombe, 
and Shehan in Frey et al., 1991). People are less likely 
to feel lonely or have low self-esteem when involved a 
committed relationship.
 
 As seen in Easterin and Sawangfa (2009), 
education is positively correlated with happiness levels. 
Educational attainment is likely positively linked to 
happiness because of its contribution to socio-economic 
status. Highly educated individuals possess more human 
capital to help productivity and success in the economy. 
People will show higher rates of happiness with more 
education.
 
 Given the neoclassical theories, one could 
deduce that income and other economic factors have a 
significant relationship to happiness. Yet, it is found that 
these theories miss crucial aspects of happiness such 
as education, family, gender, race, religiosity, and marital 
status. Focusing solely on economic factors would 
not encompass all the influences on happiness. This 
project asserts that these non-pecuniary factors will 
be significant in evaluating happiness which challenges 
fundamental economic theory.
III. DATA
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 
1979 (NLSY79) is a panel study with nearly 13,000 
participants. The questionnaire was administered in 
1979, and respondents answered annually until 1994 
when the surveyors shifted to biannual questionnaires 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d.). The NLSY79 is an 
appropriate data set for this research project, because 
the survey asks a variety of questions ranging from 
self esteem, employment status, and other personal 
characteristics. The NLSY79 data will be essential to 
assess economic and non-pecuniary factors in relation 
to happiness.
In addition, a panel study like NLSY79 is ideal 
Hancock
The Park Place Economist, Volume XXI46
to test the mentioned neoclassical economic theories 
at face value. Statistical significance does not need to be 
explained. The model will include independent variables 
for income, net worth, ability to work, employment 
status, and employment type (Table 1). Income and 
net worth represent standard of living or the ability to 
consume more goods. For the subsequent regression, it 
will include non-pecuniary variables.
Model 1, Regression 1:
Happiness(Happy, Somewhat Happy, Somewhat 
Unhappy, Unhappy) = ß0 + ß1(IncomeThou) 
+ ß2(FamilyWorthThou) + ß3(Employed) 
+ ß4(HealthytoWork) + ß5(GovernJob) 
+ ß6(PrivateJob) + ß7(NonProfitJob) + 
ß8(SelfEmployed)
 The second regression of Model 1 will include 
the same economic variables with a set of controls for 
well-being. These variables include: age, gender, race, 
religiosity, education, family size, and marital status. 
The hypothesis states that all the non-pecuniary 
variables will be statistically significant determinants 
on happiness and obtain their expected sign (Table 1).
Model 1, Regression 2:
Happiness (Happy, Somewhat Happy, Somewhat 
Unhappy, Unhappy) = ß0 + ß1(IncomeThou) 
+ ß2(FamilyWorthThou) + ß3(Employed) 
+ ß4(HealthytoWork) + ß5(GovernJob) 
+ ß6(PrivateJob) + ß7(NonProfitJob) + 
ß8(SelfEmployed)+ß9(Female) + ß10(AgeCurrent) 
- ß11(Hispanic) + ß12(Black)+ ß13(Married)+ 
ß14(FamilySize)+ ß15(HighestGrade) + 
ß16(Religiosity)
 Because the dependent variable is categorical 
and not continuous, ordinary least squares is not the 
most efficient form of analysis. However, condensing 
the four options of happiness into two categories, 
the ordinary least squares regressions become linear 
probability models. In other words, the regression can 
predict the probability of being happy or not. Therefore, 
the second model of regressions follows the same form 
as above except the dependent variable is condensed 
to “Happy” or “Not Happy.” Respondents that strongly 
agreed or agreed with the statement, “I am satisfied 
with myself ” were grouped into the “Happy,” and 
respondents that strongly disagree or disagree were 
sorted into the “Not Happy” category. This regression is 
easier to interpret in the ordinary least squares format 
yet lacks the degree of accuracy in the first model.
V. RESULTS
The results will be presented in three sections 
to account for the cross tabulations and both empirical 
models. The two models represent different degrees of 
happiness and therefore, present slight differences in 
results. The first set of results in Model 1 demonstrates 
the effect of economic variables on the four levels 
of happiness. Then, the second regression in Model 
1 accounts for both economic and non-pecuniary 
variables. The comparison of these two sets of results 
will determine the significance of both types of variables 
(economic and non-pecuniary) and if the neoclassical 
model holds.
 
 The second model is a probability model. 
Therefore, the results of the regression will be 
interpreted differently. However, the comparison of 
economic and non-pecuniary variables remains the 
focus. A summary of regression results are in Table 2 of 
the Appendix.
A. Cross Tabulations of Happiness & Independent 
Variables
 As mentioned, this paper used Chi-square 
testing to find if there was a relationship between 
the variables. The economic variables for income, 
new worth, employment status, and the ability to 
work demonstrated statistical significance and largely 
impacted happiness. This result is consistent with 
neoclassical theory and verifies that economic variables 
are appropriate for measuring happiness. Of the non-
pecuniary variables, education, gender, race, marital 
status, family size, and religiosity affected one’s happiness. 
The statistically significance of the relationship between 
happiness and these non-pecuniary variables suggests 
they should be used in the regression models. 
 Measures for job type and age were not 
statistically significant and therefore do not affect the 
measures of happiness used in this study. The negative 
outcome for age is understandable because the 
respondents of the survey are in the same age group. 
The slight differences in age will not produce dramatic 
effects on happiness.
Nonetheless, the variables will be included in the 
regression models because some literature suggests 
that they are important determinants of happiness.
B. Model 1: Multinomial Dependent Variable
 After running an ordinary least square 
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regression for Model 1, it is apparent from the results 
presented in Table 2 that the economic variables were 
highly significant predictors of happiness. Income, net 
worth, employment status, and the ability to work 
passed the .01 significance level. This affirms the 
neoclassical models that cite income and the ability to 
consume as the major influences on happiness. Also, 
all these coefficients followed their predicted sign. The 
high significance of these four pecuniary independent 
variables occurred in both models and all four regression 
analyses. The only unsuccessful economic variables 
were the four dummy variables for job type. Despite 
job type showing no significance, the other economic 
variables are consistent with neoclassical relationships 
of happiness.
 
 In the second regression of Model 2 (Appendix 
Table 2), all independent variables were used to 
predict the four degrees of happiness. Again, the first 
four economic variables showed high significance. 
Unfortunately, the non-pecuniary variables did not 
exhibit the same success. The only significant attributes 
of the respondent were their marital status, education 
level, and whether they were African American or 
not. Marital status and education level had positive 
coefficients as expected; the dummy variable for African 
American did not have its predicted sign. Because 
African Americans are a minority and a marginalized 
group, it would follow that their race would negatively 
affect their happiness. However, the regression showed 
that being black actually positively influenced happiness, 
an unexpected result.
 
 The results show insignificant coefficients 
for the variables female, age, Hispanic, family size, and 
religiosity. It is surprising that being a female was not 
significant because like African Americans or other 
minorities, woman experience inequality compared 
to white men. This inequality may lead to decreases in 
happiness. In addition, the literature stated that women 
express more emotions, which affects happiness (Frey, 
et al., 2002). Yet, this theory was not supported in the 
first model, because being female or Hispanic was 
insignificant and the Black dummy variable had the 
opposite sign than predicted. 
 Model 1 identified the key variables in assessing 
the four degrees of happiness. Consistent with the 
neoclassical models, income and other economic 
variables were statistically significant. This demonstrates 
that happiness is a function of standard of living. 
Furthermore, it suggests that non-pecuniary variables 
like gender and race are not nearly as significant to 
assessing happiness.
C. Model 2: Binomial Dependent Variable
 Model 2, finds results consistent with the first 
model. Again, the first four economic variables are 
highly significant and important to the model. Job type 
fared slightly better because working in the private 
sector was significant and followed its predicted sign. 
In the second regression, all the previously significant 
economic variables remained. Yet, the non-pecuniary 
variables show different levels of significance than Model 
1. Race and education level are no longer significant. 
Marital status is still highly significant along with age and 
gender.
 
 Because NLSY79 is a cohort study, age should 
not be a significant variable. All the respondents are 
within ten years of age of each other. It is interesting that 
only one non-pecuniary variable was significant across 
both models. This may be due to subjectivity in that the 
non-pecuniary variables are too personal and not easily 
measured. Ideally, more non-pecuniary variables would 
be consistently significant.
Overall, the results demonstrated strong 
support of neoclassical models. Economic variables were 
highly significant for each regression. Non-pecuniary 
variables did not achieve the same success; therefore, 
the hypothesis is not sufficiently supported. A possible 
reason for this result is immense subjectivity. In other 
words, the personal differences in happiness cannot 
be fully measured by objective variables. Therefore, the 
empirical model was limited in assessing happiness.
VI. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
The economics of happiness is an emerging 
field with important policy implications. Essentially, 
economies should behave in a way to benefit their 
constituents. Microeconomic theory can aid in this 
task when it is all encompassing or includes several 
influences on happiness. Yet, we find in neoclassical 
models that income and consumption are the essential 
determinants of happiness. While this appears to limit 
happiness to pecuniary variables, the results of this study 
show that economic variables have significant effects 
on happiness. Non-pecuniary variables demonstrated 
low statistical significance, which is inconsistent with 
more sociological theories. Therefore, this research 
suggest that happiness economics should remain largely 
determined by economic factors like income, net worth, 
employment status, and the ability to work.
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Future research could address the empirical 
limitations of this study. Firstly, subjectivity due to 
personality differences could be controlled more 
appropriately. Assessing happiness in each domain of life 
like family, education, financial situation, and occupation 
could have a more statistically significant relationship 
as found by Easterline and Sawangfa (2009). Therefore, 
the use of subjective independent variables versus 
objective independent variables may better assess well-
being. Happiness was measured using categories of 
life satisfaction when regression analysis is more useful 
for numerical dependent variables. The use of a probit 
model in the future will alleviate this issue. Overall, the 
study presented an analysis of an emerging field of 
economics, happiness. While the study had its limitations, 
there is evidence that, for the NSLY79 cohort, income 
and assets are important determinants of happiness.
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VIII. APPENDIX
Table 1: Variables Descriptions
Variable Name Description Exepected Sign
Dependent
Happiness: Four Degrees 4 = Happy, 3 = Somewhat happy, 2 = Somewhat un-
happy, 1 = Unhappy
Happiness: Two Degrees 1 =  Happy, 0 = Not Happy
Independent
IncomeThou Previous year’s income in Thousands of Dollars +
FamilyWorth Thou
Total Family Net Worth in Thousands +
Employed 1 = Employed 0 = Not Employed +
HealhtoWork 1 = Able to work 0 = Not able to work +
GovernJob 1 = Works for Gov’t 0 = Does not work for Gov’t -
PrivateJob 1 = Works in Private Sector 0 = Does not work in Private Sector
+
NonProfitJob 1 = Non-Profit Sector 0 = Does not work in Non-Profit Sector
+
SelfEmployed 1 = Self-Employed 0 = Not Self-Employed +
Female 1 = Yes 0 = No -
AgeCurrent Age as of 2006 -
Hispanic 1 = Hispanic 0 = Not Hispanic -
Black 1 = Black 0 = Not Black -
Married 1 = Yes 0 = No +
FamilySize Number of Family Members +
HighestGrade Total number of grade levels passed +
Religiosity
How often respondent attends religious services
5 = More than Once a week
4 = About Once a week 
3 = 2-3 times a month
2 = About Once a month 
1 = Several times a year or less
0 = Not at all 
+
Table 2: Regression Results for Both Models
Variable Model 1
4 Degrees of Happiness
Model 2
2 Degrees of Happiness
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 1 Regression 2
Constant 2.904
.000***
2.44
.000***
0.746
.000***
0.545
.000***
Income 0.001
.000***
0.001
.000***
0.000
.003***
0.000
.060*
Net Worth 7.93e-5
.000***
6.328e-5
.003***
2.835e-5
.003***
1.910e-5
.057*
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Table 2: Regression Results for Both Models
Employed 0.094
.000***
0.091
.000***
0.049
0.000***
0.043
.000***
Healthy to Work 0.225
.000***
0.221
.000***
0.130
.000***
0.128
.000***
GovernJob 0.034
0.235
0.000
.994
0.000
.990
-0.006
.668
Private Sector -0.028
0.114
-0.024
0.187
-0.019
.022**
-0.018
.029**
Non-Profit Sector -0.011
0.786
-0.024
0.560
-0.011
.544
-0.015
.438
Self Employed 0.034
0.214
0.040
0.152
-0.004
.759
-0.003
.829
Female
N/A
-0.015
0.370
N/A
-0.014
.054*
Current Age 0.004
0/194
0.004
.021**
Hispanic 0.030
0.159
-0.007
.462
Black 0.084
0.000***
0.011
.185
Married 0.080
.000***
0.033
.000***
Family Size -0.004
0.441
0.001
.698
Education 0.014
.000***
0.002
.240
Religiosity 0.011
.151
0.003
.442
N 6565 6290 6590 6312
Adjusted R2 .044 .052 .045 .048
*Significance at the 0.1 level
**Significance at the 0.05 level
***Significance at the 0.01 level
Table 3: Cross Tabulations for Happiness Levels and Independent Variables
Cases
Valid Missing Total
N Percent N Percent N Percent
SelfEsteeem *
 BracketSalary
7213 56.9% 5473 43.1% 12686 100.0%
SelfEsteem * 
FamilyWorthBracket
7541 59.4% 5145 40.6% 12686 100.0%
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SelfEsteerms *
Employed
7611 60.0% 5075 40.0% 12686 100.0%
SelfEsteem * 
HighestGradeBracket
7611 60.0% 5075 40.0% 12686 100.0%
SelfEsteem 
*HealthytoWork
7448 58.7% 5238 41.3% 12686 100.0%
SelfEsteem * Female 7611 60.0% 5075 40.0% 12686 100.0%
SelfEsteem * 
AgeCurrent 
7611 60.0% 5075 40.0% 12686 100.0%
SelfEsteem * Black 7611 60.0% 5075 40.0% 12686 100.0%
SelfEsteems *
Married
7611 60.0% 5075 40.0% 12686 100.0%
SelfEsteem * 
FamilySize
7611 60.0% 5075 40.0% 12686 100.0%
SelfEsteem * Freq of 
Attending Religious 
Services
7102 56.0% 5584 44.0% 12868 100.0%
Table 3.1:  Self Esteem & Bracketed Salary 
Self Esteem 
4 Categories 
Salary Total 
$0
-
10,000
$10,001 
-
20,000
$20,001 
- 
30,000
$30,001
- 
40,000
$40,001 
-
50,000
$50,001 
-
60,000
$60,001 
-
70,000
$70,001 
-
80,000
$80,001 
-
90,000
$90,000
-
100,000
>
$100,000
Unhappy
Count 34 10 9 5 4 1 1 1 1 0 0 66
% 
within 
Salary 
1.7% 1.2% 0.9% 0.5% 0.6% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9%
Somewhat 
Unhappy
Count 298 68 86 57 35 22 16 9 9 5 7 612
% 
within 
Salary 
14.9% 8.1% 8.5% 6.0% 5.1% 4.4% 4.7% 3.8% 5.7% 4.0% 1.9% 8.5%
Somewhat 
Happy 
Count 1143 530 616 574 384 282 172 136 79 80 184 4180
% 
within 
Salary 
57.2% 63.1% 60.7% 60.4% 55.7% 56.0% 56.0% 57.6% 50.0% 64.0% 51.1% 58.0%
Happy
Count 522 232 303 314 266 199 151 90 69 40 169 2355
% 
within 
Salary 
26.1% 27.6% 29.9% 33.1% 38.6% 39.5% 4.4% 38.1% 43.7% 32.0% 46.9% 32.6%
Total 
Count 1997 840 1014 950 689 504 340 236 158 125 360 7213
% 
within 
Salary
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- Sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
Liklihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
295.054a
294.268
206.789
7213
30
30
1
.000
.000
.000
a. 6 cells (13.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.14. 
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Table 3.2:  Self Esteem & Family Worth
Self Esteem 
4 Categories 
Salary Total 
< 
$50,000
$50,001
-
100,000
$100.001
-
150,00
$150,001
-
200,000
$200,001
-
250,00
$250,001
-
300,000
$300,001
-
350,000
>
$350,001
Unhappy
Count 44 10 3 7 2 2 1 1 70
% within 
Salary 
1.2% 1.1% 0.5% 1.4% 0.5% 0.8% 0.4% 0.1% 0.9%
Somewhat 
Unhappy
Count 438 62 39 31 20 11 10 33 644
% within 
Salary 
11.8% 7.1% 6.3% 6.3% 5.4% 4.2% 4.5% 3.3% 8.5%
Somewhat 
Happy 
Count 2143 524 365 293 212 144 124 567 4372
% within 
Salary 
57.9% 60.0% 59.3% 59.3% 57.6% 54.5% 55.6% 56.7% 58.0%
Happy
Count 1077 278 209 163 134 107 88 399 2455
% within 
Salary 
29.1% 31.8% 33.9% 33.0% 36.4% 40.5% 39.5% 39.9% 32.6%
Total 
Count 3702 874 616 494 368 264 223 1000 7541
% within 
Salary
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- Sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
Liklihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
159.233a
171.295
119.301
7541
21
21
1
.000
.000
.000
a. 4 cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.07. 
Table 3.3: Self-Esteem & Employment Status
SelfEsteem4Cateogories Employed Total
Not Employed Employed
Unhappy
Count 29 41 70
% within Employed 1.9% 0.7% 0.9%
Somewhat Unhappy
Count 264 385 649
% within Employed 16.9% 6.4% 8.5%
Somewhat Happy
Count 902 3507 4409
% within Employed 57.6% 58.0% 57.9%
Happy
Count 371 2112 2483
% within Employed 23.7% 34.9% 32.6%
Total
Count 1566 6045 7611
% within Employed 100.00 100.0% 100.0%
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Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- Sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
Liklihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
227.377a
202.898
180.892
7611
3
3
1
.000
.000
.000
a. 6 cells (13.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.14. 
Table 3.4: Self-Esteem & Highest Grade Attained
SelfEsteem4Categories Highest Grade Attained Total
Grade School High School Undergrad Beyond Grad
Unhappy
Count 3 44 21 2 70
% within 
HighestGrade
1.5% 1.1% 0.8% 0.3% 0.9%
Somewhat 
Unhappy
Count 22 392 187 48 649
% within 
HighestGrade
10.9% 10.1% 6.8% 6.2% 8.5%
Somewhat 
Happy
Count 134 2327 1525 423 4409
% within 
HighestGrade
66.3% 59.8% 55.6% 54.8% 57.9%
Happy
Count 43 1131 1010 299 2483
% within 
HighestGrade
21.3% 29.0% 36.8% 38.7% 32.6%
Total
Count 202 3894 2743 772 7611
% within 
HighestGrade
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- Sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
Liklihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
88.815a
91.130
80.342
7611
9
9
1
.000
.000
.000
a. 1 cell (6.3%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.86. 
Table 3.5: Esteem & Healthy/Able to Work
SelfEsteem4Categories Healthy to Work
Total
No Yes
Unhappy
Count 19 45 64
% within Healthytowork 2.0% 0.7% 0.9%
Somewhat Unhappy
Count 194 412 606
% within Healthytowork 20.2% 6.4% 8.1%
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Somewhat Happy
Count 544 3790 4334
% within Healthtowork 56.6% 58.4% 58.2%
Happy
Count 204 2240 2444
% within Healthytowork 21.2% 34.5% 32.8%
Total
Count 961 6487 7448
%within Healthytowork 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- Sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
Liklihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
258.593a
212.051
188.794
7448
3
3
1
.000
.000
.000
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.26. 
Table 3.6: Self-Esteem & Female
SelfEsteem4Categories Percent Male/Female
Total
Male Female
Unhappy Count 28 42 70
% within Female 0.8% 1.1% 0.9%
Somewhat UnHappy Count 281 368 649
% within Female 7.6% 9.4% 8.5%
Somehwhat Happy Count 2155 2254 4409
% within Female 58.0% 57.9% 57.9%
Happy Count 1251 1232 2483
% within Female 33.7% 31.6% 32.6%
Total Count 3715 3896 7611
% within Female 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- Sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
Liklihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
12.534a
12.580
10.013
7611
3
3
1
.000
.000
.000
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 34.17
Table 3.7: Self-Esteem & Current Age
SelfEsstem4Categories
Current Age
Total
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49
Unhappy
Count 6 15 11 7 11 9 3 7 1 70
% within 
AgeCurrent
0.9% 1.4% 1.0% 0.7% 1.0% 1.0% 0.4% 0.8% 0.5% 0.9%
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Somewhat 
Unhappy
Count 59 86 96 86 96 89 59 65 13 649
% within 
AgeCurrent
9.0% 8.1% 9.0% 8.3% 8.9% 9.7% 7.5% 7.8% 7.1% 8.5%
Somewhat 
Happy
Count 387 612 578 604 631 539 471 480 107 4409
% within 
AgeCurrent
58.8% 58.0% 54.2% 58.5% 58.8% 58.7% 59.7% 57.4% 58.5% 57.9%
Happy
Count 206 343 381 335 335 281 256 284 62 2483
% within 
AgeCurrent
31.3% 32.5% 35.7% 32.5% 31.2% 30.6% 32.4% 34.0% 33.9% 32.6%
Total
Count 658 1056 1066 1032 1073 918 789 836 183 7611
% within 
AgeCurrent
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- Sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
Liklihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
20.327a
20.736
.594
7611
24
24
1
.678
.654
.441
a. 1 cell (2.8%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.68 
Table 3.8: Self-Esteem & Race-Black
SelfEsteem4Categories Black
Total
Not Black Black
Unhappy Count 43 27 70
% within Black 0.8% 1.1% 0.9%
Somewhat Unhappy Count 435 214 649
% within Black 8.3% 9.1% 8.5%
Somewhat Happy Count 3125 1284 4409
% within Black 59.5% 54.4% 57.9%
Happy Count 1649 834 2483
% within Black 31.4% 35.4% 32.6%
Total Count 5252 2359 7611
% within Black 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- Sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
Liklihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
18.105a
17.990
2.583
7611
3
3
1
.000
.000
.108
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 21.70. 
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Table 3.9: Self-Esteem & Marriage
SelfEsteem4Categories Married
Total
Not Married Married
Unhappy Count 29 41 40
% within Married 1.1% 0.8% 0.9%
Somewhat Unhappy Count 323 326 649
% within Married 11.7% 6.7% 8.5%
Somewhat Happy Count 1594 2815 4409
% within Married 57.9% 57.9% 57.9%
Happy Count 805 1678 2483
% within Married 29.3% 34.5% 32.6%
Total Count 2751 4860 7611
% within Married 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- Sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
Liklihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
67.962a
66.155
50.610
7611
3
3
1
.000
.000
.000
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 25.30. 
Table 3.10: Self-Esteem & Family Size
SelfEsteem4Categories Family Size
Total
1-3 4-6 7-9 10 or more
Unhappy Count 44 25 1 0 70
% within Family 
Size
0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.0% 0.9%
Somewhat
Unhappy
Count 459 179 11 0 649
% within Family 
Size
9.5% 6.7% 10.1% 0.0% 8.5%
Somewhat 
Happy
Count 2788 1546 64 11 4409
% within Family 
Size
57.9% 57.9% 58.7% 73.3% 57.9%
Happy Count 1528 918 33 4 2483
% within Family 
Size
31.7% 34.4% 30.3% 26.7% 32.6%
Total Count 4819 2668 109 15 7611
% within Family 
Size
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- Sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
Liklihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
22.527a
24.477
9.336
7611
9
9
1
.007
.004
.002
a. 4 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .14. 
Table 3.11: Self-Esteem & Frequency of Attending Religious Services
SelfEsteem4Categories Freq of Attending Religious Services
Total
Not at all Yearly Monthly Weekly
Unhappy Count 8 11 23 24 66
% within Freq of Attending 
Religious Services
1.0% 0.7% 1.2% 0.8% 0.9%
Somewhat 
Unhappy
Count 65 151 160 216 592
% within Freq of Attending 
Religious Services
8.1% 10.3% 8.4% 7.4% 8.3%
Somewhat 
Happy
Count 467 902 1100 1678 4147
% within Freq of Attending 
Religious Services
58.0% 61.2% 58.0% 57.3% 58.4%
Happy Count 265 409 612 1011 2297
% within Freq of Attending 
Religious Services
32.9% 27.8% 32.3% 34.5% 32.3%
Total Count 805 1473 1895 2929 7102
% within Freq of Attending 
Religious Services
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- Sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
Liklihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
29.027a
28.984
10.424
7102
9
9
1
.001
.001
.001
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.48. 
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water rights amongst senior users and juniors, those with 
secondary claims on the water source, during times of 
drought has been proposed. Water leasing, also known 
as water banking, provides a temporary transfer of water 
rights, which could provide a market for smaller water 
users who need to buy water for irrigation purposes in 
times of drought. One possible problem could arise in a 
water market under a prior appropriations setting. As a 
result, the price differentials occur where higher prices 
are paid for “senior” water rights vs. “junior” water rights 
as defined by Libecap (2005).
In cases of water scarcity, consideration for a 
water market is necessary especially if the watershed 
is over allocated. This is supported at the state and 
national level. On the national level, the Department of 
the Interior (2005) discussed the issue of water scarcity 
in their report entitled Water 2025: Preventing Crises 
and Conflict in the West. Many states have drafted 
plans to address issues in water management. These 
state level water plans have been drafted by: California, 
New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming. (California 
Department of Water Resources, 2012; New Mexico 
Office of the State Engineer, 2009; State of Nevada 
Division of Water Resources, 2011; Utah Division of 
Water Resources, 2001; Wyoming Water Development 
Office, 2007). The water scarce region of the western 
United States has consistently increased its demand for 
water despite limited water supplies. This points to a 
need for improved water allocation mechanisms, such 
as water leasing markets.
The inefficiencies of water allocation can be 
addressed through two market institutions: permanent 
water rights transfer or the leasing of water rights. 
Permanent transfer of water rights is an established 
practice in the west. Los Angeles would not exist today 
without the purchase and transfer of water rights from 
the Owens Valley. Water leasing markets, on the other 
I. INTRODUCTION
The Southwestern United States is an arid 
region with significantly low levels of precipitation. This 
region not only has a limited water supply, but also 
consequently has a large percentage of population 
growth. From 1965 to 2000 population has increased 
by 80 percent (Konieczki and Heilman, 2004). With the 
population increasing from year to year, as a result, there 
has also been an increase in the demand for water. This 
is seen in the withdrawal rate of water for domestic 
use, which has increased by 64 percent (Konieczki and 
Heilman, 2004).  While a growing population increases 
the demand for water use among humans, a majority 
of the water supply still goes towards irrigation for 
agriculture. The demand for water is not the only 
increasing factor, but temperatures over the last century 
have increased 1.5 degrees Fahrenheit around the globe 
(United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2012). 
The warming climate has impacted, for example, the 
natural flow of the Colorado River, which supplies water 
to a large portion of the arid Southwestern region of the 
United States (United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2012). Future prospective droughts due to 
climate change and an increasing population have the 
potential to create conflicts over water supplies, which 
is amplified by the nature of the water rights in the 
Southwest.   
The water right laws in the Southwest differ 
from the rest of the country (i.e. riparian rights). In the 
western United States the predominant water law is 
known as the Doctrine of Prior Appropriations. This law 
was a response to the arid climate and has been in 
existence since the settlement of the west. The concept 
of prior appropriations states that water can be set aside 
for “beneficial use”, which is an ambiguous term (Fort, 
2002).  Prior appropriations give senior users the first 
claim to the water in the times of a drought. A drought 
is commonly referred to as a call. Therefore, leasing of 
Allocating Scarce Water Resources:Examining if 
Price Differentials Exist in a Prior
Appropriations Setting
Hayley Harroun
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hand, are a newly emerging market institution. Water 
leasing provides a temporary transfer of water rights, 
which would provide a market for smaller water users 
who need water for irrigation purposes (Shupe et. al., 
1989).  
This study examines the potential for a 
water leasing market within one singular basin in 
Southwestern, New Mexico. The goal of this research 
is to test the feasibility of a water market in the river 
basin and determine if price differentials are found in 
a prior appropriations setting. This was done through 
a laboratory experiment to test if participants would 
simulate an effective water leasing market in a basin 
within New Mexico. In order to assess the potential 
for a water leasing market, a water leasing market was 
designed to incorporate the hydrologic, engineering, 
institutional, and economic market of the Upper Mimbres 
Basin (Broadbent et. al., 2009). Using experimental 
economics, which uses computer programs and 
simulation to test an economic theory, the market 
value of water was induced through the set up of the 
experiment. The set up involved double auction where 
all bids and offers are presented publicly and each bid 
and offer is presented simultaneously. The advantages of 
conducting a laboratory experiment is predominantly 
time, data that would usually take a year to collect can 
be done in a short amount of time. By simulating the 
water leasing market we can test participants’ reactions 
to drought conditions, which could take years to occur 
in the real setting of New Mexico. 
The data from two trials (each simulating a 
year’s worth of transactions) were studied. From these 
experiments, individual transactions are recorded 
including the stakeholders involved in the trade, the 
quantity of water traded, price of water traded and 
the impacts on the hydrologic model. It is, therefore, 
hypothesized that stakeholders will fulfill their assigned 
roles under the experimental leasing system (the market 
price will be equal to the expected market price) and 
there will be a price differential between senior and 
junior user’s water rights during times of a call. The 
focus of this research is firstly is to test whether the 
experimental market follows realistic expectations and 
secondly to examine the benefits of instituting a water 
leasing market within the river basin. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Broadbent et al. (2009) summarize the 
literature on water leasing markets. Their article 
establishes the need for water leasing markets in the 
west, the barriers to establishing water leasing markets, 
and past theoretical and empirical studies on water 
leasing markets.
Permanent transfer of water rights, have been 
studied for almost forty years. Literature regarding 
permanent transfer of water rights has outlined criteria 
essential for successful water market transactions. 
Broadbent et al. (2009) outline the criteria as “1) well-
defined, securable, and tradable property rights; 2) 
hydrologic and engineering reality; 3) environmental 
quality; 4) social/community and traditional uses; 5) 
transaction costs; and 6) third-party effects” (p. 713). 
Third party effects are resolved through the adoption of 
the “no-injury” rule, transactions that economically harm 
third parties cannot occur. Typically, transaction costs 
are higher in water markets and therefore addressing 
third party effects is necessary to create a successful 
water leasing market. Water markets must acknowledge 
traditional water uses such as Native American rights 
to water as well as the environmental impacts of water 
leasing on the watershed. Understanding the hydrologic 
and engineering reality of a watershed will not only 
determine the feasibility of trading water in specific 
locations but also address the impacts on the watershed. 
Above all, well-defined property rights encourage right 
holders’ to act in their own self-interest.
Theoretical studies on water leasing markets 
have acknowledged it as “an attractive option for 
both parties because it maintains continuity, preserves 
ownership by holder of the right for future use, and 
accommodates an intermediate use” (Shupe et al. 
1989). Empirical studies have been conducted in the 
Western United States (Yoskowitz, 1999; Czetwertynski, 
2002; Yoskowitz, 2002; Loomis et.al., 2003; Adams et. al., 
2004; Howitt, 2005; Brown, 2006; Brewer et.al., 2007), 
as well as southeastern Australia (Crase et.al, 2000; 
Bjornlund, 2003, 2004; Crase, et. al., 2004; Turra et. al., 
2005), and Southern Chile (Hadjigeorgalis, 2004). These 
studies show that water leasing has received national 
and international attention. Studying the literature on 
water leasing markets establishes a basis to study water-
leasing markets.  
A recent article by Basta and Colby (2010) 
examine the trends of water markets for leasing and 
permanent transfers. Basta and Colby expand the 
literature on water markets through the compilation 
of the monthly water transactions reported from 1987 
to 2007 in the journal Water Strategist. From this they 
establish a large dataset of many states and regional 
water markets. Through the analysis of water sales 
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data, Basta and Colby ascertain trends in the water 
market. Trends, such as total transactions, total quantity 
traded, and average prices, aid in the understanding 
in the valuation of water rights and the water market 
itself. Almost all states and regions observed a general 
trend of an increasing number of transactions in the 
sale and lease of water rights, whereas New Mexico is 
experiencing a growing leasing market instead of the 
permanent sale of water rights. Leasing is a growing 
market within California, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, 
and the Pacific Northwest Region. Prices are rising, with 
a variance in prices between regions. This supports the 
concept of the increased strain on the water supply, 
especially in the Western United States. It also signifies 
the importance to understand trends in the burgeoning 
water market.
Watson and Davies (2011) examine regional 
growth in the South Platte River Basin in Colorado to 
understand the incentive structures for different users 
if the water supply is fixed (2011). They examine the 
demand of both agricultural and municipal water users, 
finding that with an increasing population will strain the 
water supplies and force water to be used for urban 
user rather than irrigation. In addition, return flows from 
municipal to agricultural users provide more water 
for irrigation. Finally, they found the price of municipal 
water to increase by 25 percent where the agricultural 
price for water remained the same. This is likely due 
to the increasing population within the region, which 
subsequently increases the municipalities demand 
for water ; whereas, the demand from the agricultural 
sector remains largely the same.
Yoskowitz (2001) looks at existing price 
differentials in water market transactions in the Rio 
Grande Valley in Texas. In order to understand this 
phenomenon the article addresses the institutional 
nature of the water markets. This is done by statistics 
to show price differentials converging and diverging 
over time among agricultural users and urban users. 
In addition, Yoskowitz hypothesizes possible reasons 
why price differentials occur. The results support a 
differential price among different water users, and price 
convergence has yet to occur. Yoskowitz (2001) attributes 
price differentials to asymmetries in information and 
the price elasticity of different water users. Yoskowitz 
(2001) looks at price differentials between consumers 
and represents the empirical model used to test if price 
differentials occur.
A. Summary of Literature
 There are many challenges facing the current 
water leasing markets. Broadbent et al. (2009) outlined 
requirements necessary to ensure water-leasing markets 
are efficient. These included well-defined water rights, 
markets based upon hydrologic and engineering reality, 
markets that protect environmental quality, community 
and traditional uses, acknowledge transactions costs, 
and address third-party effects. Basta and Colby (2010) 
survey the current trends of water markets in the 
Western United States and find a general increase in 
the number of transactions of water rights through both 
leasing and sales. While there have been many studies 
done examining water leasing markets in the Western 
United States (Yoskowitz 1999; Czetwertynski, 2002; 
Yoskowitz, 2002; Loomis et al., 2003; Adams et al., 2004; 
Howitt, 2005; Brown, 2006; Brewer et. al., 2007), very 
few have examined the occurrence of price differentials 
(Yoskowitz, 2001; Watson, 2011).  These studies have 
found price differentials occurring between agricultural 
users and urban users.
III. THEORY 
 The design of the hypothetical water leasing 
market draws upon experimental economics. 
Experimental economics uses laboratory techniques 
to test an economic theory. Essentially, experimental 
economics induces values through the use of 
participants to test a hypothesis. The data for this paper 
was collected through a double auction experiment. 
A double auction means that all bids and offers are 
presented publicly and each bid and offer is presented 
simultaneously.
 Basic supply and demand theory is the 
conceptual framework where the demand function is a 
step demand function (Smith, 1982). The step demand 
function occurs due to a differing market price value 
between irrigators and municipalities. The flat region of 
the demand curve in Figure 1 refers to the irrigators 
demand for water. The marginal utility for municipalities 
is higher than irrigators and therefore the left flat 
region on the demand curve represents municipalities 
demand for water (See Figure 1). Municipalities value 
water rights at a higher price than irrigators because 
there are a fixed number of water rights based upon 
the hydrology of the basin and the supply of water is 
perfectly inelastic. Users are not able to draw more 
than their allotment of water, even when flows are high. 
In times of a call the supply moves left and water prices 
rise (See Figure 1).  Water is only supplied to senior 
users during a drought. Senior users are those with the 
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oldest claim to the water. Junior users are those with 
newer claims to the water and are the first to have their 
water cut off during times of a drought. Therefore junior 
users as well as the municipalities’ willingness to pay for 
these rights will increase in times of drought. 
Based upon the step demand function, during 
times of a drought a price differential will occur between 
senior and junior users if prices depend upon the users’ 
willingness to pay. Price differentials occur as a result 
of differing marginal values between users. According 
to Libecap (2005) price differentials still exist within 
the water leasing market because of the infrequency 
of trades. Libecap states, “Water trades take place and 
are growing in frequency and magnitude, but they are 
not sufficient to cause water prices to equalize on the 
margin, adjusting for transport costs” (p. 39).  Water 
markets still face heavy regulations on the transfer of 
water rights due to the interconnectedness of water 
uses (Libecap, 2005).
IV. DATA
 The data for this study comes from an 
experimental water leasing market that was designed 
for the Upper Mimbres Basin in southwestern New 
Mexico. The two treatments used in this paper 
to understand the impacts of a call under a prior 
appropriations setting. The data collected from each 
experiment measures a full years worth of transactions. 
Conducting an experiment to test the feasibility of a 
water leasing market was chosen primarily because of 
a lack of data for the region. This data is appropriate 
to measure the hypothesis because the experiment 
induced values in which stakeholders first learned 
about the subject matter and had a monetary incentive 
to act in their best interest. In the Upper Mimbres Basin 
there are eleven stakeholders.
The oldest priority date is 1869, which has a 
yearly allocation of 789 acre-feet of water. This is the 
senior user who has the most favorable water rights 
during periods of drought, since they will be the last 
to get their water cut off. There are four users with 
the priority date of 1870 with an average allotment of 
18 acre-feet of water. Following the four users of 1870, 
there is one user with a priority date of 1880 with a 
yearly allocation of 99 acre-feet. Then there is one user 
with an 1893 priority date with a yearly allocation of 
132 acre feet and two users with an 1894 priority date 
with an average of 117 acre feet of water. The previously 
mentioned users are currently using their water for 
irrigation purchases but there are two municipalities 
in the region interested in leasing water rights. The 
water leasing market allows users to trade water each 
month to address inefficiencies in the current water 
allocation. Each trading round, which represents one 
trading round, users are able to buy or sell water to 
other users since this experiment is a double auction 
and all prices posted to buy and sell water are visible to 
all users. These trading decisions are then applied to the 
hydrologic model, which factors in the affects on water 
flow within the basin. Each month individual transactions 
are recorded including the stakeholders involved in 
the trade, the quantity of water traded, price of water 
traded and the impacts on the hydrologic model.
    
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL
 In this study, two T-tests are done to measure 
whether there is a statistical difference between the 
following groups. Firstly, to investigate whether the 
data collected reflects the expected market price. 
Market price is determined through the experiment in 
each round of trading. For each round of trading the 
average price per quantity of water or market price was 
determined. Expected price is the price per quantity 
of water that should be elicited from the trading 
rounds given the unique payout of each participant. The 
expected market price was three dollars per acre-foot 
of water as shown in Figure 1; the null hypothesis was 
that market prices would not be equivalent to expected 
prices. To test whether market prices were equivalent 
to three dollars the following T-test was done.  
Secondly, the study determines if a price 
differential between senior and junior users during 
times of a drought exists. Senior users’ price per 
quantity of water should be higher than junior users in 
times of a drought. To accomplish this, the average price 
per quantity of the senior user’s water (1869 priority 
date) in each round was compared to the price per 
quantity of all other users (all other priority dates). 
Both experiments were aggregated in an effort to 
increase the sample size. The null hypothesis is: price is 
not dependent upon priority date. The following T-test 
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was done to see if there was a statistical significance 
between priority dates.
V. RESULTS
 The results proceed in four sections. First, 
results are presented that compare the expected price 
with the market price. Secondly, price differentials allow 
for the comparison between priority dates. Thirdly, 
the total number of transactions and, fourthly, the 
call results of both experiments. These are necessary 
comparisons when looking at the feasibility of a water 
leasing market for any basin operating under the setting 
of prior appropriations.
A. Market Prices
Descriptive statistics were used on the 
experimental data to determine the average price per 
acre-foot sold in every trading month (See Table 1). 
As well as each priority dates average price per acre-
foot (See Table 1). A T-test calculated to see whether 
market prices were equivalent to the expected market 
price of three dollars per acre-foot. Overall both 
experiments found the market prices were equivalent 
to the expected market price, except in times of a 
call (See Table 1 and 2). Rejecting the null in times of 
drought could be an indicator that price differentials 
exist. In the first few months of both experiments the 
null hypothesis can be accepted this is likely due to the 
fact that users were adjusting to the market as well as 
preemptively purchasing water in case of a call. This 
means that participants for the most part did take on 
their assigned role.
B. Price Differentials
 The results of the first T-test indicate the 
potential for price differentials. To determine whether 
price differentials occur between the oldest priority date 
and the rest of the priority dates, a second T-test was 
performed. The T-test found that there was a statistical 
difference between priority dates (See Table 4) and 
that there was a lag in price differentials during times 
of a drought. The high prices for the oldest priority date 
occurred in the month following the beginning of the 
drought and remained high the month after the drought 
ended. The small sample size did affect the ability to 
test certain months, even with the aggregation of data 
between the two experiments (See Table 3).
 C. Total Number of Transactions
The total number of transactions in both 
experiment one and two is displayed in Table 3. Table 
3 illustrates how minute the water leasing market 
is within the Upper Mimbres Basin, New Mexico. In 
some rounds, there were only one or two transactions. 
The small sample statistics indicate that an alternative 
method may be needed to further test the hypothesis. 
This can be done using a Willcoxon rank sum test.
D. Call Results
For both experiments, one and two, the 
expected drought given the hydrologic model is seen in 
Table 2. Without a water leasing market, the drought was 
expected to occur in the months of July and August. The 
drought in July would affect 1880, 1893, 1894, and in 
August it would affect 1994 users. In both experiments 
there is a decline in the severity and longevity of the 
drought (See Table 2).  In experiment one the drought 
occurred in July and August and affected 1894 users 
and the drought in experiment one occurred in July and 
affected 1894 users. These results show that the water 
leasing market allowed the participants to minimize the 
impacts of a call and therefore trading was beneficial.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Increased populations are adding pressure on 
the already scarce water resources of the Western 
United States. Establishing water-leasing markets within 
basins that are well established in the hydrological 
and engineering reality have the potential to increase 
efficiencies. Through this experimental market, which 
was modeled after an actual basin in New Mexico, the 
benefits of water leasing can be seen. However, this 
experiment data does reflect the expected outcome 
of a water leasing market in terms of average price per 
quantity of water.
In this study market prices overall were 
equivalent to expected prices, with the exception of 
months when there was a drought. Price differentials 
between the oldest priority dates and the rest of the 
priority dates do occur. Price differentials are a limiting 
factor in implementing a water leasing market. Water is 
not homogenous and thus price differentials might slow 
the transaction process down and result in less water 
allowed to the market, which in turn results in increased 
prices and making the market less efficient. The results 
of this study support results of previous studies 
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(Yoskowitz, 2001; Libecap, 2005; Watson, 2011) of which 
found price differentials between agricultural users and 
urban users. Libecap (2005) explains “the persistence 
of large price differentials between agricultural, urban, 
and environmental users reflects the lack of extensive, 
routine market trades that would otherwise arbitrage 
to narrow the differences” (p. 4). Promoting widespread 
use of water leasing markets should help eliminate price 
differentials between users.
This study had very few transactions in certain 
trading rounds. The thin market impacted the ability 
to calculate a significance level as well as to compare 
between priority dates. This led to an aggregation of 
both experiments in order to test whether price 
differentials occur between junior and senior users. 
A Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test eliminates the concern 
for a small sample size because it is a nonparametric 
distribution free test. This would be an ideal way to 
extend this study. 
Establishing a water leasing market within this 
particular basin has shown environmentally beneficial. 
Due to the nature of the experiments, both trials had the 
same expected outcome in terms of a drought. In both 
experiments the length and severity of the expected 
drought was reduced due to the reallocation of water 
from the leasing of water. This displays the potential for 
water leasing markets to reallocate resources in a more 
efficient manner in regions where the Doctrine of Prior 
Appropriations is the predominant water law.
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Table 1: Weighted Average Market Prices
Trading 
Month
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
Experiment 1
Market 
Price
3.89** 3.91* 2.59+ 4.5+ 4 4.71** 5.5** 5.33* 3.71* 3.61 5+ 0
-1.06 -0.89 -0.65 0 -1 -1.29 -1.15 -0.88 -0.25 -0.67 0 0
1894 2 3 2 0 0 0 0 4.333 3.5 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1893 3.5 2.5 3.4 0 5 0 0 0 4 4 0 0
-0.7 0 -0.29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1880 4.29 3.5 3.5 0 3 4 4 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1870 5 3 0 0 4 7 6 0 0 0 5 0
0 -1.06 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1869 4 4.43 0 4.5 0 5.4 6 5.83 3.6 3.56 0 0
0 -0.12 0 0 0 -0.71 0 -0.23 -0.12 -0.75 0 0
Experiment 2
Market 
Price
4.63* 3.9* 3.59* 3.5++ 3.17 3.61* 2.6+ 2.8+ 3++ 3.33 0 0
-0.82 -0.2 -0.27 0 -0.25 -0.32 -0.3 -0.19 0 -0.35 0 0
1984 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.5 0 0 2.4 2.75 3 0 0 0
0 0 -0.3 0 0 0 -0.07 -0.23 0 0 0 0
Figure 1: Step Demand Function
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Table 1: Weighted Average Market Prices
1893 4.5 4 3.5 3.5 3 3.33 3 3 3 3.33 0 0
-0.71 0 0 0 0 -0.47 0 0 0 -0.35 0 0
1880 4 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1870 5.5 0 0 0 0 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0
-0.71 0 0 0 0 -0.12 0 0 0 0 0 0
1869 4 4 0 0 3.5 3.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 -0.47 0 0 0 0 0 0
 *Denotes 0.05          +Denotes only one transaction
**Denotes 0.10      ++ More than one transaction, no standard error
Table 2: Expect Versus Actual Affects of Drought
Year Expected Affects of Drought
June July August
1869
1870
1880 X
1893 X
1894 X X
Drought in Experiment 1
1869
1870
1880
1893
1894 X X
Drought in Experiment 2
1869
1870
1880
1893
1894 X
Harroun
The Park Place Economist, Volume XXI 67
Table 3: Total Number of Trades
Trading Month
Scenario Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
No Stack/
Call #1
6 7 5 1 3 4 3 3 7 5 1 0
1894 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
1893 2 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 4 1 0 0
1880 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1870 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1869 1 2 0 1 0 2 1 2 2 4 0 0
No Stack/
Call #2
8 6 6 2 4 6 5 3 3 2 0 0
1894 1 2 5 1 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 0
1893 2 1 1 1 3 2 3 1 2 2 0 0
1880 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1870 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1869 1 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4: Weighted Average Price by Priority Dates
Trading Month
Weighted 
Avg. Price
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
1869
Priority
4 4.25* 0 4.5* 3.5+ 4.86 6* 5.83* 3.6 3.56 0 0
0 -0.236 0 0 0 -1.258 0 -0.236 -0.118 -0.74 0 0
All Other 
Priorities
4.35 3.71 3.09 3.5 3.5 3.88 3 3.38 3.58 3.6 5 0
-1.047 -0.744 -0.499 0 -0.837 -1.315 -1.252 -0.739 -0.496 -0.5 0 0
Transactions by Priority Date
1869 2 5 0 1 1 3 1 2 2 4 0 0
All Other 
Priorities
12 9 10 2 6 7 8 4 8 3 1 0
* Denotes 0.05 significance + Denotes only one transaction
** Denotes 0.10 significance
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percent decline in manufacturing employment (BLS, 
February 2012). Despite government programs to level 
the playing field such as affirmative action laws and 
other aid that is available to those seeking employment, 
there is a continuous disparity among different ethnic 
groups. With regard to “The Great Recession,” there 
is a disparity among the unemployment rates of 
Hispanics and other ethnic groups. This paper intends to 
explain why there is a disparity. Specifically, it addresses 
reasons that the unemployment rates of Hispanics 
are more adversely affected by the Great Recession 
when compared to the unemployment rates of other 
minority groups. Also, did concentrations of Hispanics 
in adversely affected industries contribute to higher 
unemployment levels during the Great Recession?
II. THEORY
The theoretical framework of this paper is 
based on two economic theories: the human capital 
theory and the occupational segregation theory. In 
regard to the former, human capital is the productive 
capabilities that one possesses to generate income 
within an economy (Rosen, 2008). An individual 
with higher levels of human capital is less likely to be 
unemployed and more likely to be employed because 
of their productive capabilities. Furthermore, greater 
levels of human capital will allow individuals to be in 
corresponding industries that require higher levels of 
productivity. As a result, individuals with higher levels 
of human capital tend to be in industries that are less 
cyclical in nature and will suffer less during recessions.
 
As for human capital theory, the occupational 
segregation theory is also relevant to this research. 
According to Gordon Marshall (1998), sociologist and 
former chief executive of the Economic Social and 
Research Council, occupational segregation refers to 
labor being divided in such a way that groups of people 
are channeled into specific types of occupations with 
specific roles and tasks. Based on other studies such 
I. INTRODUCTION
As America continues to “reel” from the effects 
of the recession, unemployment rates continue to be 
a pertinent topic among politicians and the media. 
The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate increased 
from five percent in 2007 to 9.5 percent in 2009 
(Hoynes et. Al, 2012). Minorities are affected by the 
recession more than are whites. Specifically, Hispanics 
have suffered greatly as a result of the recession. “The 
recession has hit Hispanic employment relatively hard, 
resulting in employment that is 9.5 percent lower than 
it would have been if the recession had not occurred” 
(Engemann & Wall, 2010).
 
Similarly, certain industries have also been 
more adversely impacted by the recession. Most 
notably, blue-collar industries, such as manufacturing 
and construction, have been affected by the recession 
disproportionately comparing to other industries, such 
as education. The employment rate fell by 27 percent 
from the start of the recession in 2007 in the residential 
construction industry. Likewise, there was a 14.8 
percent decrease in employment during the recession 
in the nonresidential construction industry (Hadi, 2011). 
Although the employment rate declined the most in 
industries such as construction, more resilient industries 
such as hospitality and retail trade also experienced 
decreases in employment (Goodman & Mance, 2011).
While it is evident that the recession has 
affected a diversity of people in different ways of life, 
there is a unique connection between industries and 
ethnic groups. “Many of the demographic groups that 
exhibit larger cyclical variation such as those with lower 
education, minorities, and males, are more likely to 
be employed in the industries with greater exposure 
to cycles (Hoynes et. al, 2012). Construction and 
manufacturing have experienced the largest declines in 
employment rate of the post-WWII era, with a 13.7 
percent decline in construction employment and a 10.0 
The Effects of the Great Recession on the
Unemployment Rates of Minorities
in the United States
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as Catherine Hakim’s Key Issues in Women’s Work: 
Female Heterogeneity and the Polarisation of Women’s 
Employment (1996), Marshall links “channeling” or 
occupation segregation to discrimination. It is commonly 
explained as a consequence of discrimination (Marshall, 
1998). This “segregation” can take place among men 
and women or among different ethnic groups. For 
this research, the definition will be in reference to the 
latter. Specifically, Hispanics are being “sorted” into 
certain industries such as construction that were more 
adversely affected by the recession and in effect, are 
hurt more than other individuals in this sector and 
those that are not in this sector. This “sorting” may be 
due to human capital factors or lack thereof. Conversely, 
it could be due to discrimination. The means of sorting 
may be different, but the result is the same. 
These two theories work together to suggest 
why Hispanics in the labor market are at a disadvantage 
relative to other groups. Lower levels of human capital 
yield difficulties in finding work for Hispanics. Moreover, 
jobs that are successfully obtained by Hispanics tend to 
be in blue-collar industries.
In the research, there are three main hypotheses 
that flow from the theoretical framework: 
1. High unemployment rates among Hispanics 
are due to low levels of human capital;
2. Individuals with lower levels of human capital 
are less likely to be employed in “white collar” 
industries and thus, are more likely to be 
employed in “blue collar” industries; 
3. Hispanics are being channeled into “blue 
collar” industries, which were hit harder by 
the recession and thus, suffer more adverse 
consequences than those who are not in blue-
collar industries.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
As “The Great Recession” has wreaked havoc 
in the lives of many Americans, particularly Hispanics, 
much has been documented about the effects it has 
had and is still having on the nation as a whole. With 
regard to unemployment rates in general, African 
Americans and Hispanics have historically had higher 
unemployment rates than Whites (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, February 2012). Table 1 shows the 
unemployment rates of four different racial groups.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Hispanics and African Americans have been most 
adversely affected by the recession. Although African 
Americans have the highest unemployment rate after 
the recession at 16 percent, Hispanics have seen the 
biggest change in their unemployment rates with an 
increase of 7.3 percentage points between 2006 and 
2010. African Americans are a close second with a 
change of 7.1 percentage points. Whites and Asians 
have been less adversely affected with differences of 
4.7 and 4.5 percentage points respectively.
When compared to past recessions, greater 
declines in employment were experienced during “The 
Great Recession” than any other recession in history 
(BLS, February 2012). The Great Recession caused a 
7.9 percent decrease in employment, which is an even 
greater decline than experienced during the recession 
between 1981 and 1982 when there was a 6.0 percent 
total change in employment (Engemann & Wall, 2010). 
“Despite recent improvements, the labor market 
continues to struggle from the aftermath of a historic 
employment downturn” (Goodman & Mance, 2011). 
The literature points to specific industries 
that have been hit more than others by the recession 
and, as a result, these are some of the industries that 
continue to suffer even after the recession has officially 
ended. According to Goodman and Mance (2011), 
manufacturing employment fell 14.6 percent, from 2007 
to 2009. Also, the automobile industry’s employment fell 
35 percent during the recession. Similarly, construction 
employment fell by 19.8 percent during the recession, 
seeing the most devastating depths in employment 
since March 1998 (Hadi, 2011).
Working in these industries, there is a 
disproportionate amount of Hispanic workers compared 
to other minority and ethnic groups. According to the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 11 percent of all Hispanics 
are in the construction industry (September 2012). 
Comparatively, 3.3 percent of African Americans and 
7.2 percent of whites are in the construction industry. 
Similarly, the leisure and hospitality industry as well as 
the manufacturing industry employ a higher percentage 
of Hispanics at 13 percent and 11 percent, respectively. 
Table 2 shows the percentage of each race in a given 
industry for 2011.
The coalescence of the recession, race, and 
industry has been evident in other studies, especially 
during economic downturns. According to Gregory 
Defreitas (1985), the single most important factor is 
the above-average elasticity of Hispanics’ employment 
with respect to variations in aggregate demand. In 
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other words, because Hispanics are employed in 
industries that are based on the demand of consumers 
or the cyclicality of the economy, they bear “harsher” 
consequences from recessions and are in effect, more 
adversely affected. Conversely, other studies approach 
the effect of the recession on Hispanics in terms of 
human capital factors. For instance, a study conducted 
by Boisjoly and Duncan (1994) concluded that lower 
levels of education accounted for the difference in 
employment numbers between Hispanics, other 
minorities, and whites.
From the literature, one can make the 
conclusion that human capital factors such as educational 
attainment and occupational segregation across 
industries are pertinent in explaining why Hispanics 
were adversely affected by the Great Recession. 
However, this paper will contribute to the literature 
by focusing on the effects of the Great Recession on 
Hispanics rather than comparing recessions or looking 
at less severe recessions.
IV. DATA & EMPIRICAL MODEL
The data is collected from the American 
Community Survey that is distributed by IPUMS-USA 
at the University of Minnesota. This database is chosen 
because of the large sample size and the variables that 
are accounted for in this survey. Specifically, the years 
2006 and 2010 are chosen to account for the boom 
year, 2006, when unemployment levels were low, and 
the recession year, 2010, when unemployment levels 
were persistently high. Although people of all ages 
are included in the sample with over 6 million cases, 
only “working age” individuals are considered in this 
research. Similarly, individuals in the work force and out 
of the work force are included in the sample, but only 
individuals in the work force are considered.
Descriptive statistics will be used to compare 
unemployment rates before and after the recession. 
Change in the percentage points of unemployment 
rates before and after the recession will be used to 
measure the effects of the recession. Specifically, change 
in the percentage points of unemployment rates by 
race and industry will be analyzed. In connection with 
my hypotheses, there will be a greater change in the 
unemployment rate before and after the recession 
among Hispanic workers in blue collar industries such 
as construction and manufacturing.
When considering the effects of the recession, 
three regressions will be used to account for various 
factors such as human capital, age, and gender. Specifically, 
unemployment will be the dependent variable. Model 1 
will account for race and the recession year. Therefore, 
the regression will be as follows:
Unemployment= ß0 + ß1(Race) + ß3(Rec Yr)
 
Next, model 2 will be ran to account for human capital 
factors such as age, language, years in the United States, 
educational attainment, and gender. Model 2 is as follows:
Unemployment= ß0 + ß1(Race) + ß2(Rec Yr) + 
ß3(Language) + ß4(Age) + ß5(Yrs. in the U.S.) 
+ß6(Gender) + ß7( Ed
n)
Lastly, model 3 will take industry into consideration. 
Hence, model 3 is as follows:
Unemployment= ß0 + ß1(Race) + ß2 (Ed
n) + ß3(Yrs. in 
the U.S.) + ß4(Language) + ß5 (Rec Yr) + ß6 (Age) + ß7 
(Gender) + ß8 (Industry)
In models 2 and 3, language, gender, 
unemployment, age, and industry are all dummy 
variables. This model will account for both human 
capital issues and occupational issues in regard to the 
theoretical framework of this paper.
 The groups included in this research are 
defined as follows:
•	 Asians (NonHispanAsian)
•	 African Americans (Black)
•	 Other minorities (NonHispanOther)
•	 Hispanics (Hispanic)
•	 Whites (NonHispanwhite)
•	 Non-Hispanic Blacks (NonHispBlack)
These groups are all dummy variables with the value 
of 0 or 1.
 Educational attainment was also considered 
and is defined as follows:
•	 High school diploma (HSdiploma)
•	 Some college (Somecollege)
•	 Bachelor’s degree (Bachelorsdegree)
•	 Masters + (Masterplus)
Likewise, these variables are dummy variables with a 
value of 0 or 1.
 People of all ages are included in the sample; 
however, because people usually do not begin to work 
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until their teen years, age in this research will be split 
into five groups:
•	 Young people (16-26)
•	 Mid twenties & thirties (27-36)
•	 Mid thirties & forties (37-46)
•	 Mid forties & fifties (47-56)
•	 Mid fifties & sixties (57-66)
With regard to industry, the industries 
included in this research are as follows: agriculture, 
mining, construction, retail trade, transportation and 
warehousing, utilities, information and communications, 
finance, professional services, education/health and 
social services, the arts, public administration, and other 
services. All these industries are dummy variables, 
possessing a value of 1 if employed in the given industry 
and 0 if one is not in the given industry.
Language is an important variable in this 
research as well. It is a dummy variable having a value of 
0 if English is not the primary language spoken and 1 if 
English is the primary language spoken.
It is hypothesized that the following variables 
will have positive signs: Hispanic, language, recession 
year, age, and gender. In agreement with the literature, 
males will have higher unemployment rates than 
females. Education will have a negative sign, decreasing 
unemployment as more education is attained. Years 
in the United States will also have a negative sign, 
decreasing unemployment as the number of years in 
the United States increases.
The industry variable will have a positive sign 
if it is an industry that was more adversely impacted 
by the recession. This means that the given industry 
will add percentage points to unemployment rates. 
Conversely, the industry variable will possess a negative 
sign if the given industry is less adversely impacted 
by the recession. Hence, percentage points will be 
deducted from the unemployment rates of individuals 
within the given industry.
V. RESULTS
In conjunction with the hypotheses of this paper, 
Hispanics are in fact channeled into certain industries. 
Moreover, Hispanics are concentrated in industries that 
are more adversely impacted by the recession. Table 3 
shows the percentage of all employed individuals of a 
given race within an industry. In 2006, 8.3 percent of all 
employed Hispanics were in the retail trade industry. 
This figure increases to 10 percent in 2010, the highest 
of any race in 2010. Similarly, 6.9 percent of all employed 
Hispanics were in the construction industry in 2006; 
6.5 percent of all employed Hispanics were in the 
construction industry in 2010. In 2010, whites, blacks, 
other minorities, and blacks enjoyed lower percentages 
in this industry at 4 percent, 2.8 percent, 4 percent, and 
4.1 percent, respectively. 
Similarly, Hispanics are more concentrated in the 
arts and entertainment industry. Before the recession, 
7 percent of all employed Hispanics were in the arts 
and entertainment industry. This figure increased to 
8.6 percent after the recession. In comparison, only 5.5 
percent and 5.7 percent of all employed whites were in 
the arts and entertainment industry in 2006 and 2010, 
respectively. Likewise, only 5.4 percent of all employed 
Asians were in the arts and entertainment industry in 
2006, increasing minutely to 5.5 percent in 2010. 
  
 With regard to Hispanics, approximately 
two-fifths of all Hispanics are in industries that were 
heavily impacted by the recession. However, some are 
in the professional services industry, a “white-collar” 
industry. This finding is in opposition to my hypotheses. 
Furthermore, it shows that some Hispanics are in 
“white-collar” industries; nonetheless, it still speaks to 
the testimony that Hispanics were in industries that 
were heavily impacted by the recession. Specifically, 
7.1 percent of all employed Hispanics were in the 
professional services industry in 2010, the highest 
percentage among the included groups. 
  
 In concurrence with the aforementioned 
descriptive statistics, the regression results for models 1, 
2, and 3 each present results that are in agreement with 
the three hypotheses of this paper. Table 4 shows the 
coefficients for each regression model before and after 
the recession. The constant for Model 1 is .029 before 
the recession and .050 after the recession; i.e., without 
controlling for anything, there is an unemployment rate 
of 2.9 percent before the recession and 5 percent 
after the recession. Recall, Model 1 accounts for race 
and whether or not it was a recession year or not. In 
conjunction with the literature, blacks have the highest 
coefficient at .030 before and after the recession. 
Merely being black adds 3 percentage points to the 
unemployment rate. Hispanics are second with .7 
percentage points added to their unemployment rate. 
Asians and other minorities are impacted less when 
only accounting for race and the year.
In addition to race, Model 1 also accounts for 
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the year. In 2006, a boom year, the coefficient is negative. 
That is, one was less likely to be unemployed in 2006. 
Specifically, 2.1 percentage points could be deducted 
from unemployment rates on account of the year. 
Conversely, in 2010, a year after the recession officially 
ended, the coefficient carried a positive sign. This 
means that the year impacted unemployment rates in 
a negative manner. After the recession, 2.1 percentage 
points were added to unemployment rates.
Model 2 accounts for human capital and 
demographic factors in addition to the factors accounted 
for in Model 1. These additional variables include 
language, age, years in the United States, educational 
attainment, and gender. With the exception of years in 
the United States, these factors had a negative impact 
on unemployment rates, adding percentage points to 
unemployment rates.
Compared to older individuals, young people 
were more likely to be unemployed before and after the 
recession. In 2006 and 2010, 6.5 additional percentage 
points were added to the unemployment rates of 
young people. In relation to the human capital theory, 
as individuals increase their education, unemployment 
becomes less likely. In Table 4, Model 2, as more 
education is obtained, the sign changes from positive to 
negative. Both before and after the recession, individuals 
with some college are still impacted negatively with .9 
percentage points being added to their unemployment 
rates. However, individuals with a bachelors or masters 
degree decrease their unemployment rates by 1.1 and 
.7 percentage points, respectively. 
With regard to gender and in conjunction with 
the literature, males are more adversely impacted by 
the recession when compared to women. Men have 
an additional .9 percentage points added to their 
unemployment rate. 
The language variable also possessed a positive 
sign. When compared to individuals who do not speak 
English, those who do speak English suffer higher levels 
of unemployment. A substantial 1.1 percentage points 
are added to the unemployment rates of those who 
speak English.
Surprisingly, years in the United States do not 
add or subtract percentage points from unemployment 
rates. Although it is statistically significant at the .000 
level, it is insignificant in regard to unemployment rates. 
This could be due to how years in the United States 
were measured. Unlike the other variables, years in the 
United States are an absolute variable, not a dummy 
variable. Nonetheless, years in the United States are not 
an important variable in this research.
Finally, Model 3 considers industry as well as 
the aforementioned variables accounted for in models 1 
and 2. By way of this model and the descriptive statistics 
presented in Table 3, my hypothesis that Hispanics are 
concentrated in blue-collar industries that were hit 
harder by the recession and thus, are more adversely 
impacted by the recession is proven. In 2006, being in 
the construction industry added 3.6 percentage points 
to unemployment rates. In 2010, this figure ballooned 
to 11.8. That is, 11.8 percentage points were added to 
the unemployment rates of those in the construction 
industry.
Recall, in 2006, 6.9 percent of all employed 
Hispanics were employed in the construction industry. 
Although this figure decreased by .4 percentage points 
to 6.5 percent, there was still a higher concentration of 
Hispanics in the construction industry and hence, their 
concentration within this industry contributed to their 
high unemployment rates. 
Similarly, the manufacturing industry shared a 
similar story. In 2006, being in the manufacturing industry 
added 2 percentage points to their unemployment 
rates. In 2010, this figure increased to 6.2 percent. The 
retail trade and arts/entertainment industries also saw 
increases before and after the recession in relation to 
unemployment. In 2006, 2 and 5.3 percentage points 
were added to the unemployment rates of those in 
the retail trade and arts/entertainment industries, 
respectively. In 2010, these figures increased to 4.6 and 
5.3 percent.
In contrast to the hypotheses of this paper, 
the professional services industry, a white-collar 
industry, was an adversely impacted industry in which 
Hispanics were employed. Like the other four industries 
mentioned, there was an increase in the coefficient for 
this industry before and after the recession. Before the 
recession, this industry added 2.8 percentage points to 
the unemployment rates of those within the industry. In 
2010, this figure jumped to 5.9 percent. 
Although this industry is a white collar industry, 
notice the percentage of Hispanics in this industry. 
According to Table 3, 5.8 percent of all employed 
Hispanics were in the professional services industry 
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in 2006, compared to 6.3 percent of all employed 
whites, Asians, and other minorities, and 6.2 percent of 
all employed blacks. Perhaps the difference between 
Hispanics and everyone else is educational attainment. 
Normally, this industry requires higher levels of 
education. In connection with one of my hypothesis, 
this shows that low levels of educational attainment 
does contribute to the high unemployment rates of 
Hispanics. In 2010, Hispanics led all other racial groups 
with 7.1 percent of all employed Hispanics being in the 
professional services industry. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
By way of this research, there are many 
conclusions that can be made. For instance, as levels of 
human capital increase, an individual is less likely to be 
unemployed. In connection with one of the hypotheses, 
individuals with less human capital are more likely to 
be unemployed and are thus, less likely to be in “white 
collar” industries. Low levels of human capital are a 
factor that is affecting Hispanics employment or lack 
thereof. 
Also, the descriptive statistics used in Table 3 
show that there are high concentrations of Hispanics 
in industries that were more adversely affected by the 
recession. The regression results show that some of 
these industries that Hispanics were highly concentrated 
experienced high levels of unemployment after the 
recession. Specifically, cyclical industries like construction, 
manufacturing, retail trade, and the arts contained high 
concentrations of Hispanics and were hit harder by 
the recession compared to other industries. Also, the 
professional services industry, a white-collar industry, 
was adversely impacted. Hence, Hispanics were 
channeled into industries that were hit hard by the 
recession and consequently, suffered more adversely 
compared to other minorities and whites.
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS/ FUTURE RESEARCH
There are serious policy implications that flow 
directly from this research. It is evident that there are 
high concentrations of Hispanics in particular industries, 
some of which experience high levels of unemployment. 
Work needs to be done to increase human capital 
levels among Hispanics. Work programs that allow 
individuals to increase their educational attainment and 
work simultaneously need to be made more readily 
available to Hispanics. Also, colleges and universities 
need to continue to seek talent from all demographic 
groups, in an effort to give everyone in America an 
equal opportunity to succeed. 
Future research could focus more on 
immigrants. Specifically, are Hispanic immigrants more 
adversely affected by recessions than Hispanic natives? 
Also, do the same factors affect the unemployment 
rates of Hispanic natives and Hispanic immigrants? 
Lastly, is there a factor that has a greater net effect on 
the unemployment rates of Hispanic immigrants and 
Hispanic natives before and after the recession? These 
types of questions should be considered in the future 
to better understand why these Hispanics suffer more 
during and after recessions.
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IX. APPENDIX
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Average Unemployment Rates Before and After the Recession
Year Whites African American Asians Hispanics
2006 4% 8.9% 3% 5.2%
2010 8.7% 16% 7.5% 12.5%
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Industry Employment in 2011
Industry African Americans Hispanics Whites
Construction 3.3% 11% 7.2%
Ed’n and Health
Services
22.8% 17% 22%
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade
13.3% 15% 14.3%
Leisure and Hospitality 9.5% 13% 8.8%
Professional & Business 
Services
9.1% 12% 11.5%
Manufacturing 8.3% 11% 10.4%
Table 3: Descriptive statistics: Distribution of Employed Individuals by Race & Industry 
Whites Blacks Other Minorities Asians Hispanics
Industry 2006 2010 2006 2010 2006 2010 2006 2010 2006 2010
Construction 4.5% 4% 3.1% 2.8% 4.4% 4% 4.6% 4.1% 6.9% 6.5%
Manufacturing 8% 6.9% 7.3% 6.6% 8% 6.9% 8% 6.8% 7.9% 7.2%
Retail Trade 8.9% 9.2% 8.3% 9.4% 8.9% 9.2% 9% 9.2% 8.3% 10%
Arts/
Entertainment
5.5% 5.7% 6.7% 7.5% 5.4% 5.7% 5.4% 5.5% 7% 8.6%
Professional 
Services
6.3% 6.7% 6.2% 7% 6.3% 6.7% 6.3% 6.5% 5.8% 7.1%
All other
industris
66.8% 67.5% 68.4% 66.7% 67% 67.5% 66.7% 67.9% 64.1% 60.6%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 4: Regression results for Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variables Before Rec After Rec Before Rec After Rec Before Rec After Rec
Constant .050 .029 .028 .007 .031 .014
(32.674) (18.990) (17.954) (4.323) (20.032) (9.412)
Hispanic .007 .007 .007 .007 .006 .005
(4.561) (4.561) (4.582) (4.582) (4.027) (3.296)
Black .030 .030 .028 .028 .028 .030
(116.452) (116.452) (107.320) (107.320) (110.481) (117.247)
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NonHispan
Asian
.000*** .000*** -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002
(1.039) (1.039) (-4.518) (-4.518) (-4.248) (-5.262)
NonHispan
Other
-.005*** -.005*** -.004*** -.004*** -.004*** -.004***
(-3.271) (-3.271) (-2.411) (-2.411) (-2.621) (-2.528)
LanguageEng .011 .011 .010 .008
(43.425) (43.425) (38.859) (32.137)
Youngppl .065 .065 .061 .060
(275.803) (275.803) (257.818) (256.581)
Yrs. In the US .000 .000 .000 .000
(39.264) (39.264) (34.909) (27.343)
Somecollege .009 .009 .007 .005
(45.258) (45.258) (36.672) (23.301)
Bachelors
degree
-.011 -.011 -.010 -.009
(-37.949) (-37.949) (-36.508) (-33.283)
Mastersplus -.007 -.007 .006 -.004
(-18.345) (-18.345) (-15.628) (-9.744)
Male .009 .009 .007 .003
(55.876) (55.876) (43.012) (16.721)
afterrec .021 .021 .002
(131.864) (132.350) (13.601)
beforereec -.021 -.021 -.029
(-131.864) (-132.350) (-165.419)
Construction .036 .118
(63.717) (202.048)
Manfacturing .020 .062
(45.977) (134.249)
Retail Trade .020 .046
(47.953) (112.299)
ArtsEnter-
tainmentetc
.034 .053
(65.451) (105.498)
Professional
serv
.024 .059
(58.142) (125.656)
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I. INTRODUCTION
It’s not the amount of water that matters, it’s the 
quality of the water consumed that is most important. 
For an agricultural continent, like Africa, that relies so 
heavily on physical labor, improvements in water quality 
could improve health for those employed on farms. 90 
percent of human health depends on consumed water, 
making the availability of safe drinking water a top 
priority in African nations. 
UNICEF’s seventh Millennium Development 
Goal is to reduce the portion of people without access 
to safe drinking water and basic sanitation in half by 
2015. Failure to obtain safe water leads to widespread 
diseases like cholera and infant diarrhea. The poor 
health of an economy can be attributed to unclean 
water and lack of proper sanitation facilities, which in 
turn can hinder the learning potential of children and 
the further development of the country as a whole. 
Lakes, rivers, and ground water are all sources 
from which people can obtain drinking water. Water 
from each source will need to go through some 
purification processes to attain the acceptable level 
before it can be consumed. Whether or not water 
can be used for drinking after being treated heavily 
depends on the raw water source quality. For example, 
surface water collects hazardous runoff as it flows 
through rivers, which needs more purification, while 
most ground water is mildly contaminated and requires 
less treatment. There are two methods of treatment: 
point of entry treatment and point of use treatment. 
Disinfecting is a point of use treatment, but it does not 
ensure that drinking water is safe. The chemicals used 
during point of use treatment to disinfect pathogens are 
a health hazard in high quantities.
Only 62 percent of Africans have access 
to safe water. 75 percent of drinking water comes 
from groundwater and is consumed with little or no 
purification. And when drinking water is not easily 
accessible on land, women bear the burden of collecting 
it. In research done by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and UNICEF, it found that women in African 
are more than five times as likely as men to walk to a 
source in order to collect drinking water for the entire 
household.
In Africa, poor legislation on water pollution 
and regulation of water activities leave much of the 
raw water sources untreated and unprotected. Dirty, 
contaminated water leads to an ongoing cycle of poor 
health, which in turn impacts more aspects of life such as 
the level of education attainment existing poverty. Since 
85 percent of water resources in African are shared 
river basins there is unequal usage of the water among 
citizens. This is due to the varying social, political, and 
economics structures adopted by individual countries. 
The different priorities of each country result in large 
fluctuations in usage and high demand for water. 
Safe drinking water is scarce in Africa primarily 
due to practices of open defecation and poor sanitation 
facilities. Fecal pollution is among the most pressing 
concerns on the continent with regards to safe drinking 
water. In addition, fecal pollution is the largest contributor 
of water born diseases such as typhoid. 
Poor water quality in the region is also a result of 
untreated waste water, such as industrial and domestic 
waste, entering water sources. The combination of 
dangerous waste and naturally existing chemicals in 
the bed rock allow for disease and contamination to 
spread. Water, therefore, has an extremely high level of 
toxic pollutants such as heavy metals, persistent organic 
pollutants, and biological contaminants. It is difficult for 
African countries to implement water management 
programs because many African governments do not 
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establish water quality monitoring programs. Data on 
water pollution in present day is also as a result very 
limited, as are analytic laboratories where water quality 
can be studied. Without a structured framework for 
water governance, it has become apparent that African 
governments are finding it hard to manage their own 
water sources efficiently.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
There are several paths that can lead towards 
improved water quality and sanitation facilities. Working 
with governments to improve technology and hygiene 
education decreases the inefficiencies in wasted 
freshwaters and the need for treatment. Developing low 
cost programs that address efficient use and promote 
hygiene should be the primary focus of African countries. 
The African Development Bank Group founded in 1964 
works on several developmental efforts throughout 
the continent including water and sanitation (OWAS). 
The OWAS department reported on the water and 
sanitation index of development effectiveness in Sub-
Saharan Africa in February of 2012. The study compares 
the countries’ performance in the water and sanitation 
sectors and analyzes how well the outputs correlate with 
the resources and developmental aid that they receive 
(Stampini, et. al., 2012). This is compiled in the Watsan 
Index of Development Effectiveness (WIDE). Gabon 
and Mauritius were found to be better off in terms 
of resources than the other Sub-Saharan countries, in 
that they received over 10 USD per capita per year of 
Official Development Aid (ODA) to assist their water 
and sanitation sectors (Stampini, et. al., 2012). Gabon, 
in addition, also has more water resources per capita, 
about 58 times more than Mauritius. Mauritius, while 
lacking in water resources, has the least amount of 
corruption and the best governing body to allow for 
progress and efficient use of resources (Stampini, et. 
al., 2012).  Relative to Gabon and Mauritius, Zimbabwe 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo have the 
least amount of ODA per capita and water resources 
in addition to having a highly unstable government 
structure that is more conducive to corruption and less 
likely to successfully implement new initiatives. This study 
helps clarify the positive relationship between GDP and 
ODA on water quality and sanitation; however it does 
not address the impacts of education or human capital’s 
impact on water quality. 
With respect to the quality of life, research has 
found that there are non-economic factors that impact 
the quality of life, in addition to the conventionally 
measured economic factors of income, growth, poverty, 
and inequality (Lee, et.al., 1982). Non-economic 
measures such as happiness, satisfaction, and optimism 
react slowly and are more costly to measure than the 
conventional economic factors. In addition, growth in 
economic factors, such as an increase in per capita 
income, does not necessarily correspond with increases 
in the general well being of human life (Rossouw, 2008). 
Despite the difficulty of measuring these variables, 
the quality of life measurements can prove useful for 
policy makers. Nleya (2008) claims that there is a direct 
relationship between the standard of water services and 
the poverty level. Kapatamoyo (2004) similarly states 
that the mere lack of clean water is a manifestation 
of poverty, which has serious consequences for the 
survival of individuals and communities. 
As of 1990, the United Nations Development 
Program created the Human Development Index that 
averages values for income, life expectancy, and literacy 
into a single measure (Rossow, 2007). The purpose of 
the measure is to shift policy focus away from national 
income accounting to people centered policies. This 
shift is done in order to evaluate human development 
by not only economic advances, but also through 
improvements in overall human well-being. But critics 
of the HDI say that life expectancy and literacy are too 
closely correlated with Gross National Product (GNP) 
per capita, which makes the index redundant. Rossouw 
and Naude (2007) developed their own measures 
and found that in South Africa the most populous 
cities were not the cities with the best geographical 
and environmental quality of life. The areas with the 
highest quality of life were those that were sparsely 
populated with lower than average per capita income. 
While their research looks at the relationship between 
non-economic factors and quality of life, there is little 
research on the impacts of water accessibility or water 
cleanliness on quality of life. 
The benefits of higher quality water and 
sanitation suggest lower healthcare costs and an increase 
in productivity of workers (Hutton et al., 2007). On the 
cost side, the water supply and sanitation industry is a 
natural monopoly because the fixed costs for entering 
the industry are so high. Due to the class nature of water 
problems, there is no real incentive for elites to invest in 
this industry if they already have water security, which is 
the idea that water is accessible and affordable to allow 
people to lead a healthy, dignified, and productive life and 
that ecological systems are maintained in a sustainable 
level (Nleya, 2008). By encouraging investment in this 
monopolistic market, Nleya (2008) states it is important 
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to produce at the socially optimal level instead of at 
the profit maximization level, which will allow for water 
security to increase for more individuals and ultimately 
positively impacting their quality of life. 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
 Grossmand and Krueger (1995) along with 
the World Bank found that pollution in developing 
economies first increases and then decreases as the 
country’s wealth increases over time. They captured this 
theory in the environmental Kuznets curve (henceforth 
EKC). This is similar to Simon Kuzenets’ idea of income 
inequality. It can be seen from the figure that, income 
inequality and pollution is greatest for middle-income 
countries. Grossmand and Krueger (1995) support 
their findings from air and water quality experiments, 
which is why their conclusions can hold true for water 
and sanitation. These conclusions seem reasonable as 
most developing countries do not have the technology 
or resources with which to produce sustainably. Thus, as 
a country becomes more financially stable and wealthy, 
it can be expected that the country will have more 
resources to dedicate towards improving production 
processes that reduce pollution. 
 
 The EKC can be divided up into three parts: 
scale, composition, and technique. In theory, as an 
economy grows the scale of all activities increases 
proportionally. This implies that pollution will grow 
proportionally to the economy’s growth. However, the 
growth of an economy can change if the composition 
of the goods produced change. For example, if richer 
countries produce less polluting goods, due to a 
change in preferences, then the composition effect 
leads to a decline in overall pollution as economic 
growth continues. In addition, pollution also falls if 
richer countries adopt new technological practices that 
reduce pollution residuals. 
Greater economic activity hurts the 
environment initially due to the lack of technology and 
environmental investments available for low-income 
countries. However, as income rises, the demand for 
improvements in environmental quality increases; 
resources available for investment will also increase. 
Beckerman (1992) claims that “there is clear evidence 
that, although economic growth usually leads to 
environmental degradation in the early stages of the 
process, in the end the best-and probably the only-
way to attain a decent environment in most countries 
is to become rich.” Therefore, countries should strive 
to increase their overall national income, in hopes of 
reducing pollution in the future.
According to the United Nations, many African 
nations are in the pre-industrial economy stage and 
are classified by the United Nations as least developed 
countries (LDCs). Thirty-four African countries fit the 
criteria of an LDC (See Appendix A for a complete 
list). Criteria for inclusion in this category include (a) a 
gross national income per capita of 750 dollars or less, 
(b) a weak human assets index that reflects nutrition, 
health, education, and adult literacy, and (c) economic 
vulnerability as measured by instability in agricultural 
production and instability in exports. 
Using the EKC framework of Grossmand and 
Krueger (1995), it is therefore hypothesized that GDP, 
HDI, and ODA (defined in Appendix B) will have a 
positive impact on water quality and sanitation.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH, DESIGN, & DATA
A simple OLS regression of paneled data is 
conducted. The four regressions, shown below, predict 
improved water sources and improved sanitation facilities 
respectively, definitions for all variables can be found 
in the Appendix. The first two regressions predict the 
dependent variables separately through HDI and ODA, 
and the second set of regressions includes ODA and 
GDP. GDP and HDI are collinear variables that generally 
move in the same direction, so to isolate their effects 
separate regressions were performed. HDI includes a 
Gross National Income (GNI) component that is similar 
to GDP, therefore by performing separate regressions 
eliminates the redundancy or double counting for GDP. 
The regressions run in SPSS as follows:
y1=Improved Water Source
y1=ß0 + ß1(LNODA) + ß2(LNODA) + ß3(1990)  + ß4(1995) 
+ ß5(2000) + ß6(2005) + ß7(2006) +  ß8(2007) + 
ß9(2008) + ß10(2009) + ß11(2010)
y2=Improved Water Source
y2=ß0 + ß1(HD1) + ß2(LNODA) + ß4(1995) + ß5(2000) + 
ß6(2005) + ß7(2006) + ß8(2007) + ß9(2008) + ß10(2009) 
+ ß11(2010)
y3=Improved Sanitation Facilities
y3=ß0 + ß1(HD1) + ß2(LNODA) + ß4(1995) + ß5(2000) + 
ß6(2005) + ß7(2006) + ß8(2007) + ß9(2008) + ß10(2009) 
+ ß11(2010)
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y4=Improved Sanitation Facilities
y4=ß0 + ß1(HD1) + ß2(LNODA) + ß4(1995) + ß5(2000) + 
ß6(2005) + ß7(2006) + ß8(2007) + ß9(2008) + ß10(2009) 
+ ß11(2010)
The data for this study is derived from the 
World Bank Dataset, which is an important source 
of financial and technical assistance to developing 
countries. Drawn from this data base were the following 
variables: Human Development Index, GDP per capita, 
Improved Sanitation Facilities, Improved Water Source, 
and Net Official Development Assistance received. See 
Appendix B for World Bank definitions of the variables 
as well as how they are calculated.
The time period for the data begins in 1990. 
Prior to 1990 few African countries reported per capita 
GDP and any other variable used. The years that include 
complete data are 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009 and 2010. The gaps in years can be attributed 
to the political turmoil of African countries, such as civil 
wars, which make gathering and sharing data costly 
and difficult. All African countries were included with 
the exception of Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, 
Somalia, and South Sudan due to the fact that little 
data is available for the above mentioned variables. See 
Appendix C for a full list of countries included in this 
study.
GDP and ODA were adjusted for by taking the 
natural log of each variable, so that the results were not 
dominated by one variable having large absolute values. 
This is an important step since HDI, IWS and ISF are in 
absolute terms which are relatively smaller than GDP 
and ODA. Ideally, literacy, life expectancy, employment, 
democratic freedom, government corruption levels and 
pollution variables would have been included, but data 
for those variables are not reported for the years used 
in this study. Instead the Human Development Index is 
used, which includes its own measures for literacy and 
life expectancy.
A control for time is also included. The data 
was compiled in a panel comprising of 50 countries 
over nine observed years. The regression spans a total 
of 450 observations. Cases in specific years where GDP, 
HDI or ODA were not reported were omitted from 
the regression.
V. RESULTS
This first regression, which is reported in Table 1, 
shows that both HDI and ODA have a significant impact 
on the accessibility of water. HDI increases accessibility 
to water by 84 points. On the other hand, a one percent 
change in ODA reduces accessibility by 3 percent. The 
sign for HDI is positive and thus consistent with the 
hypothesis. However, ODA is negative and thus does 
not support the original hypothesis that ODA would 
have a positive impact upon water quality. T-statistics for 
both values are greater than 2 or -2, which indicate that 
the coefficients are significant with a greater than 95 
percent confidence level. The R Square is 46.2 percent, 
which explains the total variation by HDI and ODA for 
the improved water source. The results indicate that 
there is a significant positive correlation between HDI 
and water quality, the greater the HDI is the greater 
the percentage of people with access to an improved 
water source.
In the regression shown in Table 2, the second 
regression, HDI has a greater impact on access to 
proper sanitation facilities than it did on accessibility to 
water. ODA has a negative impact but it is not significant 
at the 0.1 or 0.05 level, meaning the variable is unable 
to conclude its impact on sanitation. The t-statistic for 
HDI is greater than 2, indicating that the coefficient for 
the variable is significant above a 95 percent confidence 
level. The same cannot be said for ODA, since the 
t-statistic is less than -1.68, which is not significant with 
90 percent confidence level or greater. The hypothesis 
for HDI is supported in that it has a positive impact on 
sanitation, however the hypothesis does not hold true 
for ODA since it is not significant enough. 48.2 percent 
of the total variation in improved sanitation facilities 
variable is explained by HDI and ODA. The results 
indicate that there is a significant positive correlation 
between HDI and sanitation. The greater the HDI is, 
the greater the percentage of people with access to 
improved sanitation facilities.
In Table 3, for regression 3, we predict 
accessibility to water but with the use of GDP instead 
of HDI. The regression shows that both GDP and ODA 
have a significant impact on accessibility of water. A one 
percent change in GDP causes a 9.8 percent increase 
in accessibility to water, while a one percent change in 
ODA causes a 2 percent decrease in accessibility. The 
t-statistics for both variables are greater than 2 or -2, 
implying that the coefficients for those variables are 
significant with a greater than 95 percent confidence 
level. In addition both are significant at the p-value of 
0.05. 44.1 percent of the variability in the improved 
water source is explained by GDP and ODA. Despite 
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this, the hypothesis again does not hold true for 
ODA, but it does support the positive impact which 
was expected for GDP to have. Thus there is a strong 
positive correlation between GDP and improved water 
sources, so as GDP increases the percentage of people 
with access to quality water also increases. There is a 
negative correlation between ODA and an improved 
water source so as ODA increases the percentage of 
people with access to water decreases. 
Table 4 predicts accessibility to an improved 
sanitation facility by using GDP and ODA in regression 
4. The regression results show that GDP has a significant 
impact on access to better sanitation. A one percent 
change in GDP causes a 17.5 percent increase in 
accessibility to proper sanitation, while a one percent 
change in ODA causes a 0.678 percent increase in 
accessibility. However since the coefficient for ODA 
is not significant at the 0.1 or 0.05 levels we cannot 
conclude its impact on sanitation. The t-statistic for 
GDP is greater than 2, indicating that the coefficient is 
significant at significance level greater than 95 percent; 
my hypothesis holds true for GDP. However the same 
cannot be said for ODA. The t-statistic for ODA is 
less than 1.68 thus it is not significant at 90 percent 
confident level or greater. The results do not support 
the hypothesis because they do not show a significant 
positive correlation to improved sanitation facilities. 50.9 
percent of the variability in improved water sanitation 
can be explained by GDP and ODA. Thus as GDP 
increases we can expect the percentage of people with 
access to sanitation to also increase. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS & POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In conducting research on water quality and 
sanitation, it is expected to find that an increase in GDP, 
HDI and ODA would all correspond with an increase 
in water quality and sanitation. According to the theory 
underlying the EKC, the richer a country becomes the 
less polluted its environment should be. Less pollution 
implies fewer people pollute and water quality increases.
This study found that GDP had a significant 
positive impact on water quality and sanitation, meaning 
that as the GDP per capita in African countries 
increases it can be expected that the accessibility to 
quality water and proper sanitation increase. This 
implies that countries should continue to do what they 
have been doing in order to increase their GDP per 
capita. HDI also had a significant positive correlation 
to water and sanitation, implying that the components 
of HDI should also continue to improve. If a person 
lives a longer lifespan, they become more educated, 
and make a greater income. With a larger income, the 
people of African are more likely to invest and promote 
accessibility to water sources and improved sanitation 
facilities. 
Taking this research further, there is a dire 
need for data collection on the African continent. 
Specifically, a database needs to be developed over 
time so that it includes more direct variables that could 
predict quality water. These variables should include: the 
distance and time it takes to collect water on a regular 
basis, pollution levels of nearest water source, amount 
of surface and ground water available in the country, 
and lastly an index that measures the stability of the 
government. An increase in the amount of surface or 
ground water available would mean that, that country 
should most likely receive more aid in developing 
better water management systems because they have 
the natural resources available to work with. In addition 
if an index were developed to measure the stability 
of the government over time, the more stable the 
government, the less likely it is that corruption will take 
place. If there’s less corruption, then the success rate 
of a water and sanitation management program is a 
lot higher, and thus the likelihood of improving water 
quality and sanitation increases. 
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VIII. APPENDIX
Table 1: Regression Results: Dependent Variable is Improved Water Source
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic 
HDI 84.63* 15.004
LN_ODA -2.889* -4.949
Adj R Squared .462
Sample Size 390
* Denotes significanct at the .05 level
Table 2: Regression Results: Dependent Variable is Improved Sanitation Facilities 
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic 
HDI 138.635* 17.729
LN_ODA -.973 -1.192
Adj R Squared .482
Sample Size 394
*Denotes significant at the .05 level
Table 3: Regression Results: Dependent Variable is Improved Water Source
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic
LN_GDP 9.841* 14.312
LN_ODA -2.377* -3.898
Adj R Squared .441
Sample Size 424
*Denotes significant at the .05 level
Table 4: Regression Results: Dependent Variable is Improved Sanitation Facilities 
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic 
LN_GDP 17.504* 19.672
LN_ODA .678 .849
Adj R Squared .509
Sample Size 426
*Denotes significant at the .05 level
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Appendix A: List of Least Developed Countries in Africa
Angola Djibouti Liberia Sierra
Benin Equatorial Guinea Madagascar Sao Tome and Principe
Burkina Faso Eritrea Malawi Sudan
Burundi Ethiopia Mali Somalia
Cape Verde Gambia Mauritania Tanzania
Central African Republic Ghana Mozambique Togo
Chad Guinea Niger
Comoros Guinea-Bissau Rwanda Uganda
Conog, Dem. Rep. Lesotho Senegal Zambia
Source: United Nations
Appendix B: Definitions of ariables used and how they are mesaured 
Human Development Index
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of human development. It measures 
the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and 
healthy life (health), access to knowledge (education) and a decent standard of living (income). The 
HDI was created to emphasize that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for 
assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone. The HDI can also be used to 
question national policy choices, asking how two countries with the same level of GNI per capita can 
end up with such different human development outcomes.
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross 
value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsi-
dies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreci-
ation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 
U.S. dollars.
Improved Water Source (% of population with access)
Access to an improved water source refers to the percentage of the population with reasonable 
access to an adequate amount of water from an improved source, such as a household connection, 
public standpipe, borehole, protected well or spring, and rainwater collection. Unimproved sources 
include vendors, tanker trucks, and unprotected wells and springs. Reasonable access is defined as the 
availability of at least 20 liters a person a day from a source within one kilometer of the dwelling.
Improved Sanitation Facilities ( % of population with access)
Access to improved sanitation facilities refers to the percentage of the population with at least 
adequate access to excreta disposal facilities that can effectively prevent human, animal, and insect 
contact with excreta. Improved facilities range from simple but protected pit latrines to flush toilets 
with a sewerage connection. To be effective, facilities must be correctly constructed and properly 
maintained.
Net Official Developmental Assistance
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Net official development assistance (ODA) consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional 
terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the De-
velopment Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to 
promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA re-
cipients. It includes loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate) of discount 
of 10 percent). Data are in constant 2009 U.S. dollars.
Appendix C: African countries included in empirical study 
Algeria Cote d’Ivoire Liberia Rwanda
Angola Djibouti Libya Senegal
Benin Egypt, Arab Rep. Madagascar Sierra Leone
Botswana Equatorial Guinea Malawi South Africa
Burkina Faso Eritrea Mali Sudan
Burundi Ethiopia Mauritania Swaziland
Cameroon Gabon Mauritius Tanzania 
Cape Verde Gambia, The Morocco Togo
Central African Re-
public
Ghana Mozambique Tunisia
Chad Guinea Nambia Uganda
Comoros Guinea-Bissau Niger Zambia
Congo, Dem. Rep. Kenya Nigeria Zimbabwe
Congo, Rep. Lesotho
Note: Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, and South Sudan were excluded from study due to 
data inaccessibility.
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I.INTRODUCTION
Driving through Washington, D.C. today is 
noticeably different from twenty years ago. In the 
1980s and early 1990s, the crack epidemic took hold of 
Washington D.C. and in 1991, the murder rate peaked 
at 479 deaths (NBC4 Washington, 2011). Since then, 
crime has plummeted and investment in the poverty-
stricken areas is on the rise. According to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, from 1995 until 2010, the 
violent crime rate in Washington, D.C. fell by more 
than half from 2,661.4 per 100,000 individuals in 1995 
to 1,330.2 per 100,000 in 2010 (FBI, 1995, 2011). 
During that same timeframe, the median housing price 
(2010 $) rose three-fold from $176,000 to $528,000 
(NeighborhoodInfo DC, 2011). These astonishing 
changes are not a mere coincidence. There is a definite 
social phenomenon called ‘gentrification’ occurring in 
the nation’s capital.  
This project looks at the relationship between 
gentrification and violent crime rates, specifically in 
Washington, DC. Gentrification is a social phenomenon 
that involves middle and upper class residents 
moving into the city center where violent crime had 
previously acted as a barrier for keeping unwanted 
demographics out. An increase in demand for housing 
by the higher income residents drives up the cost of 
housing which, in turn, forces out the lower income 
residents. Higher income residents generally have 
lower crime rates, so the crime rate falls as the lower 
income residents with higher crime rates move. This, 
however, is all theory. This study explores whether 
crime rates fall as a result of these upper income 
families moving in or if the drop in crime is one more 
reason the upper income residents want to move.
II. THEORY & LITERATURE REVIEW
As gentrification is a pressing phenomenon, 
large amounts of literature have been devoted to it, and 
more specifically, its relationship with crime. McDonald 
(1986) provides somewhat of a literature review, albeit 
a dated one, of the competing theories regarding the 
effects of gentrification. McDonald (1986) characterizes 
gentrification as “the apparent revitalization of central 
city private housing markets”. An important distinction 
that must be made in that definition is the existence of 
a population shift. Simply upgrading the housing supply 
by long-term residents does not qualify as gentrification. 
There has to be a movement of middle and upper-class 
people into what was formerly a predominately lower-
class neighborhood.  
While it may seem that this ‘revitalization’ will 
be a positive influence on neighborhoods, the theory 
is not so cut-and-dry. In Fairmount, a neighborhood of 
Philadelphia that previously had strong ethnic bonds, 
upper class residents with different cultural norms moved 
in and led to direct conflict escalating into violence with 
the lower class, long-term residents (McDonald, 1986, 
p. 167). That being said, this is usually rare because of 
how strong the ethnic and cultural bonds need to be. 
A potpourri of different cultures living together simply 
because of lower housing costs is not enough for this 
to occur. Rather, it is more in line with the districts of 
Chinatown and Little Italy in New York City.
McDonald (1986) outlines five potential 
reasons why crime rates drop with gentrification and 
four potential reasons why they might rise, along with 
one reason why it might stay stagnate. The reasons they 
might drop are as follows: (1) affluent neighborhoods 
have, on average, less crime than impoverished 
neighborhoods, (2) revitalization at the hands of the 
new residents can “pull up” instead of “push out” the 
former residents, (3) new residents are more cognizant 
of the crime problem and establish initiatives to combat 
crime, for example, the neighborhood watch, (4) 
affluent residents usually have more political influence 
which leads to more funding devoted to the police 
department, more stringent stances on crime, etc., and 
Does Gentrification Lower Crime: A Look at 
Granger-Casuality in Washington, D.C.
Will Lawrence
The Park Place Economist, Volume XXI 87
(5) the displacement of the poor residents can lead to 
the individuals responsible for committing the crimes 
to be displaced. Reason five is what gets at the heart 
of gentrification and is directly related to, if not the 
cause of, reason one. Reasons two, three, and four are 
periphery causes of the drop in crime, at least in the 
context of a model of gentrification.
On the other hand, McDonald (1986) also 
gives several reasons why gentrification might not 
lead to a decrease in crime: (1) when individuals are 
displaced, they may only be displaced to adjacent blocks 
or neighborhoods which hardly prevents them from 
committing crime in their old neighborhood, especially 
with an influx of attractive targets, (2) if gentrification is 
drawn out over a long period of time, there will be a very 
apparent income-gap between residents which suggests 
an increase in violent crime, (3) gentrification in ‘cohesive 
ethnic neighborhoods’ rather than ‘disorganized ghetto 
neighborhoods’ may lead to the breakdown of natural 
order in the communities, (4) gentrification can cause 
community conflicts which, on some occasions, results 
in criminal activity, and (5) it may not have any effect at 
all.  Most of these theorized effects occur at the onset 
of gentrification. As time goes on, it appears that the 
end-result of a fully gentrified neighborhood will have 
lower crime rates.
Much research use case-studies to look at 
individual neighborhoods (McDonald, 1986; O’Sullivan, 
2005; Kreager et al, 2011). This paper is different in that 
it examines the city-wide effect of gentrification. By 
using data from every neighborhood in a city, regression 
analysis can be employed to explore the effects of 
gentrification. Unfortunately, by not focusing on specific 
neighborhoods, this paper cannot examine the specific 
reasons gentrification affects crime rates.  Instead, it 
will focus on the gentrification process as it permeates 
throughout a city.
This paper employs location theory to look at 
the general effects of gentrification on crime. Location 
theory states that in a completely un-gentrified city, the 
city center is high in crime with a low income residential 
population while the suburbs around the city with low 
crime rates are populated by higher income people 
who commute into the city. O’Sullivan’s (2005) model 
of location theory holds that as the cost of travel into 
the city center goes up and the cost of security in the 
city center goes down, the higher income people will 
move into the center of the city to take advantage of 
the cheap housing and low travel costs. As the higher 
income population moves in, they push out the lower 
income population and the crime rate should fall 
further due to a variety of factors that McDonald 
covered previously. The lower income population gets 
pushed out because while they also value the low 
travel expenses that are a result of living close to the 
center of the city, the higher income population is able 
to outbid the lower income population in order to 
take advantage of the convenience. The lower income 
population will be pushed out, starting from the center, 
to the edges of the city. Once the gentrification process 
is complete, they will ultimately move elsewhere. Rising 
travel costs for the upper income population in addition 
to less crime in the center of the city, based on location 
theory’s explanation of gentrification, will ultimately lead 
to higher housing costs and a further reduction of crime.
A Granger-causality Test is used in order to 
examine the relationship between gentrification and 
crime. A Granger Test attempts to show causality 
between two variables, although it is closer to an 
inference than a conclusive finding. The idea behind 
the Granger Test is that if an independent variable ‘X’ 
combined with lags for a dependent variable can give a 
better estimate of the dependant variable ‘Y’ than just 
the lags, X is said to have ‘Granger-caused’ Y. Specifics of 
running the test will further be explored in the outline 
of the empirical model.
The hypothesis states that gentrification will 
Granger-cause crime rates to go down, at least in 
Washington, D.C, but crime rates will not Granger-
cause gentrification. While location theory holds that 
both the crime rates are going down as well as travel 
costs are going up which causes gentrification, this 
study examines if D.C. is a unique case. Washington, 
D.C. has the second worst traffic among US cities 
(Weather.com). Washington D.C. is a high commuter 
city with the limited upper class neighborhood options 
concentrated in a very small area. A large population 
works in Washington D.C. but commutes every day, as 
evidenced by the fact that the population of Washington 
D.C. almost doubles during the workday according to 
the 2000 Census. This study, therefore, has important 
policy implications for the city of Washington D.C. If 
gentrification is a socially desirable outcome, it would 
be beneficial for the government in Washington D.C. 
to allow travel costs to rise to encourage gentrification. 
On the other hand, if gentrification is undesirable, it 
would be more efficient to subsidize travel so that the 
upper income population stays in the suburbs and does 
not displace the lower income population in the city.
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In the context of this study, it is possible for crime 
to Granger-cause gentrification just as gentrification 
Granger-causes crime. If this occurs, this study will be 
forced to conclude that the two variables are working 
simultaneously and the causal factors cannot be brought 
out. If neither gentrification nor crime Granger-cause 
the other, then the two variables are unrelated.
III. DATA
This study uses data directly from the 
Metropolitan Police Department’s (MPD) Research and 
Analysis Branch.  Washington D.C. has several different 
divisions including quadrants (NW, SE, etc.), wards (1-
8), police districts (1-7), and police service areas (PSAs) 
(within each police district).  Quadrants, police districts, 
and wards are all too large areas to approximate the 
effect of individual neighborhoods. Another problem 
is there are not enough data points to get significant 
results. Even with wards, 8 wards and 6 years (2004-
2010) only yield 48 observations. Because of the 
Granger-causality Test, lagging variables take even more 
observations away. Therefore, this study uses PSAs, both 
to combat a small sample size and to attempt to get 
at neighborhood differences. Ideally, this study would 
examine data going back to 1995, or when the crack 
epidemic of the late 1980s and early 1990s was winding 
down.  Unfortunately, MPD was not comfortable 
releasing data prior to 2004 due to reporting and 
geographic inconsistencies. In order to get the prior 
data, a FOIA request is necessary, which leads to a 
natural continuation of this research. Going back to only 
2004 will yield a large enough sample size to conduct 
a regression analysis, but it is unlikely to show as strong 
of a correlation between crime and gentrification. 
Because gentrification is a process, only six years 
might not be enough to show the process happening.
This study also uses data from a website called 
NeighborhoodInfoDC.com which is a source that pulls 
together data from a variety of sources including the DC 
Department of Human Services and the D.C. Office of 
Tax and Revenue’s Real Property Tax Administration’s 
real property database. From this website, the average 
property values as well as Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) for each individual PSA will 
be used.  Property values are used as a proxy for one 
side of gentrification: the upper class residents moving 
in. TANF will be used as a proxy for the other side 
of gentrification: the lower classes moving out. TANF 
is a means-tested government subsidy so the more 
individuals receiving TANF implies that there is a higher 
population of poor people. If gentrification is occurring, 
an increase in housing prices, accompanied with a fall 
in individuals receiving TANF, will show that crime rates 
are falling.
In 2004, Washington, D.C. redrew the lines 
for the Police Service Areas. Unfortunately, the data 
from the Metropolitan Police Department were 
coded for the post-2004 PSAs while the data from 
NeighborhoodInfoDC.com were coded for the pre-
2004 PSAs. While this certainly detracts from the 
credibility of the data, it does not completely undermine 
the study. The police districts have not changed. So 
while the districts may have been slightly different, the 
neighborhoods still have much overlap. The biggest issue 
is that in the redistricting, two new PSAs were created. 
Because this study cannot accurately redistribute the 
crime data from the new PSAs to the old ones, those 
data points have been omitted. Due to the same overall 
police districts and the two omitted PSAs, there should 
not be significant errors in the analysis.
Due to the limited scope of this project, the effect 
of traffic will not be examined. While it is an important 
effect with regards to location theory, the other half 
of the location theory still warrants a treatment. An 
increase in housing prices implies that there is a higher 
demand for houses in neighborhoods with high crime 
rates, which accounts for the gentrification. In addition, 
looking at the effects of gentrification (the smaller 
number of lower income people proxied by the TANF 
measure) can also be fruitful.  A continuation of this paper 
would incorporate traffic and attempt to show that 
traffic Granger-causes gentrification, although the exact 
method for conducting that test is not overtly apparent.
IV. EMPRICIAL MODEL
The empirical model in this paper follows the 
Granger-causality Test. Two separate Granger-causality 
tests will be run: one with housing as the independent 
variable and the other with TANF as the independent 
variable. To begin, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression is run to see the correlation between the 
dependent variable (crime) and the independent 
variables (housing or poverty), as well as a variable for 
lagged crime. The number of violent crimes related 
to the city-wide mean will be CRIME. HOUSE is the 
median house price for the individual PSA. TANF is the 
number of individuals receiving the subsidy as related to 
the city-wide mean. This takes the following form:
CRIME = ß0 + ß1HOUSE + ß2CRIMEt-1
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Next, the variable ‘HOUSE’ is removed yielding the 
following equation:
CRIME = ß0 + ß1CRIMEt-1
Finally, a Wald test is done between the two regressions. 
The first equation with housing included is the 
unrestricted model. The second model with the HOUSE 
variable omitted is the restricted model. An F-test is 
then run to determine if the omission of HOUSE had a 
statistically significant effect on the prediction of CRIME. 
The F-statistic is as follows:
F = (ESSR – ESSU)/(DFR – DFU)
ESSU/DFU
Where ESS is the Error Sum of Squares for the 
respective restricted and unrestricted models and DF 
is the Degrees of Freedom for the respective restricted 
and unrestricted models. If the F-test is significant, then 
it can be said that HOUSE ‘Granger-caused’ CRIME. 
The test then needs to be run again to 
determine if CRIME ‘Granger-causes’ HOUSE. It will 
look exactly the same as the first Granger-causality Test 
except the initial setup will look as follows:
HOUSE = ß0 + ß1CRIME + ß2HOUSEt-1
HOUSE = ß0 + ß1HOUSEt-1
The F-test is then run to determine if CRIME ‘Granger-
caused’ HOUSE. The hypothesis is HOUSE will 
‘Granger-cause’ CRIME to fall but CRIME will have no 
effect on HOUSE in terms of Granger-causality. This is 
in accordance with the location theory as previously 
articulated.
The previous test is then run again with 
the variable TANF in place of the variable HOUSE. 
Equations 1 to5 are followed and the methodology is 
exactly the same.
V. RESULTS
In order to simplify the Granger-causality Tests, 
only one variable at a time is introduced . This results in 
two separate Granger Tests, one for housing prices and 
the other for TANF. These two tests get at both sides 
of the gentrification process: the former is a proxy for 
the upper income residents moving in and the latter is a 
proxy for the lower income residents moving out.
To start, two regressions are run: the first 
regression is HOUSE on CRIME and the second 
regression is TANF on CRIME. This is done to check 
both the coefficients and the signs. As a Granger Test 
only examines Granger-causality, the coefficients and 
signs are irrelevant. Table 1 shows the first regression 
with HOUSE is significant at the .01 level, has the 
correct sign, and a coefficient of -.287. Table 2 shows the 
second regression with TANF also is significant at the 
.01 level, has the correct sign, and a coefficient of .150. 
The reason for running the two regressions separately 
was that the variables have high multicollinearity. Since 
both housing prices and TANF numbers are directly 
related (lower income residents have lower housing 
prices), including both HOUSE and TANF in the same 
regression with crime is not productive.
Table 3 shows the first Granger Test examined, 
CRIME and HOUSE. As previously explained, HOUSE 
and CRIMEt-1 are regressed on CRIME in the unrestricted 
model. Then,   CRIMEt-1 is regressed on CRIME in the 
restricted model. The resulting F-value comparing the 
restricted and the unrestricted models is 39.94 which 
is statistically significant at the .01 level. Next, CRIME 
and HOUSEt-1 are regressed on HOUSE. Then, CRIME 
is taken out and HOUSEt-1 is regressed on HOUSE. 
The resulting F-value is 102.68, which is also statistically 
significant at the .01 level. From these results, HOUSE 
Granger-causes CRIME and CRIME Granger-causes 
HOUSE.
Table 4 shows the second Granger Test 
which repeats the above test, this time examining the 
relationship between TANF and CRIME. The unrestricted 
model involves regressing TANF and CRIMEt-1 on CRIME 
while the unrestricted model excludes TANF and only 
has a regression of CRIMEt-1 on CRIME. The resulting 
F-value was 36.6, which is statistically significant at the 
.01 level. The process is then reversed with CRIME and 
TANFt-1 having a regression on TANF in the unrestricted 
model. CRIME is then excluded from the restricted 
model and the resulting F-value was 6.3, which due to 
the high sample size is significant at the .01 level. From 
this, it can be shown that TANF Granger-causes CRIME 
and CRIME Granger-causes TANF.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
From the results, the effects of gentrification can 
clearly be seen. The individual regressions show that an 
increase in housing price and a decrease in the number 
of poor people will each lead to a decrease in crime. 
That being said, the goal of this project is not to merely 
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note the existence of gentrification. Rather, it is to show 
a potential causal relationship between the proxies for 
gentrification and the effects of the gentrification.
The two Granger Tests yielded the same result: 
both examined variables Granger-caused the other. This 
essentially means that the variables influence each other, 
preventing any causal conclusions from being drawn. 
While there is no one way Granger-causality, these 
results still allow some inferences to be made.
It is worth looking at the TANF Granger Test 
a little more closely. The F-statistic for the first half of 
the Granger Test to determine if TANF Granger-causes 
CRIME was 36.6, which is statistically significant at the 
.01 level. The F-statistic for the second half of the test 
was merely 6.3, but is also statistically significant at the 
.01 level due to the large sample size. Because the F-test 
is designed to examine the difference between two 
regressions, the large difference in magnitude between 
the two F-statistics may lead one to believe that there is 
a difference. While conclusions cannot be drawn given 
that they are both statistically significant, it appears that 
TANF may Granger-cause CRIME to a higher degree 
than CRIME Granger-causes TANF.
One possible reason why no conclusive 
Granger-causality results were drawn is that the data 
only went back to 2005. Because the Metropolitan Police 
Department did not grant access to earlier data, the 
entire process of gentrification could not be examined. 
One important aspect of gentrification on a city-wide 
level is that it is an ongoing process. In Washington, 
D.C., the process started in the early 1990s with the 
end of the crack epidemic. Without including almost a 
decade’s worth of data, it is hardly a surprise that the 
results are not exactly what are expected.  Once the 
entire gentrification process is contained in the data, the 
results might be more in line with what is hypothesized.
Even without Granger-causality one way or the 
other, this study still has merit. In short, it served as a 
confirmation of one side of location theory. A fall in 
crime rates does lead to the occurrence of gentrification. 
While the traffic side has not been accounted for, it is an 
area for additional research. Washington, D.C., at least 
according to the results in this study, is simply another 
example of location theory at work.
Unfortunately, without any Granger-causality 
to build from (aside from the weak inference with 
the TANF results), it is not as easy to make policy 
implications. That being said, this information can be 
useful for city planning. If gentrification is a desired 
outcome, governments should allow traffic costs to rise 
(assuming the traffic side of location theory still holds) 
as well as combating crime in the inner-city. This brings 
up an entirely new debate, however, about whether or 
not gentrification is, in fact, desired. There is a difference 
between pushing lower income people out and pulling 
them up into a better social standing. It appears that 
gentrification is guilty of the former, although this area 
deserves more research. If this is the case, it is difficult 
to see gentrification as anything more than a geographic 
redistribution of the indigent; a hardly desirable outcome 
when it comes to social justice.
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VIII. APPENDIX
Table 1: Preliminary Housing Regresion 
Vairable Explanation Coefficient Significance 
Dependent Variable 
CRIME Number of crimes in a given year
Independent Variable 
HOUSE Median house sale for a given year -.287 -.2900(***)
Adjusted R2 .030 Sample Size 243
Table 2: Preliminary Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Regression
Variable Explanation Coefficicent Significance 
Dependent Variable 
CRIME Number of total crimes in a given year 
Independent Variable 
TANF Number of individuals receiving Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families 
.150 6.627(***)
Adjusted R2 .143 Sample Size 257
Table 3: HOUSE Granger Test
Variable Unrestricted Restricted
HOUSE -.009 (-.396)
CRIMEt-1 .974 (64.971)*** .975 (71.994)***
Error Sum of Squares 1632386 1953531
Sample Size 206 257
F-Statistic 39.94***
CRIME -.012 (-1.346)
HOUSEt-1 .966 (64.014)*** .959 (58.928)***
Error Sum of Squares 598383 907136
Sample Size 201 207
F-Statistic 102.68***
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Table 4: TANF Granger Test
Variable Unrestricted Restricted
TANF .013 (2.230)**
CRIMEt-1 .964 (64.240)*** .975 (71.994)***
Error Sum of Squares 1673740 1953531
Sample Size 220 257
F-Statistic 36.6***
CRIME -.043 (-2.460)**
TANFt-1 .999 (144.045)*** .993 (160.756)***
Error Sum of Squares 2071699 2132402
Sample Size 215 224
F-Statistic 6.3***
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I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between aggregate 
unemployment rates and the incidence of crime has 
been frequently analyzed (Cantor and Land, 1985; 
Bennett, 1991; Bushway, 2011). However, the result 
of this analysis has been inconsistent. This discrepancy 
could be related to the inconsistent application of 
both economic and sociological theory, as well as 
several methodological issues with previous research 
and literature (Bennett, 1991). Becker’s 1968 paper 
describes crime as an individual decision made based 
on potential loss and gain. However, many prior analyses 
examine aggregate data, masking changes in individuals’ 
situations behind aggregate numbers.
The importance of predicting crime for 
law enforcement and public policy can have a large 
significance and magnitude on informed decisions. 
This can both reduce the cost of law enforcement and 
increase the efficiency of anti-crime measures.
Potential criminals include their own situations 
in their decision-making processes. In order to examine 
how changes in situation affect changes in crime rates, 
it is necessary to look at time series data to see the 
subject’s response to changes. The longitudinal nature of 
time series analysis also allows for comparison between 
individuals. As a result, it is possible to make general 
statements about responses to economic conditions.
NLSY97 data was examined to see whether 
employment variables predict crime, with employment 
represented by both income and the number of weeks 
worked. Theory predicts that there are lagged effects of 
employment on crime, which is why both lagged and 
unlagged cases are examined. In order to validate the 
assumption that changes in employment cause changes 
in crime, rather than the other way around, the impact 
of lagged crime on employment variables is also tested. 
Employment is found to have a significant effect on 
crime, although the theory fails to explain the lagged 
effects of employment measures.
II. THEORY & LITERATURE REVIEW
Many of the economic theories of criminal 
activity draw from Becker’s 1968 paper, analyzing crime 
as the result of rational choice. In his model, individuals 
consider the expected benefit of crime, taking into 
account the chance of success and the possible 
monetary gain. If the expected benefit is greater than 
the expected cost, which takes into account the chance 
of failure and the cost of being punished, the individual 
will commit a crime.
The expected benefit of crime depends on a 
variety of factors. For crimes such as theft or burglary, 
there is usually a clear monetary gain. However, the utility 
gained from many types of violent crime, including rape 
and murder, is usually not measurable. The expected 
benefit of crime should also depend on income and 
wealth; money has diminishing marginal effects on 
utility, so people with higher wealth or income benefit 
comparatively less from the same amount of capital.
The costs of crime offer a more direct 
relationship between employment status and crime. In 
general, the cost of crime is its punishment and depends 
on the chance of being caught. The costs include any 
fines for the crime and the opportunity cost incurred 
by imprisonment. While in jail, a person cannot earn 
the wages they would have earned if not in jail. There 
may also be a loss in future wages. With a conviction 
on record, it is harder to find higher paying jobs, which 
means that past crimes can lead to lost wages well 
into the future (Barak, 2009). Often included in other 
studies is a measurement of the utility gained by being 
honest or the cost of being dishonest. Many individuals 
associate immorality with crime, and incur a “moral 
cost” by committing a crime (Bourguignon, 2003).
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If unemployed, a person earns no wages, and so 
loses no wages if in jail. This decreases the opportunity 
cost of committing crime. Additionally, if a person’s 
wealth decreases while unemployed, the same financial 
benefit from a crime will have greater relative value. 
Both effects lead to a higher chance of committing 
crime.
Cohen and Felson (1979) predict additional 
effects on crime from unemployment. They base 
their theory around the idea that individuals tend to 
fall into routines. According to them, individuals who 
have fallen into routines while employed tend to stay 
in their routines immediately after losing employment. 
According to the routine activities theory, routines take 
a certain amount of time to change. Instead of changing 
their habits, Cohen and Felson claim that they the 
recently unemployed will tend to draw on savings for a 
short period of time to perpetuate their old routines 
while first unemployed, without changing their behavior. 
If conditions while unemployed are favorable for 
committing crimes, individuals will commit crimes only 
after taking time to break routines. Routine activities 
theory thus suggests that there is a lagged effect of 
unemployment on crime.
Christenson and Thornberry (1984) point out 
that it is important to also consider reciprocal effects. 
As mentioned above, committing a crime can make it 
more difficult to procure employment in the future. This 
not only increases the expected cost of current crime, 
decreasing crime rates, but also leads to lagged effects 
of crime on employment. Without testing for reciprocal 
effects, conclusions assuming the changes in crime could 
occur before changes in employment are invalid.
Theory predicts that both the number of 
weeks worked and income should correlate negatively 
to the probability that an individual commits a crime. 
Routine activities theory predicts that this correlation 
should be lagged. It is important to separately test for 
reciprocal effects, as they influence the validity of the 
forward relationship between employment measures 
and crime.
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL
By using longitudinal data, we can account 
for each individual’s characteristics by looking at the 
likelihood of committing a crime changes over time. The 
NLSY97 has longitudinal data for a many individuals that 
include self-reported crimes and information about 
employment. In order to simplify the analysis, only three 
types of crime are examined: destruction of property, 
theft both above and below 50 dollars, and assault. The 
survey question about assault focuses on fights, which 
are more likely to offer a financial benefit than other 
types of violent crime, such as murder or rape. As Land 
(1985) finds, purely violent crimes such as murder 
or rape respond differently to changes in economic 
variables than other types of crime, partly because 
these crimes usually offer a psychological benefit, rather 
than a financial one. As a result, no other violent crimes 
are analyzed.
Self-reported crime data tends to underestimate 
the number of crimes committed (Mosher, et. al, 2002). 
Minor offenses are particularly liable to being under-
reported; the inclusion of thefts below 50 dollars 
could skew the data. This problem is difficult to avoid 
for longitudinal data, as surveys rely on self-reported 
information.
When analyzing the chance of an individual 
committing a crime based on their current economic 
situation, the total number of crimes isn’t as relevant 
as whether or not a crime was committed at all. If 
conditions make crime favorable, individuals should 
commit crimes as long as they continue to offer a net 
benefit. As a result, we look solely at whether or not 
an individual committed a crime in the survey year. 
This leads to a binary dependent variable. Although 
subjects tend to underestimate the number of crimes 
committed, they are more likely to accurately answer 
binary questions about crime (Mosher, et. al, 2002).
Income per week is included to take into 
account the potential opportunity cost of time in 
prison, as well as the lower relative benefit from 
committing crimes. Both effects should lead to a negative 
correlation between income and crime. The amount 
of employment is measured by the number of weeks 
worked each year. This doesn’t discriminate between 
full-time and part-time workers. However, the amount 
of work per week is reflected in weekly income. These 
variables collectively represent employment.
Several other variables can also impact crime 
rates and are important to control for. As many authors 
have shown (Shelley, 1981), age has a strong negative 
impact on crime rates, an effect that is separate from 
correlations between age and other variables. Because 
age is known to have non-linear effects on crime (Shelley, 
1981), age squared is included as well. Education is 
also measured. The subject’s highest degree is used to 
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measure education, even if the survey year is before the 
subject obtained the degree. In these cases, the highest 
degree variable serves as a proxy for educational 
achievement, ranging from a high school education to a 
PhD, omitting the case of no high school or high school 
equivalent degree.
Because the dependent variable is a binary 
variable, a logistic regression model is used. The 
relationship is assumed to be multiplicative, as in 
Equation 1.
P = Emp*Income*ß
Here, P represents the odds of an individual 
committing a crime, Emp is the number of weeks 
employed and Income is income per week. The 
variable ß represents the product of other factors. 
Taking the logarithm, the following regression equation 
is created, Equation 2.
ln P = a _0+ a_1 ln Emp+ a_2 ln Income+ a_3 Age  
+ a_4 Age^2+ a_4 Female+ ∑i yk HighestDegreei
Here, the ak represent the coefficients for the different 
variables. The ykrepresents the coefficients for the 
collection of education dummy variables Highest 
Degreei.
 The logarithmic nature of Equation 2 makes 
the equation focus on the multiplicative assumption in 
Equation 1, which is equivalent to the assumption that 
the equation is linear in the proportional changes of the 
variables. This suggests that Equation 2 measures the 
individuals’ responses to changes in variables. As a result, 
dummy variables are unnecessary for each individual in 
Equation 2.
Some survey questions are phrased in terms of 
the calendar year before the interview, while others are 
based on the duration since the last interview. Subjects 
who missed survey years are likely to report data 
with different scopes, making the data meaningless. In 
order to avoid these errors, all missing years and cases 
following missing years are excluded from the analysis. 
In order to measure the lagged effect of 
employment variables on crime, another regression 
is run. According to the routine activities theory 
mentioned above, there should be a lagged effect of 
income and weeks worked on crime. As Thornberry and 
Christenson mention (1984), there are also reciprocal 
effects to consider. However, using unlagged crime rate 
variables to test such effects is mathematically a re-
arrangement of the regression in Equation 2. In order 
to measure the reciprocal effects, regressions are run 
to measure the impact of crime on future economic 
variables by lagging the crime variable. Equation 3 
shows the regression equation for the number of weeks 
worked.
WeeksWorked=[(a+ß)]_0 LagCrimeInYear+ß_1 
Age+ß_2 Age^2+ß_3 Income+
ß_4 Gender+ ∑_iy_i HighestDegree_i+ß_5 
LagWeeksWorked
 These regressions are simple linear regressions. They 
are run for both the length of employment and weekly 
income. The other variables are included for the same 
reason as in the first set of regressions. Income and 
WeeksWorked are lagged in their own regressions, and 
unlagged in the others. Including a lagged dependent 
variable as an independent variable for time-series 
data reduces autocorrelation. Along with variables like 
education and age, income can be seen as a measure 
of productivity, which influences the length an individual, 
is hired. If productivity is taken to explain the length of 
employment, then the length of employment cannot be 
used in the regression for productivity, as it gives no new 
information. Equation 4 shows the income regression.
Income=[(a+ß)]_0 LagCrimeInYear+ß_1 Age+ß_2 
Age^2+ß_3 Gender+
∑_i y_i HighestDegree_i+ß_4 LagIncome
 Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics for the data. The 
ages range from 13 to 30, with every subject within a 
couple years of the same age. For both WeeksWorked 
and income earned, the means are decreased by the 
number of cases with no reported employment.
IV. RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the results of the unlagged 
crime regression. The coefficients are the log odds 
ratios for each independent variable. As expected, both 
the number of weeks worked and employment show 
a significant negative relationship with the likelihood of 
committing a crime. Because the regression is run in log 
terms, the magnitudes of the coefficients represent the 
powers of the terms multiplied. More importantly, the 
significance of the coefficients points to a multiplicative 
relationship between these independent variables 
and crime rates. To interpret the log odds ratio, the 
coefficient is exponentiated, yielding the odds ratio, 
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which is then converted to a probability.
The odds ratio for number of WeeksWorked 
means that for an increase by a factor of e in the number 
of weeks worked, the odds of committing a crime 
decrease by 10 percent, meaning that the individual 
is 2.4 percent less likely to commit a crime. Similarly, 
when income increases by a factor of e, the individual’s 
chance of committing a crime decreases by around 
2.2 percent compared to even odds. This comparison 
to even odds represents the exponentiation of the 
odds ratio mentioned earlier. However, the change 
in probability for a given change in odds is nonlinear, 
and so the comparison to even odds serves only as an 
illustrative tool.
Because there is a finite number of weeks 
in a year, there is a limit to how low weeks worked 
can decrease the odds ratio for committing a crime. 
Compared to an identical individual with no employment 
in a year, an individual with 52 weeks worked will be 
around 10 percent less likely to commit a crime. Given 
the cost required to employ someone throughout the 
year, this is a relatively small decrease in crime rates.
The education dummy variables are generally 
as expected, with more education leading to lower 
crime, with two exceptions. The variables range from a 
GED, the first case, to a professional degree, the seventh 
case, which omits the case of no GED and no high 
school. Subjects with a PhD and subjects with a GED 
show a higher chance of committing a crime than those 
without degrees, which contradicts the hypothesis that 
education leads to higher crime. The result for doctorates 
is small and very insignificant, which makes sense given 
that there are very few individuals in the study with a 
highest degree of a PhD. However, the results for GEDs 
are significant to the .05 level. There are many possible 
explanations for this: individuals who took the time to 
get a GED could be the same individuals who are more 
willing to take risks for economic gain, for instance. For 
the other education levels, the results make sense: as 
education level rises, the chance of committing crime 
drops.
The age results also support Shelley’s empirical 
findings (1981). As discussed above, age should have 
a negative, but diminishing, effect on crime rates. The 
results show a strong negative impact of age on crime; 
however, age squared shows a slight, but significant, 
positive correlation with the chance of committing 
crime. This nonlinear term, although small, significantly 
reduces the marginal effect of age for the ranges of ages 
in the study. Theoretically, the turning point at which the 
nonlinear effects dominate and higher age leads to more 
crime is around 26 with the data given. However, this is 
unreliable simply because of the limited age range of the 
study. With a highest age of 30, there are too few points 
above the age of 26 to make a claim about a turning 
point; however, it is notable that a turning point was 
seen at all, and gives opportunity for further analysis 
with larger data sets.
Gender also has a significant coefficient, showing 
that women are less likely to commit crimes. Compared 
to even odds, the probability of committing a crime 
decreases by more than .13 for women, an effect that 
supports other criminological research (Shelley, 1981).
Table 3 contains the regression results for the 
model with only lagged employment variables included. 
Most of the coefficients are similar to those obtained 
from the first regression. However, the lagged income 
and lagged number of WeeksWorked variables both 
correlate positively to crime. As mentioned by Shelley 
(1981) and Cohen and Felson (1979), this could be 
because individuals compare their current position to 
past positions, and once an individual has been more 
successful, they are willing to take greater risks to 
continue their success.
Table 4 summarizes the regression with both 
the lagged and non-lagged cases. The same patterns 
seen earlier are seen here as well. The impact of age on 
crime is much larger, while the coefficient for gender is 
smaller.
Compared to the first and second regressions, 
the coefficients for the employment variables are greater 
in magnitude. This can be interpreted in a variety of ways. 
The positive sign of the lagged variables suggests that to 
a certain extent, the amount that an individual’s income 
or employment has improved within a year plays a role 
in determining when to commit crime.
The results for the reciprocal effects are 
summarized in Tables 5 and 6. For the regression with 
only lagged crime rate, we see that most coefficients 
have the expected sign. As expected, as age increases the 
number of weeks worked increases as well. Diminishing 
returns for age suggest that age squared should reduce 
the impact of age, with a coefficient with the opposite 
sign. Age squared here has a slight but significant negative 
effect, as expected. The education dummy variables all 
have positive effects, but interestingly, higher education 
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has less of a positive impact than an associate degree 
or junior college.
As can be seen, lagged crime rates have a 
negative impact on the number of weeks worked. 
However, this effect is both small, and statistically 
insignificant. This suggests that crime does not have a 
strong lagged effect on employment.
Table 6 summarizes the results for the income 
regression. For income per week, crime has an even 
smaller, statistically insignificant effect. The same is true 
for unlagged crime: the effect is relatively small and 
insignificant. This suggests that the result obtained by 
Thornberry needs to be revisited, as the effects of 
crime on employment and wages are small.
V. CONCLUSIONS
As expected, employment correlates negatively 
to crime. Assuming that this relationship is a causal 
relationship, this suggests that increasing employment 
leads to lower crime rates. Because the relationship is 
logarithmic, the effect has diminishing marginal returns, 
meaning that increasing employment is most effective 
for individuals who are unemployed or have little 
employment. The same is true for income.
The results support Becker’s rational choice 
theory. However, for the lagged variables, the effect is 
positive, and fails to show evidence for routine activities 
theory, which claims that Becker’s predicted negative 
effect would be lagged. The positive effect observed is 
statistically significant. Moreover, the effect’s magnitude 
increases when the unlagged variables are included as 
well, suggesting that, to a certain degree, the difference 
between current and past employment status is an 
important determinant of crime. This could be because 
of the importance of comparison for individuals: the 
routine activities theory describes a necessary lag in 
time for routines to be broken, but, rather than the 
change of routine, the change in lifestyle necessitated by 
changes in employment may be more relevant.
For the reciprocal effects described by 
Thornberry (1984), the results are mixed. The effects of 
crime on the number of weeks worked and on weekly 
income are both small and statistically insignificant. This 
suggests that the relationship is more complex than the 
description of either routine activities theory or the 
reciprocal effect theory.
Shelley (1981) mentions that given the 
complexity of the causes of crime, it is impossible to 
come up with coherent prediction. However, Becker’s 
rational choice theory remains well supported by the 
evidence, which justifies its continued use (Levitt and 
Miles, 2006) in analyzing crime.
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VII. APPENDIX
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
AnyCrimesinYear 0 1 .19 .389
WeeksWorked 0 60 24.84 21.035
IncomePerWeek 0.00 44091.00 223.6962 814.42017
HighestDegree 0 7 2.21 1.375
Gender 1 2 1.47 .499
Table 2: Unlagged Employment
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
LnWeeksWorked -.159 .025 39.649 1 .000 .853
LnIncomePerWeek -.063 .016 14.608 1 .000 .939
HighestDegree 140.047 7 .000
HighestDegree(1) .196 .075 6.735 1 .009 1.216
HighestDegree(2) -.165 .065 6.344 1 .012 .848
HighestDegree(3) -.180 .089 4.065 1 .044 .835
HighestDegree(4) -.468 .073 41.508 1 .000 .626
HighestDegree(5) -.540 .117 21.127 1 .000 .583
HighestDegree(6) .059 .389 .023 1 .879 1.061
HighestDegree(7) -.728 .229 10.089 1 .001 .483
Age -.744 .062 144.518 1 .000 .475
Gender(1) -.470 .038 156.780 1 .000 .625
AgeSquared .014 .001 94.939 1 .000 1.014
CrimeLastYear 1.414 .038 1361.635 1 .000 4.111
Constant 8.400 .615 186.763 1 .000 4445.093
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: LnWeeksWorked, LnIncomePerWeek, HighestDegree, Age, Gender, 
AgeSquared, CrimesLastYear. 
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Table 3: Lagged Employment
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
LagLnWeeksWorked .180 .023 60.543 1 .000 1.198
LagLnIncomePerWeek .213 .013 254.126 1 .000 1.237
HighestDegree 154.125 7 .000
HighestDegree(1) .141 .075 3.559 1 .059 1.151
HighestDegree(2) -.284 .064 19.885 1 .000 .753
HighestDegree(3) -.365 .090 16.555 1 .000 .694
HighestDegree(4) -.522 .072 53.331 1 .000 .593
HighestDegree(5) -.737 .121 37.354 1 .000 .478
HighestDegree(6) -.355 .475 .559 1 .455 .701
HighestDegree(7) -.638 .221 8.365 1 .004 .528
Age -1.084 .054 403.658 1 .000 .338
Gender(1) -.373 .038 97.190 1 .000 .689
AgeSquared .020 .001 228.190 1 .000 1.020
CrimeLastYear 1.688 .043 1561.462 1 .000 5.411
Constant 10.326 .578 319.232 1 .000 30524.587
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: LagLnWeeksWorked, LagLnIncomePerWeek, HighestDegree, Age, 
Gender, AgeSquared, CrimeLastYear.
Table 4: Unlagged and Lagged Employment
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
LagLnWeeeksWorked .259 .036 52.845 1 .000 1.296
LagLnIncomePerWeek .261 .020 173.035 1 .000 1.298
LnWeeksWorked -.300 .039 60.439 1 .000 .741
LnIncomePerWeek -.186 .025 53.755 1 .000 .830
HighestDegree 85.394 7 .000
HighestDegree(1) .002 .106 .000 1 .985 1.002
HighestDegree(2) -.377 .091 17.180 1 .000 .686
HighestDegree(3) -.496 .122 16.540 1 .000 .609
HighestDegree(4) -.602 .099 36.586 1 .000 .548
HighestDegree(5) -.755 .156 23.561 1 .000 .470
HighestDegree(6) -.587 .578 1.031 1 .310 .556
HighestDegree(7) -1.136 .311 13.325 1 .000 .321
Age -.970 .088 121.764 1 .000 .379
Gender(1) -.355 .051 48.502 1 .000 .701
AgeSquared .018 .002 81.550 1 .000 1.018
CrimeLastYear 1.742 .053 1096.264 1 .000 5.710
Constant 10.327 .904 130.507 1 .000 30551.427
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: LagLnWeeksWorked, LagLnIncomePerWeek, LnWeeksWorked, LnIn-
comePerWeek, HighestDegree, Age, Gender, AgeSquared, CrimeLastYear.
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Table 5
Model Unstandardized
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) -69.281 2.500 -27.715 .000
CrimeLastYear -.257 .190 -.006 -1.351 .177
AgeSquared -.148 .005 -1.325 -27.898 .000
IncomePerWeek -.003 .000 -.140 -32.567 .000
Age 7.763 .233 1.593 33.386 .000
KEY!SEX(SYMBOL)1997 -.288 .145 -.008 -1.992 .046
GED 1.218 .297 .024 4.106 .000
High School 4.826 .248 .142 19.422 .000
Associate/Junior College 6.348 .355 .094 17.875 .000
Bachelor’s 4.719 .277 .112 17.064 .000
Master’s 4.110 .441 .045 9.322 .000
PhD 2.060 1.923 .004 1.072 .284
Professional Degree 1.028 .844 .005 1.218 .223
LagWeeksWorked .175 .003 .278 62.440 .000
a. Dependent Variable: Weeks Worked
Table 6
Model Unstandardized
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) -837.039 146.285 -5.722 .000
CrimeLastYear -2.329 11.394 -.001 -.204 .838
AgeSquared -.084 .306 -.015 -.273 .785
WeeksWorked -8.097 .266 -.157 -30.497 .000
Age 68.495 13.539 .282 5.059 .000
KEY!SEX(SYMBOL)1997 -68.853 8.368 -.041 -8.228 .000
GED 46.472 17.255 .019 2.693 .007
High School 106.984 14.594 .064 7.331 .000
Associate/Junior College 156.113 20.653 .047 7.559 .000
Bachelor’s 99.585 16.192 .048 6.150 .000
Master’s 68.071 25.593 .015 2.660 .008
PhD 91.678 107.206 .004 .855 .392
Professional Degree 16.854 49.480 .002 .341 .733
LagIncomePerWeek .047 .005 .043 8.592 .000
a. Dependent Variable: IncomePerWeek
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I. INTRODUCTION
Outsourcing is typically viewed as the process 
of shipping jobs overseas to another country so the 
job can be done by workers for a lower cost. However, 
there are many types of corporate restructuring that 
can fall under the broad scope of outsourcing. Wooster 
and Paul (2010) define outsourcing as sending in-house 
production to another company, which can achieve the 
same results at a cheaper price, whether domestic or 
overseas. This paper asserts that the immigration of 
temporary labor, such as the H-1B visa program, is yet 
another type of outsourcing.
 
 This study specifically examines the Information 
Technology (IT) industry because the majority of the 
H-1B immigrants work in the IT industry (Kerr & Lincoln, 
2010). The H-1B program was developed in 1990 and 
was a refinement of the H-1 immigration program. The 
H-1 program was created to allow individuals who 
show special merit or ability to perform temporary 
services to immigrate for a period of time. The H-1B 
program specified the requirements of these types of 
visas more definitely. This program places a cap on the 
number of immigrants allowed into the country each 
year, and specifies a six-year limit on the length an H-1B 
visa can be in effect. Many companies, specifically in the 
IT industry, have lobbied the government to expand the 
quota of H-1B visas every year since the cap was put 
into effect (Watts, 2001).
 
 There are a significant number of H-1B 
immigrants who are employed through specific 
outsourcing companies upon which United States’ 
companies then contract with for contract labor. 
According to Thibodeau & Machlis (2012), the top United 
States companies that employ H-1B immigrants are 
“offshore outsourcing companies”, including Cognizant 
and Infosys, which each employ approximately 5000 
H-1B immigrants who are then contracted out to other 
United States companies for specific jobs. The fact that 
most H-1B immigrants are not employed directly by the 
United States companies for which they are working, 
implies that there will be some discrepancy between 
the temporary immigrant workers and the native 
workers in terms of: types of jobs, wage rate, and job 
security. Therefore, this paper aims to study how the 
recession of 2008 affected the market for workers in 
the IT industry, specifically focusing on the number of 
jobs lost or retained by temporary immigrant workers 
compared with those of native workers.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The H-1B program was developed in the 1990s, 
and little research has been done on the program or its 
effects on either the temporary immigrant workers or 
the native workers in specific industries. The literature 
reviewed for the purpose of this paper varies in many 
different ways. Some of the articles, such as Das et al. 
(2012), look specifically at a comparison of immigrant 
labor and outsourcing of jobs. Other papers, such as 
Zavodny (2003), focus more on the problem this paper 
aims to analyze. This paper focuses on the idea of using 
immigrant labor compared to outsourcing, while taking 
into account the view that temporary immigration is an 
aspect of outsourcing.
 
 It is important to examine why firms decide 
to outsource production to another firm, either 
domestically or offshore. Paul and Wooster (2010) 
investigate this specific decision. Typically, firms find a way 
to produce the same products either at a cheaper price 
or more efficiently. However, recently with the addition 
of the H-1B visa program, businesses are finding a niche 
where they can produce at cheaper prices while keeping 
jobs in the United States. Thibodeau and Machlis (2012) 
argue that offshore outsourcing companies employ 
the majority of H-1B users in the United States. The 
source they cite is the United States Citizenship and 
The Effects of Temporary Immigrant Labor on the 
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Immigration Service (2012), which is the government 
organization that controls the application process for 
these companies to employ H-1B visa to immigrants. 
The niche these outsourcing companies are now able 
to fill with the H-1B visa program is allowing them to 
become the “major beneficiary of the H-1B program” 
(Thibodeau & Machlis, 2012, p. 1).
 
 Paul and Wooster (2010) assert that because 
the IT industry is so competitive and operates in an 
“environment where continuous innovation is crucial,” 
(p. 300) the need to outsource is greater than in other 
industries. According to Thibodeau (2010), Congress 
increased the scope of the H-1 program in 1990 “in 
response to warnings of an emerging ‘skills gap’ or 
‘skills mismatch’ among United States engineering and 
technology professionals” (p. 1). Kerr and Lincoln found 
that “science and engineering and computer-related 
occupations account for approximately 60 percent of 
H-1B admissions” (2010, p. 474). This paper focuses on 
the IT industry to analyze the effects the H-1B program 
has on both the temporary immigrants and the native 
workers because IT was one of the industries that this 
program was aiming to benefit.
 
 Much of the literature that specifically studies 
the H-1B program focuses on what the H-1B program 
is as a whole and to articulate the reasoning behind 
the need for temporary immigrant workers. Julie Watts 
(2010) states that, “because the IT industry accounts 
for nearly one-third of the growth of the United States 
economy, and because IT has penetrated almost all 
sectors, a shortage of skilled IT labor threatens the 
global competitiveness of the entire United States 
economy” (p. 145). Kerr and Lincoln (2010) look at how 
the H-1B program has affected innovation on behalf of 
the native workers and the temporary immigrants. The 
authors assert that “total invention increased with higher 
admissions primarily through the direct contributions of 
immigrant inventors” (p. 504). The purpose of this paper 
most resembles Zavodny’s study, The H-1B Program 
and Its Effects on Information Technology Workers. 
Zavodny (2003) examines the effect the temporary 
immigrants have on wages as a whole in the IT industry. 
However, her results do not support her hypothesis 
that an influx of H-1B workers will cause downward 
pressure on wages and ultimately lower wages in the 
entire IT industry.
 
 The H-1B visa program and other similar 
programs, have both proponents and opponents. The 
primary argument against the H-1B program is that the 
immigration of temporary workers will take jobs away 
from United States workers. While on the other hand, 
the primary argument in favor of the H-1B program 
argues that the temporary immigrants are helping fill 
a void or shortage in skilled laborers specific to the 
IT industry. The majority of the literature on this topic 
explains the reasons for temporary immigrant labor 
or provides policy implications to either reduce or 
increase the number of temporary immigrant workers 
allowed in the country. The paper aims to contribute 
to this body of research by specifically looking at the 
effect that the business cycle has on both temporary 
immigrants and native workers in the IT market, after 
the temporary immigrants have entered the IT industry. 
III. THEORY
Zavodny’s (2003) paper looks specifically into 
the topic of what effects an increase in H-1 B immigrants 
(due to an increase in the cap of H-I B Visas) have on 
wages. Zavodny’s study assumes that there is one labor 
market that includes the temporary immigrants, as 
well as the native workers. The main hypothesis of this 
study is that the influx of temporary immigrants who 
are willing to work at a lower wage will cause pressure 
on the entire labor market in the IT industry, ultimately 
lowering all wages. The study finds that the results 
do not support this hypothesis; wages did not in fact 
decrease during this time period (2003). 
Zavodny’s paper, in conjunction with the fact 
that the majority of H-1B visa immigrants are hired by 
outsourcing companies rather than directly by United 
States companies, as well as the temporary status of 
the immigrant workers, all lead to the conclusion 
that there seems to be a segmentation of the labor 
market between the temporary immigrants and the 
native workers. Therefore, the theory of a dual labor 
market in this situation seems to be the underlying 
theory that needs to be taken into account. A dual 
labor market means that there are two labor markets 
separated by some barrier (Reich et al., 1973). In this 
case, the temporary immigrants are in their own labor 
market, which is segmented from the labor market 
of the natives in the IT industry. These two labor 
markets have a barrier between them, which prevents 
mobility of labor;. Specifically, the temporary immigrant 
workers are hired by different companies (outsourcing 
companies) rather than those of the natives. This allows 
for a different equilibrium for wages and quantity of 
labor in each of the labor markets.
This theory assumes that if there is a change in 
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one of these labor markets, there will be no effect on 
the other labor market. In the native workers’ market, 
we assume that supply and demandare derived based 
on the economy and available workers in the field. In the 
temporary immigrant workers market, we assume that 
demand is derived from the number of jobs needed, 
but that supply is only derived up until the point of the 
quota for the H-1B visas. Reich et al. identifies this as 
a dual labor market, where one market is the primary 
market with more stability and higher wages, and the 
other market is the secondary market with less stable 
working environments lower wages generally. According 
to Das et al., “the host country workers and migrant 
workers are imperfect substitutes” (2012, p. 111). The 
idea of imperfect substitutes suggests that the native 
workers are in the primary market because they live 
in the country and can be employed for an unlimited 
amount of time. The secondary market consists of the 
temporary immigrant workers who are only allowed to 
work in the country for a short period of time (1973). 
The figures in the appendix graphically 
represent the situation of a dual labor market- where 
Figure 1 represents one labor market, the temporary 
immigrant workers- and Figure 2 represents the other 
labor market, the native workers. The line drawn 
between the two graphs represents the barrier where 
no worker can cross from one market to the other. As 
is shown by W* and Q* in both graphs, it is clear that in 
the secondary market, Figure 1, the temporary workers 
have a lower wage than that of the native workers in 
Figure 2. The graphs also represent how the equilibrium 
is derived. In Figure 1, the Q* is forced because there 
is a quota of the number of H-1B visas allowed in the 
country each year, and therefore, there is a maximum 
number of temporary workers that can be accounted 
for. In figure 2, the native workers equilibrium is derived 
from the market where supply of native workers 
equals the demand of native workers. When taking into 
account the segmented labor market theory, we can 
hypothesize that the temporary immigrant workers 
will be more subject to fluctuations in the business 
cycle than the native workers Thus, we would expect 
a decrease in the temporary immigrants’ quantity of 
labor during tough economic times. It is expected that 
since the temporary immigrant workers are in the 
secondary labor market, they are the most expendable 
and hence, will be the first to be let go during times of 
economic struggle. While the native workers are seen 
as more permanent workers, there is less of a chance 
they will be let go before the immigrants, regardless of 
the fact that native workers have higher wages than 
their temporary immigrant counterparts. Therefore, 
this study hypothesizes that during the 2008 recession, 
there was a decrease in temporary immigrant workers 
in the IT industry relative to the amount of workers in 
the native market, which I hypothesize will stay about 
equal, or will at least decrease less than the temporary 
immigrant market does
IV. DATA
The primary database used in this study is 
iPums-USA American Community Survey. The data that 
specifically look at the effect on H-1B immigrants is not 
available, however, through the ACS, it can be controlled 
for specific variables, such as immigration status, year 
naturalized, country of birth, and so on, to get the 
data of a specific group of immigrants who meet the 
requirements of the H-1B visa. There is no certain way 
to ensure that all members of the sample of temporary 
workers in my study have the H-1B visa, but it is known 
that the immigrants in this study meet the qualifications. 
So it is assumed that the data received will be similar to 
that which it would be if there was a database of H-1B 
immigrants. 
Second, this study will be looking at a native 
group of individuals who are similar to the temporary 
immigrant group in terms of age , education status and 
occupation. The individuals in this group will be citizens 
of the United States and born in the United States. The 
third group of individuals in this study will be called all 
other immigrants. This group will include individuals 
who are immigrants, thus not born in the United States, 
but do not have temporary status, which means that 
these individuals have been naturalized or are working 
towards naturalization and likely to have a green card 
which assures permanent residency. The theoretical 
assumption of this analysis suggests that there are 
two markets, the native market and the temporary 
immigrant market. For this reason, the group labeled all 
other immigrants will be counted in the native group 
because if they have become citizens, it is reasonable 
to assume they have mostly assimilated into the United 
States.
In this dataset, the only extracted data is of 
individuals within the age parameter of 25 to 65 years. 
In addition, more data was extracted from working age 
adults to demonstrate the IT type occupations defined 
by the 1990 occupation code as: computer systems 
analysts and computer scientists, operations and 
systems researchers and analysts, computer software 
developers, programmers of numerically controlled 
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machine tools, and computer and peripheral equipment 
operators. The reason for looking at these types of jobs 
is to attain data of workers in IT type occupations.
Furthermore, in this study, temporary 
immigrant workers and native workers are analyzed 
in three specific years. The first year is during relatively 
good economic times in 2006. The second year, 2008, is 
during the recession, with relatively bad economic times. 
The third year is during the recovery of the recession, 
2010, where the economy is thought to have recovered 
some, but was by no means completely recovered.
V. EMPIRICAL MODEL
The empirical model in this study uses 
descriptive statistics that summarizes the numbers 
of employees in each group through the three years 
to test the hypothesis that temporary immigrant 
employment in IT employment decreases relative to 
employment of natives in IT. The empirical model will 
also consist of an OLS regression, with the purpose to 
confirm the results found through descriptive statistics. 
Table 5 gives definitions of all of the variables included 
in the regression model along with the expected signs. 
The dependent variable in this case will be usual hours 
worked per week to determine if employees during the 
recession had to cut back their hours worked per week. 
There will be multiple independent variables to control 
for human capital and demographic determinants of 
hours worked including a dummy variable indicating 
temporary status immigrants (TEMPSTAT); dummy 
variables for educational, and control variables for age 
(AGE); and gender (GENDER). This regression will be 
run three different times for each of the three years, a 
boom year, in 2006, the recession in 2008, and the slow 
recovery in 2010. The results of the three years will be 
compared to determine if the dependent variables, and 
specifically TEMPSTAT, have a significant effect on the 
IT sector hours worked. The equation below is what is 
being estimated.
Usual hours worked per week = a
 + ß1(TEMPSTAT) + ß2(NATIVES) + ß3(EDUCHS) + 
ß 4(EDUCCOLG) + ß5(EDUCGRAD) + ß6(GENDER) 
+ ß7(AGE)
This regression will be run to allow for 
comparison between the two groups, temporary 
immigrants and the native workers. When this regression 
is run, the expected sign that will prove my hypothesis 
would be for ß1 to be negative all three years. This means 
that having temporary status would cause a negative 
effect on the usual hours worked per week. It is also 
expected that ß1 decreases each year to support my 
hypothesis that temporary immigrants are being hurt 
more than the native workers by the recession. The 
other independent variables in this regression should 
be interesting to determine if they affect usual hours 
worked per week, but they are not the prime focus of 
this regression.
VI. RESULTS
The results from both the descriptive statistics 
and the OLS regression are presented in tables in the 
appendix at the end of this paper. The results will be 
examined in two sections. The first will discuss the 
descriptive statistics used to determine the quantity of 
individuals employed throughout the three years. The 
second section will discuss the regression results.
A. Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive Statistics were run on the data 
for each year separately to determine how the IT 
employment numbers changed from year to year. Table 
1 represents the breakdown of the data collected to 
determine the dispersion throughout the five IT sector 
jobs through the three years. This table includes only 
workers who would be deemed full time, meaning they 
work at least 35 hours per week for at least 48 weeks 
the prior year. As is represented in the table, the total 
number of workers in each job type from 2006 to 2008 
has increased. Then looking from 2008 to 2010, the 
total number in the sample has decreased from these 
two years; this is also what we would have expected to 
occur because of the recession in 2008. It is particularly 
interesting to note that in one of the jobs the number 
of workers actually increased from 2008 to 2010, which 
means that there is growth in that part of the IT sector 
regardless of the recession. 
Table 2 represents a complete breakdown 
of the sample each year by employment status. This 
allows us to look at the changes in employment, as 
well as changes in unemployment, and people who 
have dropped out of the labor force but whose last job 
would have been in the IT sector. From 2006 to 2008, it 
appears that unemployment and individuals not in the 
labor force decreased, while those employed increased. 
From 2008 to 2010, we expect unemployment and 
individuals not in the labor force to increase quite 
significantly and employment to decrease. The data 
does show this, which suggests that the IT sector did in 
fact have to let individuals go during the slow recovery 
after the recession.
Rowley
The Park Place Economist, Volume XXI 105
Table 3 represents the percent distribution 
for IT workers of the three groups, (native workers, 
temporary immigrant workers, and all other 
immigrants) over the three years. This table includes 
only those who are working full time, which is denoted 
earlier. According to Table 3, employment in the native 
group actually decreased significantly from 2008 to 
2010, with a 4.2 percent decrease in employment. 
Surprisingly, while employment of natives decreased, 
there was an unexpected increase in the employment 
in the temporary immigrant group from 2008 to 2010. 
The third group, which includes all other immigrants, 
appeared to increase but only by less than 1 percent. 
These results are extremely surprising and suggest 
that employers are reducing employment of the native 
employees rather than the temporary immigrant 
workers. One reason employers could decide to let go 
of the native workers instead of the temporary workers 
is because typically the native workers are paid more, 
and thus the employers would save more money as a 
result of reducing their employment. 
Table 4 shows the percent of workers in the 
IT sector in each group mentioned above: natives, 
temporary immigrants, and all other immigrants. As 
this table makes clear, it appears that employers are 
decreasing the jobs of native workers relative to the 
jobs of temporary immigrants, as well as all other 
immigrants. This suggests that employers are turning 
more towards temporary immigrant workers instead 
of retaining or creating more native jobs in the IT sector.
B. OLS Regression
Table 5 defines each of the variables used in 
the regression. The dependent variable is number of 
hours worked. The results of the regression, which was 
run for each year, 2006, 2008, and 2010, are presented 
in Table 6. The results for all three years have extremely 
low adjusted R-squares, which suggests that less than 5 
percent of the variance in the dependent variable each 
year can be explained by the independent variables in 
the regression. 
The coefficients of the regression all appear 
to be significant at the .01 level except NATIVES in 
the first year, 2006 with a significant level at the .05. 
In the results, the TEMPSTAT variable, which is the 
most important for the purposes of this research study, 
appears to be negative in all three years, similar with 
the expectation. Also, it appears to be increasing each 
year, which is also what my hypothesis predicted. The 
fact that the TEMPSTAT variable is increasing suggests 
that the temporary status of an individual is becoming 
more important in the prediction of the number of 
hours worked each week. This reflects the hypothesis 
that temporary status is important when companies 
decide how many hours’ employees work. However, 
when taking into account the descriptive statistics, it 
appears TEMPSTAT is important, but that employers 
are deciding to increase temporary immigrant’s hours 
rather than maintaining or increasing the native workers’ 
hours.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the results of this study appear 
not to support my hypothesis that during a recession, 
temporary immigrant workers will be affected by 
the recession more adversely than native workers. In 
fact, it appears that the native workers were affected 
more than the temporary immigrant workers. This is 
surprising given my hypothesis, but also suggests two 
things: first, that employers could be saving more money 
through letting go the more expensive workers, and 
second, some of the decrease in native workers could 
be explained by people deciding to retire or being 
forced into retirement. 
The first explanation would make sense when 
looking back at the previous literature. Specifically, the 
article suggests that many United States companies are 
hiring more temporary immigrant workers because, 
according to Thibodeau (2010), there is “an emerging 
‘skills gap’ or ‘skills mismatch’ among United States 
engineering and technology professionals” (p. 1). 
Perhaps this is correct and the temporary immigrant 
workers still employed during the recession have some 
skills that the native workers do not. 
The second explanation of why natives were 
let go more than the temporary immigrant workers 
could represent the natives choosing to retire or being 
forced into retirement. This is an interesting hypothesis 
and one that could be considered for further research. 
The data used for this paper did not take into account 
retirement specifically However, it could be that it was 
accounted for in the variable employment status under 
‘not in labor force’. 
The assertion in the introduction of this paper 
suggesting that the influx of temporary immigrant 
workers is just another type of outsourcing, just 
domestically, appears to be the case. This is true if, as 
the results provide, the temporary immigrants were not 
let go because the cost of these workers is cheaper 
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than the cost of keeping the native workers employed. 
Overall, it appears that the IT sector is putting more 
emphasis on temporary immigrant labor instead of 
native labor as is shown through the results of both the 
descriptive statistics as well as the OLS regression. 
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IX. APPENDIX
Table 1: Number Employed in IT Occupations
Census Year
Occupation, 1990  basis 2006 2008 2010 Total
Computer systems analysts and computer scientists 14235 16140 15562 45937
Opearations and systems researchers and analysts 1463 1592 1787 4842
Computer software developers 10976 11692 11329 33997
Programmers of numerically controlled machine tools 544 643 524 1711
Computer and periheral equiptment operators 1169 1062 991 3222
Total 28387 31129 30193 89709
Table 2: Distribution of Sample by Employment Stauts and Survey Year
Employment Status 2006 2008 2010
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Employed 31948 90.40% 34225 91.80% 33543 88.80%
Unemployed 887 2.50% 913 2.40% 1951 5.20%
Not in the Labor Force 2529 7.20% 2143 5.70% 2270 6%
Total 35354 100% 37281 100% 37764 100%
Table 3: Number of Individuals Employed in IT
Number of: 2006 % Change 2008 % Change 2010
Natives 22404 8.6% 24328 -4.2% 23297
Temporary Workers 1026 6.8% 1096 5.1% 1152
All other Immigrants 4957 15.1% 5705 0.7% 5744
Table 4: Percent Distribution of Individuals Employed in IT by Immigration Status 
% Employed 2006 2008 2010
Natives 79% 78% 77%
Temporary Workers 3.6% 3.5% 3.8%
All other Immigrants 17.4% 18.3% 19%
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Table 5: Variables and Decriptions 
Variable Name Description Expected Sign 
Dependent 
Usual hours worked per week Numerical number of hours worked per week 
Independent 
NATIVES 0=immigrant, 1=native Unknown
TEMPSTAT 0=citizen, 1=temporary status -
Education Attainment
EDUCHS 0=no high school diploma, 1=has high school 
diploma
Omitted
EDUCCOLG 0=no college diploma, 1=has college diploma +
EDUCRGRAD 0=no education beyond college, 1=attended 
some graduate school
+
GENDER 0=male, 1=female Unknown
Age Number 25 through 65 Unknown
Table 6: Regression Results Predicting Hours Worked
2006 2008 2010
Constant 46.539*** 47.385*** 45.479***
TEMPSTAT -2.834*** -2.931*** -3.459***
NATIVES .410** .434*** .558***
EDUCCOLG .743*** .751*** 1.543***
EDUCGRAD 1.362*** 1.398*** 2.118***
GENDER -3.914*** -3.963*** -3.587***
Age -.147*** -.161*** -.155***
Adjusted R-Squared .039 .046 .038
Sample Size 35354 37281 37764
*Significance at the .10 level
**Significance at the .05 level
***Significance at the .01 level
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How Do Economic and Political Factors Affect 
NASA Funding?
Austin Smiley
I. INTRODUCTION & THESIS
The research problem of this study is concerned 
with the United States’ investment in National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). This 
funding is important for several reasons. Firstly, NASA’s 
accomplishments provide benefits not only to America, 
but to the rest of the world. All of humanity can be 
proud of landing a man on the moon. NASA’s space 
expeditions are indeed monumental in their own right, 
but human pride is not the only benefit of NASA. The 
technological advancements required to make such 
explorations possible have impacted our daily lives. 
NASA’s research is directly responsible for the CAT 
scan, microceramics used to fight cancer, personal water 
filters, and 1,300 other advances we use every single 
day. Some of NASA’s inventions are now used to save 
lives; while others are used to make life a little easier. It 
is important to understand that NASA is a significant 
technological agency and providing funding for it implies 
that America is committed to advancing technology. 
Our country is beginning to lose its once vast lead as 
the world leader in technology due to other competing 
nations and the decreased amount of available funds for 
NASA. Investing in NASA is important if we are going 
to maintain our status as a world leader. The question, 
therefore, is how much are we willing to sacrifice as 
a country in order to pursue advancements in this 
industry?
 The funding trends analyzed in this paper aim to 
answer that question. By analyzing our country’s funding 
of NASA in relation to economic success factors, such 
as unemployment and debt, and political factors such as 
party in power and military activity, we can determine 
the level of support the public maintains for investing in 
NASA. This analysis will show us how much dedication 
there is to funding NASA during both prosperous and 
difficult economic times. This research is also meant to 
identify any other factors that significantly affect NASA’s 
funding.
 The  hypothesis for this research project is that 
difficult economic times, periods of increased military 
spending, and high levels of debt will negatively affect 
NASA’s funding. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
 One of the most relevant pieces of literature 
to my project is Lambright’s (2010) research on NASA. 
Lambright sets the stage by supporting the importance 
of NASA. This paper looks at the history of NASA, 
its costs, and its contributions to society. Lambright 
(2010), therefore, deems that NASA is indeed a 
worthwhile investment. Lambright (2010) goes on to 
argue how significant it is to continue NASA’s funding 
since the future of NASA is expected to continue to 
provide significant technological advances. Additionally, 
Robolledo and Nollet (2011) provide evidence for the 
use of cooperation in advanced technological sectors. 
Cooperation saves time and resources while expediting 
the Research and Development (R & D) process 
greatly. NASA is a central hub for the space exploration 
industry. All of the private companies are connected 
through NASA, which gives out funding and contracts 
to the private companies that work in the industry. Since 
they all have a connection, they are better able to utilize 
each others’ knowledge. Since NASA awards contracts 
and funding on a competitive basis, the companies are 
still motivated to be as efficient as possible. This study 
further supports Lambright’s conclusion that NASA is 
a valuable agency that should be maintained in coming 
years.
 
 Dussauge and Garrette (1993) support the 
combining of efforts to advance aerospace, defense, 
and space exploration technology. They cite how many 
resources are saved, especially when private companies 
are able to collaborate. Scott (1993) discusses the 
benefits of the high concentration of aerospace 
companies in southern California. Scott finds that the 
close proximity is beneficial to all of the companies 
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in the industry. Whether this is due to cooperation 
or not is unclear. Dussauge and Garrette (1993) also 
analyze the factors that cause an industry to change 
and evolve. They argue that private innovation is the 
most efficient form of advancement but allow for the 
need of government funding when circumstances call 
for it. They discuss NASA’s need for billions of dollars 
which, while impractical for most institutions, is a 
relatively small investment for a national government 
such as America’s. Dussage and Garrette point out that 
under such circumstances it is very beneficial for the 
government to fund NASA.  Analyzing the factors that 
affect NASA’s funding will reveal how effectively the US 
government fulfills this potential benefit. 
 
 Schoeni and Dardia (1998) focus on government 
assistance to the space industry. They found that the 
government gives assistance to the industry workers so 
that they may be maintained when project work is down. 
Their research supports the notion that the unique skills 
that specialized workers have are valuable enough that 
the government wants at least some of the workers to 
stay onboard with NASA and its affiliates even if there 
is not enough work to warrant keeping them employed. 
This suggests that the government does indeed value 
NASA and space exploration workers, especially in the 
long run. 
 Bowen (2012) compares and contrasts 
discretionary spending, like NASA, to entitlements, such 
as social security. Bowen discusses how beneficial it is for 
a government to have power of rejection that comes 
with discretionary spending. However, his research 
shows that entitlements are usually more consistent 
in their success for the obvious reason that they can 
predict their funding consistently. When discretionary 
funding for technology is looked at, he concludes that 
it should not be cut lightly. This can be directly applied 
to NASA as they are entirely focused on technological 
development.
III. THEORY
Schoeni and Dardia (1998) did find that NASA 
is important to the government but they do not take the 
same approach as the analysis in this paper. The focus of 
this research project will involve the economic principles 
of discretionary spending and public choice; as opposed 
to simply analyzing facts like Schoeni and Dardia (1998). 
The theory behind this research is that discretionary 
funding will decrease as a result of public choice during 
difficult economic times. This theory stems from the fact 
that difficult economic times require governments to 
cut spending or raise taxes, and from the fact that the 
public demands more welfare during recessions, which 
puts further pressure on decreasing discretionary 
spending. Bowen (2012) explains that NASA has 
not received a “guarantee” on their funding since the 
space race was won in 1969. Ever since then NASA 
has been discretionarily funded. Although even during 
the Space Race NASA was never officially guaranteed 
funding, they could just be extremely confident in their 
continued funding due to the national security interest 
in beating the Soviets to the moon.
When looking at government spending it is 
crucial to differentiate between discretionary spending 
and entitlements. Entitlements are previously set 
costs to the government that they cannot back out 
of. Entitlements include things like Medicare or Social 
Security. Discretionary spending, like funding for NASA, 
is usually determined on a yearly basis and depends 
on the performance of the agency and on the amount 
of funds available for the government to give out in 
the first place. As a matter of definitions, discretionary 
spending will react more to shocks to the country than 
entitlement spending will. The issue is how much will 
NASA’s funding react to such shocks. This will depend 
on the type of shock and the dedication our government 
and the American people have to NASA.
The most important factor for discretionary 
spending is, theoretically, the health of the economy. This 
depends on if our Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 
high, the United States’ unemployment low, the interest 
rates under control, and basically if the economy is 
in a recession or not. But this is not the only factor 
that may affect discretionary funding. The amount of 
government spending as it compares to the total GDP 
is an important thing to take into consideration as well. If 
the economy grows but government expenditure stays 
the same, then discretionary spending will not increase 
even though the nation’s growth could support more 
spending. In addition to breaking down government 
spending as a portion of GDP, it is also important to 
account for the most influential shock to our economy: 
war. Several wars like WWI, WWII, Vietnam, Korea, and 
to a certain extent the Cold War, utterly consumed 
our government’s main attention. War is a serious 
enterprise and requires vast resources which may have 
to be taken from other discretionary spending. This 
suggests that defense spending as it compares to our 
GDP must be considered when analyzing discretionary 
spending trends.
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Another fiercely contested issue that is 
important to discretionary spending is the national debt. 
Today, more so than ever, the national debt has been a 
crucial issue, as it is in every country. Yes, some debt helps 
fuel growth. But once the debt reaches the point where 
people realize that they, and their descendants, are going 
to be bearing a heavy burden for the governments 
overspending, they call for decreases in government 
spending or for an increase in taxes. A decrease in 
government funding is going to affect discretionary 
funding first. Of course, not all discretionary funding is 
viewed as equally important. This research paper aims 
to find out how NASA’s funding is affected, by national 
debt levels, the health of the economy, political factors, 
and other crucial indicators.
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL
The figures for NASA’s budget can be obtained 
from the United States Office of Management and 
Budget. Unemployment, total government expenditure, 
military expenditure, and national debt can be found 
in the World Data Bank dataset for the United States. 
The values for political parties and the space race time 
period are commonly available.
 The empirical model for this analysis will be as 
follows:
NASA Budget (NASA) = a + 
ß(Unemployment) + ß(Total Government 
Expenditure/GDP) + ß(Military Expenditure/GDP) + 
ß(National Debt/GDP) + ß(Political Party) + ß(Space 
Race) + e
 The empirical model is designed to test what 
affects the government’s level of funding for NASA, 
which is measured in constant 2007 US Dollars. 
Unemployment will represent the health of the 
economy, and is expected to be negatively correlated 
with NASA’s funding. Unemployment was chosen 
because it is a dependable indicator of the state of the 
economy. It is affected by business cycles and it increases 
during recessions. Most importantly the unemployment 
measurement will capture the level of discontent within 
the nation. When people cannot find a job they want 
the government to step in and assist. This suggests that 
citizens will want the government to spend wisely so 
that all available funds can go towards supporting them 
in their time of need. This will ultimately demonstrate 
how much people value NASA as an organization. If 
NASA retains funding even when unemployment is 
high then that would represent very interesting results. 
Total government expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP is included to control for increased government 
spending overall. If the government spends more 
across the board then NASA will obviously benefit as 
well; this implies that this variable is expected to be 
positively correlated with NASA funding. Additionally, 
the percentage of GDP that the government spends on 
military spending will account for several things. Firstly, it 
will represent whether or not our nation is at war. The 
costs of war can be expected to draw funding from 
nearly every other candidate the government supports. 
Secondly, this variable will account for the overlap that 
is present between NASA and the department of 
defense. Missile defense, satellite systems, and global 
defense grids all use similar, if not the same, type of 
technology that NASA is continuously developing. 
These overlaps indicate that NASA and the department 
of defense may be substitutes to some degree. If they 
are substitutes then when military spending increases, 
NASA’s funding will decrease. Whether due to war, 
or due to substitution, it is expected that the military 
spending variable will be negatively correlated with 
NASA funding.
National debt is also an important variable. 
As national debt increases the public calls for more 
responsible spending and for cuts in spending. If the 
government decides to reduce deficits through spending 
cuts then those cuts are most likely going to come from 
discretionary spending, such as NASA. The cuts will 
almost definitely not come from entitlements spending 
because the government is obligated to pay that already. 
This means that funding programs like NASA will come 
into question as our national debt increases. Our 
country has never shied away from debt in the past, for 
better or worse, and this makes it seems like NASA’s 
funding is not hugely threatened by increasing national 
debt. Despite this, it is still expected that this variable 
will be negatively correlated with NASA funding.
The last two variables are both dummy variables. 
The first one, political party, is meant to control for the 
different spending preferences between Democrats 
and Republicans. The difficulty with this variable is 
that NASA is not definitively supported or opposed 
by either party. It can be inferred by political party 
platforms that Republicans prefer military spending 
while Democrats prefer social spending. NASA is a 
little bit of both with many social benefits in addition to 
providing technological advances for defense. Political 
Party is not expected to largely impact NASA funding 
negatively or positively, though one will certainly win 
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out. The Republican party is the one being tested so the 
results will apply to them. 
The variable for the Space Race is another 
significant variable. During the Space Race the 
government was committed to landing a man on the 
moon as quickly as possible. Cost was almost not 
a serious issue. Due to this it is necessary to control 
for this variable or else all of the other results will be 
skewed.
The data for this analysis will include all of 
the variables for the years 1958-2010. There are no 
more data to draw from and the variables included 
are each important as well. High significance rate for 
unemployment, government spending, and military 
spending is expected. Political party is expected to be 
insignificant but it will be interesting to see if either 
party is partial to NASA funding. 
V. RESULTS
 Figure 1 represents the funding levels for NASA 
from 1960 to 2009. Figure 2 through 5 represent the 
data for the independent variables. Table 1 displays the 
regression results and analysis. 
Figure 1 shows that funding for NASA clearly 
spikes soon after the creation of the agency. The decrease 
after the spike occurs due to the end of the Space 
Race. The overall trend after that drop is slightly upward 
although there are clear shocks. Around NASA’s thirty-
fourth year, the largest shock occurs. This is around the 
same time the oil crisis in the 1980s occurred. Although 
gas prices are not tested in the regression, it seems 
likely that this is not a coincidence.
Figure 2 shows that unemployment, government 
spending, and military spending have fairly fluctuating 
values. There is no clear relation between NASA’s 
funding trend and the trends for these three variables. 
As Figure 6 shows later, these variables definitely impact 
NASA’s funding significantly, it is just not apparent when 
comparing the raw data.
Figure 3 shows that the national debt does not 
have any clear relationship to NASA’s funding. The debt 
level fluctuates significantly while the trend for NASA’s 
funding, other than during the Space Race years, is 
relatively smooth. 
Figure 4 shows the years when a Republican 
was president. Again, there is no clear relationship 
between this independent variable and NASA’s funding 
trend in Figure 1.
Figure 5 shows there is a very clear relationship 
between the space race and the spike in NASA’s funding. 
While these two trends being so similar is not enough 
in its own right to confirm the relationship, it is a fact 
that the Space Race fueled NASA’s high funding level, 
which is why it must be accounted for in the regression.
Table 1 represents the regression results. It 
shows a .497 adjusted R –Square, which indicates 
that a significant amount of the variation in NASA’s 
funding has been explained by the tested variables. 
This is a skewed value given that the data sample was 
small. It means that the regression was still able to find 
worthwhile results regarding the factors that affect 
NASA’s funding, however the sample size might bias the 
results. A larger sample size would have demonstrated 
a more significant variation among the data. Table 1 
also shows that the independent variables are generally 
statistically significant. Unfortunately, the variable for 
the National Debt as a percentage of GDP was not 
statistically significant. The poor significance value for the 
debt variable indicates that the regression analysis was 
not able to identify a significant relationship between 
the national debt and NASA’s funding.
Unemployment is one of the most essential 
variables because it represents the health of the economy 
in this analysis. Table 1 shows that the significance value 
for this independent variable is 0.001 which means the 
results are highly significant. The negative impact value 
for unemployment indicates that as unemployment 
rises the funding for NASA decreases. This meets the 
previously established expectations and proves that 
as people lose their jobs, presumably due to difficult 
economic times, they, through the government, divert 
resources away from this important agency to handle 
matters that are considered more pressing. The nominal 
value of the negative impact that unemployment has is 
-1,935.381 (in millions of dollars). This means that as 
unemployment increases by one percentage point the 
funding for NASA decreases almost 2 billion dollars. 
This is a huge decrease given that NASA’s funding 
was only 17.8 billion in 2010. This is not a good sign 
because it means that the government takes away fairly 
aggressively from NASA during difficult economic times. 
This means that the government, and theoretically the 
people they represent, is not very willing to support 
the advancement of technology and exploration when 
money is tight for many individuals across the nation. 
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Unemployment is not the only variable that impacts the 
amount of funding NASA receives, though.
The next variable analyzed in Table 1 is total 
government spending as a percentage of GDP. The 
significance level of the results for this variable is smaller 
than .000. This means the correlation results between 
total government spending and NASA’s funding is 
extremely significant based on this regression. The 
results show that the impact that a one percent increase 
in this variable has on NASA’s funding is 6,175.06 
which comes out to over 6 billion dollars. The positive 
correlation is expected because if the government is 
spending more, then all of its agencies and programs 
are likely to receive at least some extra support. What 
is interesting is the size of the positive impact that 
increased government spending has on NASA funding. 
A one percent increase in government spending leads 
to a 6 billion dollar increase in funding when the most 
funding NASA has ever received is 33.5 billion dollars. 
That is almost a 20 percent increase for NASA funding 
as a result of a 1 percent increase in government 
spending. Such a disparity implies that NASA is a very 
valued agency to the US Government. This contradicts 
what the results of the unemployment analysis reveal. 
NASA is either important to the government or it is 
not. It is possible that the high funding that still occurs 
after the Space Race throws off the regression results. 
The analysis of the military spending variable 
is also provided in Table 1. The regression shows a 
significance value of less than .000 which means the 
results are very accurate just like for government 
spending. The impact that a one percent increase in this 
variable would have on NASA funding is - 4,032.593 
(millions of dollars). Such a large negative correlation 
indicates that the military and NASA can’t both get what 
they want. Military spending increases in the United 
States are usually in response to a threat of attack. So it 
makes sense that NASA must take budget cuts in order 
to protect our national interests, especially safety. Even 
though NASA’s technology is the same as much of the 
military’s global defense network it can be seen that they 
are not both utilized to respond the national threats. It 
could be that most threats are not advanced enough to 
require NASA’s expert aerospace technology. It is also 
possible that the military’s structure of command allows 
it to be more efficient or perhaps more trusted than 
NASA. It is the case that the government turns to the 
military as a priority over NASA. Whether it is a matter 
of safety first or simply avoiding funding the same thing 
twice does not change the results.
The political party variable is the next variable 
analyzed in Table 1. The regression analysis shows that 
when a Republican is the president there is a - 4,198.071 
(millions of dollars) impact on NASA’s yearly funding. 
The significance level for this factor is .007.  Republicans 
have a reputation of wanting smaller government and 
cutting taxes. So, in theory, it makes sense that such 
downsizing would negatively affect NASA. However, 
the magnitude of the downsizing seems excessive. A 
4 billion dollar decrease in NASA funding would be 
roughly 25 percent of their current budget. While such 
a cut would not destroy the agency by any means it 
seems like a drastic cut to me. The explanation may 
lie in the dates used for the Space Race variable. It is 
also possible that the increases in military spending 
that usually accompany Republican presidents is what 
causes NASA spending to drop during Republican 
administrations.
Finally, Table 1 also shows the Space Race 
variable is significant at the .005 level which indicates 
high significance. The positive magnitude for the impact 
of this factor on NASA funding is extremely high at 
13,963.558 (millions of dollars). Such an accurate and 
high correlation between the Space Race and NASA 
is not surprising since the Space Race is what fueled 
NASA’s creation and it was the purpose of NASA to 
win that race. This variable was originally intended to 
avoid the extreme bias that would occur if the Space 
Race was not accounted for. After the Space Race was 
won, the funding for NASA dropped off significantly. 
This excessive drop is not accounted for in the model 
since it occurs after the Space Race officially ended. It 
cannot be concluded indefinitely, but it would seem that 
this excessive drop, which occurred during a Republican 
presidency, negatively influenced the results for the 
Political Party variable.
VI. CONCLUSION
 In conclusion, the hypothesis that NASA 
follows the trends for discretionary spending is proven 
true. NASA’s funding decreases significantly during 
economic strife and when defensive spending increases. 
NASA’s funding increases when government spending 
increases and was much higher during the space race. 
The one aspect of the hypothesis that was not proved 
is that the debt level would have a negative impact 
on the level of funding for NASA. The political party 
variable did its job of controlling for party influences 
and indicated that Republican presidents are likely to 
cut funding to NASA. 
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This paper does not strongly confirm the 
results of Schoeni and Dardia but does not disprove 
them either. Bowen’s recommendation that technology 
be funded intensely is not followed by the American 
government. The future of our nation is said to rely 
upon our staying ahead technology wise. NASA’s 
funding has proven to be discretionary funding without 
a doubt. The trends seen and the correlations found 
in the data prove that the technological advances that 
NASA had accomplished have not allowed them to 
maintain a well funded position, but as seen in Figure 1, 
the funding levels have not suffered to a severe extent. 
It is important that the United States maintain interest 
in this organization and the technology sector in general 
in order to maintain or success in the future.
Future research may benefit from including 
additional control variables. Finding a way to account 
for the government providing funding simply to keep 
aerospace technicians employed, even if they were not 
currently needed, so that they would be available in the 
future, might help account for NASA’s funding. Also, 
controlling for the lagging effects of the Space Race 
would be a valuable addition to this study. Accounting 
for lagging high funding will help account for everything 
that could affect NASA’s funding.
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VIII. APPENDIX
Table 1: Regression Results & Analysis 
Independent Variable Impact on NASA Fund-
ing (Millions of Dollars)
Constant -50,143.823***
(-3.347)
Unemployment -1,935.381***
(-3.586)
Total Government 
Spending/ GDP
6,175.060***
(5.595)
Military Expenditure/ 
GDP
-4,032.593***
(-3.927)
National Debt/ GDP 14.292
(.249)
Political Party -4,198.071*
(-2.818)
Space Race 13,963.558**
(2.946)
*** Significant at .001 level
** Significant at .005 level
* Significant at .01
Adjusted R-Square = .497
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The Comparison of Economic Assimilation
Between Indian and Chinese Immigrants
in the United States
Zongda Tu
I. INTRODUCTION
People have been immigrating from India 
and China to the United States for many generations 
and the immigrants from these countries have 
been contributing to the United States’ economic 
development tremendously. After the Luce–Celler Act 
of 1946, an increase in immigration of Indians to the 
United States occurred as well as other to other big 
Indian communities in United Kingdom, Singapore, and 
Malaysia. The major Chinese immigration trend occurred 
after the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act Amendments in 1965, when Chinese immigrants 
with skills or high educational attainment immigrated to 
the United States. Both Indian and Chinese immigrants 
and their descendants are active in a broad range of 
job fields including science, technology, business, media, 
government, and politics. As of 2008, Indians and 
Chinese had the highest educational attainment level 
and median personal income of any racial demographic 
in the country (Walt, Proctor, & Smith, 2008). 
Nevertheless, mass media reports and studies 
show that Asian Americans are paid up to twenty-nine 
percent less than equally qualified natives (Min, 2006, 
Debusmann, 2010). Borjas (2009) states that most of 
the highly educated immigrants are able to assimilate 
economically into the United States labor market and 
are able to significantly contribute to the economy. 
Since both Indian and Chinese immigrants have a similar 
level of educational attainment distribution, according 
to IPUMS CPS statistics from 1994 to 2011, their 
economic assimilation should be similar in many ways. 
However, Vugt (2009) demonstrates that the common 
English language spoken by new immigrants from English 
speaking countries accelerates immigrants’ assimilation 
with natives. Therefore, the economic assimilation 
models tend to be different for English-speaking 
immigrants and non-native speaking immigrants.
This issue is important because of the 
rapid increases in the number of Chinese and Indian 
immigrants, which has raised a greater concern about 
economic assimilation over time.  According to United 
States Census Bureau (2010, 1980 & 1970), there 
are 2.8 million Indian Americans in 2010, which is 
approximately 7.2 times higher than the number in 
1980. For the Chinese, there are 3.8 million Chinese 
Americans in 2010, which is almost 8.5 times more than 
forty years ago. Since an increase in immigrants may 
create a greater gap in income between the immigrants 
and the natives, this problem should be taken seriously 
and analyzed clearly to determine whether there is 
an income convergence and the different rates of 
economic assimilation for these two immigrant groups.
The purpose of this research is to determine 
and compare economic assimilation of Indian and 
Chinese immigrants over time in the United States. 
On the one hand, because both groups come from 
fast growing developing countries in Asia, they could 
follow the same career path and face the same income 
disparity in the United States with natives. On the other 
hand, Indian immigrants have a higher level of English 
proficiency than Chinese immigrants do, so Indians might 
have an advantage over Chinese immigrants in terms 
of assimilation with natives. Based on data from IPUMS 
CPS (1995, 2000, 2005 & 2010), this paper applies the 
regression methodology, theories of assimilation and 
human capital, age earnings profile and the theoretical 
correlation between language proficiency and economic 
assimilation of immigrants. The study follows cohorts 
of Indian and Chinese immigrants in 1995, 2000, 2005 
and 2010. It is designed to re-examine and expand the 
conclusions of previous studies and explain similarities 
and difference in economic assimilation for these two 
immigrant groups.
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II. THEORY & LITERATURE REVIEW
The research is based on assimilation theory 
and human capital theory. Assimilation is defined as a 
socio-political response to demographic multi-ethnicity 
that supports or promotes the assimilation of ethnic 
minorities into the dominant culture. Clark (2003) 
explains that assimilation theory is an acquisition of new 
customs and attitudes that occur spontaneously through 
the contact and communication between majority and 
minority groups. According to Waters and Jemenez 
(2005), core measurements of immigrant assimilation 
are socioeconomic status, spatial concentration, language 
assimilation, and intermarriage. After immigrants settle 
down in a new region, they tend to learn and imitate 
how natives act and think by improving their host 
country language, acquiring local human capital and 
becoming permanent citizens (Schaeffer, 2006).  
Assimilation is a long-period process and the 
duration in the host country is statistically significant 
to the immigrants’ economic assimilation (Beenstock, 
Chiswick, & Paltiel, 2010). In other words, the more 
time immigrants spend in a new country, the less their 
income disparity is compared to natives. By testing the 
immigrant assimilation hypothesis with longitudinal data, 
they suggest that immigrants who spend a long time in 
the host country have rapidly increasing earnings over 
the time and almost reach the income parity eventually. 
Human capital expresses the unique set of 
abilities and acquired skills which each of us bring into 
the labor market (Borjas, 2005). Human capital theory 
emphasizes the impact of education on the income 
of minorities and therefore, claims that high levels of 
educational attainment increases the prospects for 
better wages and a more satisfying career (Barringer, 
Takeuchi, & Xenos, 1990). Moreover, a study by Barringer, 
Takeuchi and Xenos (1990) shows that education 
increase the rate of economic assimilation for Asian 
immigrants in the United States. Vigdor (2008) also 
states that an increase in the amount of education helps 
immigrants become more assimilated to the natives.
Age earnings profiles are used to describe an 
individual’s earnings over his or her work life. Chiswick 
(1978) includes cross-sectional data in his research to 
sketch out the age-earnings profiles of immigrants and 
natives. The wage of immigrants is lower than that of 
natives at the initial point but increases at a faster rate 
and surpasses the natives’ income at around the age of 
35. Both the curves for immigrants and natives increase 
at first and reach their peak at the age range of 45 to 
50, and then decrease to a somewhat lower point. The 
age earnings profiles indicate that upward mobility is 
a critical factor for immigrants and that their income 
tends to converge towards and then exceed native 
income. Nevertheless, Wu (2012) and Borjas (2009) 
suggest that the one year database in Chiswick’s study 
is misleading because different cohorts and the year 
of arrival in the U.S. can be significantly different, thus 
causing huge biases. The adjusted age earnings profile 
shows the significance of the age for both immigrants 
and natives and is analyzed by including age and age 
squared variables from multiple years in the regression 
model (Wu, 2012).
Language proficiency is one of four major 
indicators in assimilation as stated in the previous 
literature (Waters & Jemenez, 2005). Bleakley and 
Chin (2010) demonstrate that English proficiency 
helps immigrants integrate economically into their 
new home. Their research also suggests that English 
proficiency raises wages and narrows the income gap 
between immigrants and the United States natives 
by analyzing the relationship of age at arrival, English 
proficiency and social assimilation among United States 
immigrants. In addition, Beenstock, Chiswick, and Paltiel 
(2010) research the effect of language proficiency on 
assimilation of immigrants and conclude that immigrants 
who can speak the local language fluently assimilate 
faster than those who cannot.
In summary, the theoretical model for this 
research consists of assimilation theory, human capital 
theory, age earnings profiles and theoretical correlation 
between language proficiency and economic 
assimilation of immigrants. Based on the theoretical 
model, this study explores whether Indian and Chinese 
immigrants’ income converge to natives’ and whether 
language proficiency affects immigrants in assimilating 
economically in a country after controlling for human 
capital factors.
It is hypothesized that:
1. Human capital has a significant influence on 
Indian and Chinese immigrant earnings.
2. Both Indian and Chinese immigrants would reach 
income parity with natives eventually due to their 
high educational attainment.
3. Indian immigrants would assimilate faster and 
sooner than Chinese immigrants at the economic 
level because they have a higher level of English 
proficiency than do Chinese immigrants. 
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III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN
A. Data
All the data in this research is based on the 
IPUMS CPS database. IPUMS CPS is a project dedicated 
to integrating and disseminating data from the Current 
Population Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau 
and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This paper uses data 
extracted every March from 1994 to 2011 due to the 
availability of data for Indian and Chinese immigrants. 
 This research follows the following three 
cohorts:
1. Native born individuals who had positive 
earnings and were in the age range of 25 to 
50 during the 1995 survey year.
2. Indian born individuals who immigrated the 
U.S. prior to 1995, had positive earnings and 
were in the age range of 25 to 50 during the 
1995 survey year.
3. Chinese born individuals who immigrated the 
U.S. prior to 1995, had positive earnings and 
were in the age range of 25 to 50 during the 
1995 survey year.
The study compares the earnings among 
natives, Indian and Chinese immigrants based on the 
data in survey years 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. The 
same groups of cohorts are examined over time for the 
corresponding year. The descriptive statistics are applied 
to compare cohorts generally. They include mean values 
of earnings, ages and usual hours worked per week last 
year, percentages of each education attainment and 
being currently married, and the sample size for natives, 
Chinese and Indian cohorts at the survey year 1995 
and 2010 (see Table 1).  
B. Dependent variable
The variable Wage and Salary Income is each 
respondent’s total pre-tax wage and salary income for 
the previous calendar year. Amounts are stated as they 
were reported to the interview.  RealInc indicates each 
respondent’s real wage and salary income adjusted for 
inflation using Consumer Price Index (CPI) adjustment 
factors based on a 2010 price level (see Table 2). 
LnRealInc is the natural log of RealInc and is used as the 
adjusted earnings in this study. The natural log of income 
is widely applied in different studies because the adjusted 
dependent variable has a clear and simple relationship 
with other independent variables in the regression. A 
one unit change for a given independent variable leads 
to a certain percentage change, approximately the same 
as its regression coefficient after being adjusted, in the 
dependent variable - income. 
C. Independent variables
All variables and their detailed definitions are 
shown in Table 3 of Appendix.
Education attainment is the used to determine 
the highest degree of education an individual has 
completed. According to assimilation and human capital 
theory, it is an important factor in my research. The 
variable is recorded into a set of dummy variables:
      * Bachelors
      * Masters
      * Professionals
      * Doctors
The reference group for the education dummy 
variables is respondents who have high school degrees 
or under.
Age indicates each person’s age at last birthday. 
It measures each respondent’s life experience and 
working experience briefly. It is included in the regression 
as the estimate of the time in the labor market.
Uhrswork (usual hours worked per week last 
year) is used as a more accurate and specific indicator of 
working experience. It is the number of hours per week 
that respondents usually worked if they worked during 
the previous calendar year, including either working at a 
job at any time or doing “any temporary, part-time, or 
seasonal work even for a few days” during the previous 
year.
Indian and Chinese variables indicate the origin 
of immigrants and the reference group is natives. They 
show the impact of the difference between Indian 
and Chinese immigrants on the level of their earnings 
and their economic assimilation. The major difference 
between Indian and Chinese immigrants is that English 
is widely spoken and an official language in India and 
the United States but not in China. Since language 
proficiency is stated as a significant factor in determining 
economic assimilation in previous studies, these two 
variables are set as two dummy variables to roughly 
estimate the level of English proficiency.
Married variable gives each individual’s current 
marital status, including whether the spouse was 
currently living in the same household. It is adjusted 
into a dummy variable, with the reference group of 
individuals that are not currently married.
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D. Empirical Model
The empirical model of my research consists 
of two parts:
1. Descriptive statistics 
2. OLS regression analysis
 
 Descriptive statistics provides mean values 
of earnings, ages and usual hours worked per week 
last year, percentages of each education attainment 
and being currently married, and the sample size for 
three groups of cohorts at the survey year 1995 and 
2010. It is presented and defined in Table 1 and 2, and 
used to compare variables that determine economic 
assimilation in this study.
 
 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
analysis estimates the unknown parameters in a linear 
regression. It is applied to determine whether each 
variable is statistically significant on the level of income 
of Indian and Chinese immigrants and natives. The OLS 
regression model is also used to compare rates of 
economic assimilation of Indian and Chinese immigrants. 
 
 The regression model is stated as following: 
LnRealWage = ß0 + ß1(Indian) + ß2(Chinese) + 
ß3(Bachelors) + ß4(Masters) + ß5(Professionals) 
+ ß6(Doctors) + ß7(Age) + ß8(Uhrswork)+ 
ß9(Married)
 OLS regression analysis tests whether Indian 
and Chinese immigrants have an income convergence 
towards natives and whether Indian immigrants have a 
faster economic assimilation than Chinese immigrants 
with the following five steps:
Step 1: Run the regression with corresponding 
statistics from the database in 1995 and find out the 
coefficient of each independent variable. The data used 
are the combined set of statistics of natives, Indian 
immigrants and Chinese immigrants.
Step 2: Compare the signs of coefficients for 
Indian, ß1, and Chinese, ß2, to examine whether the 
group has reached the income parity with natives.  
Step 3: Compare the coefficients of Indian and 
Chinese variables to determine whether their economic 
assimilation is different.
Step 4: Analyze the percentage of income 
difference between two immigrant groups and natives 
by taking the antilog of the coefficients for Indian and 
Chinese and subtracting 1. The analysis compares the 
economic assimilation of Indian and Chinese immigrants. 
Step 5: Repeat the above steps for each of the 
remaining three selected survey years for 2000, 2005, 
and 2010.  
The five-step analysis is applied to obtain 
and explain results. The regression model analyzes 
the similarity and differences of economic assimilation 
among Indian and Chinese immigrants while controlling 
for human capital factors. If the sign of either ß1 or 
ß2 is positive or zero, then the matching group of 
immigrants have reached income parity with the 
natives. Otherwise, the corresponding group has not 
reached economic assimilation yet. If the adjusted ß1, 
which means the percentage difference of real income 
based on the native level, is smaller than the adjusted 
ß2, it can be concluded that Indian immigrants have an 
advantage over Chinese immigrants in that survey year 
and that they assimilate faster than Chinese. In this case, 
language proficiency may be a factor that contributes to 
the phenomenon. Otherwise, Chinese immigrants have 
an advantage and assimilate faster so the hypothesis is 
not valid.
IV. RESULTS
Based on the descriptive statistics in Table 1, 
both Indian and Chinese immigrants have higher means 
of wage than natives. However, high percentages of 
advanced degrees indicate that they are more likely 
to get a college degree or above. Because these two 
groups of immigrants have more human capital on 
average, it is reasonable that they have higher income.
A. OLS Regression Analysis
Regression results from 1995 to 2010 for all 
three cohorts are shown in Table 3 in Appendix 1. In 
Table 3, almost all coefficients for independent variables 
are statistically significant except for Chinese and 
Indian variables in some years. Specifically, education 
attainment, age, usual hours worked per week and 
marital status are significant at the 1 percent level for 
every year researched. Being Chinese is significant at the 
one percent level in 1995, fiver percent level in 2000 
and is not statistically significant in 2005 and 2010. Being 
Indian is not significant at all throughout the four years. 
By controlling for human capital factors and 
comparing the coefficients for Chinese and Indian, I 
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find that Chinese immigrants do have a disadvantage 
for earnings in 1995, with a negative impact of -.214 for 
the natural log of their real wage. They are assimilating 
fast though, from the impact of -.214 in 1995 to -.010 
in 2010. Although the coefficient of Chinese is still 
negative in 2010 it is extremely close to zero and is 
insignificant too. Based in this it can be concluded that 
Chinese immigrants reached income parity in 2010. For 
Indian immigrants there has been no income disparity 
since the initial year. In other words, they were already 
assimilated at the beginning of the study.
Being Indian is not significant at any level that 
suggests that their real wage does not vary significantly 
from native real wage. Based on the major difference 
between Indian and Chinese immigrants and the 
previous literature, one possible explanation for 
the different patterns between Chinese and Indian 
immigrants is that Indian immigrants’ proficient English 
skills help them earn the same with natives in the U.S. 
labor market. There is an apparent assimilation for 
Chinese immigrants from 1995 to 2010 and the longer 
time they stay in the United States, the less their income 
gap is. It may be because they obtain and improve their 
English skills throughout the assimilation process.
Education attainment, usual hours worked per 
week, and being married are statistically significant at all 
levels. They also have positive effects on income for all 
natives and immigrants. Age is also significant at the 1 
percent level and increases the income for age groups 
from 25 to 50 but have a slightly negative impact on the 
income of the age group from 50 to 65.
Because the coefficient does not accurately 
imply the percentage change in real income, all 
coefficients for Indian and Chinese variables are 
adjusted following Step 4. Figure 1(see Appendix) 
shows the impact of being Indian or Chinese immigrants 
in terms of percentage changes on their real income 
compared to natives. Chinese immigrants’ earnings are 
almost twenty percent lower than those of natives but 
increase very fast, while Indian immigrants’ earnings are 
approximately the same with those of natives.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The research examines whether there is 
an income gap in the beginning year and an income 
convergence in the final year for the selected cohorts 
of Indian and Chinese immigrants in the United States. 
Figure 1 is derived from adjusted coefficients for Indian 
and Chinese variables and proves the assimilation 
theory that Chinese and Indian immigrants do have 
an economic assimilation over the time from a lower 
wage level. Insignificant levels of being Indian and the 
different patterns of Indian and Chinese immigrants in 
Figure 1 are strongly supported by the fact that English 
proficiency facilitates and accelerates immigrants’ 
assimilation. Education attainment being significant at 
all levels with a positive impact on income is explained 
by human capital theory. Higher degrees lead to higher 
income as well as assimilation for immigrants.  The 
changes in coefficients of age match the age earnings 
profile that the increase in age positively affects earnings 
until around 45 to 50 years and then negatively affects 
earnings in a small amount.
All the results are consistent with findings in 
previous studies, and can be explained reasonably and 
logically by them. The research broadens the paper of 
Beenstock, Chiswick, & Paltiel (2010) which focuses on 
the assimilation of all kinds of immigrants in Israel, and 
the paper of Wu (2012) which focuses on the economic 
assimilation of Chinese immigrants in the United States. 
Results indicate the same conclusion that both of these 
articles present. This conclusion demonstrates that 
immigrants have a disadvantage at first but assimilate 
into the host country eventually.
My results regarding the impact that language 
proficiency has on economic assimilation are similar 
to the results in the studies of Bleakley and Chin 
(2010) and Beenstock, Chiswick, and Paltiel (2010). 
Their research concludes that language proficiency is 
significant in assimilation.  This suggests that the different 
patterns of economic assimilation between Indian and 
Chinese immigrants, in this paper, may be explained by 
their different English proficiency levels. 
The research papers of Barringer, Takeuchi, 
and Xenos (1990) and Vigdor (2008) have the same 
results, which indicate that high educational attainment 
increases the rate of economic assimilation for Asian 
immigrants. This paper narrows their researches down 
to two major Asian groups. Chiswick (1978) presents 
that age first increases income and then decreases 
it. The results in this paper match Chiswick’s results 
regarding the relationship between age and income 
exactly. The research improves Chiswick’s study (1978) 
by including multiple years of data to eliminate most 
biases proposed by Borjas (2009) and Wu (2012).
Human capital and age have a significant 
impact on Indian and Chinese immigrants’ earnings. 
Tu
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Both immigrants would reach income parity with 
natives but Indian immigrants would assimilate faster. 
By applying cross-sectional data and following three 
groups of cohorts from 1995 to 2010, the analysis in 
this paper yields results that support the hypotheses. 
The most important findings of this study is that there is 
economic assimilation for Chinese immigrants; and that 
language proficiency plays a relatively important role in 
that assimilation.
Moreover, the study suggests that immigration 
policies should strive to attract immigrants with 
higher degrees and higher English proficiency. These 
immigrants can assimilate into the United States society 
faster and contribute to the economic development 
greater than the average level of natives and thus, such 
policies should be carried out continually. Besides, new 
policies should be implemented to assist new and highly 
educated immigrants to obtain or improve their English 
skills so that they can assimilate more easily and faster, 
and contribute sooner to the economy. Both of these 
policy implications are consistent with the conclusions 
and indications in Beenstock, Chiswick, and Paltiel’s 
paper (2010) that argues that it is better for Israel to 
accept more highly educated immigrants and teach 
immigrants about more skills.  
Finally, there are still some limitations in the 
study. Only four survey years are researched in the 
paper so the lack of sufficient data may cause biases 
in the regression results.  Another limitation is caused 
by the bias about location because most Indian and 
Chinese immigrants in this study live in metropolitan 
areas, and their income tends to be higher than people 
who live in rural areas. Besides, there are many factors, 
other than language proficiency, which leads to the 
income parity between Indian immigrants and natives. 
Even though previous studies show that language 
proficiency is a significant factor, it might or might not 
be the reason that causes the difference in assimilation 
between Indian and Chinese immigrants. Future studies 
could be helpful by including more data and controlling 
for home locations and English proficiency levels of 
Chinese and Indian immigrants.
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VII. APPENDIX
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Three Cohorts Followed in 1995 and 2010
Variable 1995 (Age 25 - 50) 2010 (Age 40-65)
Natives Indians Chinese Natives Indians Chinese
Mean of Real Income 39303.36 54077.8 40466.47 52990.83 74865.51 67905.17
Percent HS 70.7% 25.8% 43.8% 65.0% 25.3% 40.7%
Percent Bachelors 20.2% 25.8% 23.5% 21.7% 27.8% 24.4%
Percent Masters 6.6% 27.2% 21.1% 9.7% 32.1% 21.5%
Percent Professionals 1.6% 12.6% 2.4% 1.8% 6.9% 2.7%
Percent Doctors .9% 8.6% 9.2% 1.7% 7.9% 10.7%
Mean of Age 37.10 36.32 37.95 50.36 49.64 49.64
Mean of Hrs Worked 40.90 43.94 40.00 40.50 39.97 40.51
Percent Married 69.1% 84.1% 82.5% 72.4% 91.0% 84.1%
Total 39895 151 251 40100 277 410
Source: IPUMS CPS (1995&2010)
Table 2: CPI Data Used for Each Survey Year
Survey Year CPI
1995 152.4
2000 172.2
2005 195.3
2010 218.1
Table 3: Variables, Definitions and Expected Signs
Variable Description Expected Sign 
Dependent
LnRealInc Natural log of real wage and salary income
Independent
Country of Origin 
Indian
0=Non-Indian immigrants or natives 
1= Indian Immigrants 
Unknown
Chinese 0=Non-Chinese immigrants or natives 
1= Chinese Immigrants
Unknown
Educational Attainment 
Bachelors
0=No Bachelor’s degree
1 = Bachelor’s degree
Positive 
Masters 0=No Master’s degree
1 = Master’s degree
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Table 3: Variables, Definitions and Expected Signs
Professionals 0=No Professional School degree
1 = Professional School degree
Doctors 0= No Doctorate degree
1 = Doctorate degree
Age A person’s age at last birthday
Uhrswork Usual hours worked per week (last year)
Marital Status 
Married
0=Not currently married 
1= Curently married 
Table 4: Regression Results for Natives, Indian and Chinese Immigrants (t-Statistics in Parentheses)
Variables 1995 2000 2005 2010
(Constant) 7.594***
(275.319)
8.083***
(248.002)
8.347***
(282.311)
8.587***
(235.224)
Chinese -.214***
(-3.930)
-.137**
(-2.381)
-.048
(-1.243)
-0.10
(-.237)
Indian -.043
(-.613)
0.043
(.591)
.005
(.109)
.011
(.214)
Bachelors .435***
(40.220)
.426***
(37.139)
.419***
(45.006)
.435***
(41.8008)
Masters .575***
(33.217)
.548***
(31.574)
.584***
(43.981)
.567***
(39.599)
Professionals .595***
(17.424)
.728***
(19.922)
.969***
(34.199)
1.033***
(32.711)
Doctors .613***
(14.032)
.697***
(17.051)
.777***
(25.575)
.858***
(27.397)
Age .015***
(24.769)
.007***
(11.281)
.002***
(3.120)
-.003***
(-4.950)
Uhrswork .045***
(115.258)
.043***
(99.881)
.042***
(122.357)
.042***
(109.523)
Married .123***
(13.089)
.132***
(13.173)
.180***
(21.087)
.182***
(19.372)
Adjusted R Square .319 .296 .312 .317
Sample Size 40297 34281 49341 40787
***Significant at the 1 percent level
**Significant at the 5 percent level
*Significant at the 10 percent level
t-Statistics are reported in parentheses
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Figure 1: Percentage Difference of Real Income for Indian and Chinese Immigrants Compared to Natives
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Analysis of the Influences of Inflation, Measured by 
Percentage Change in CPI, and Other
Economic Variables on Stock Performance
Wei Zhang
I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s increasingly interconnected world, 
nothing exists independently in a vacuum, which is 
also true for stock prices of all the stocks traded in 
the economy. Even back in the 1970s, Castanias 
(1979) admits that the stock price distribution has 
been a popular topic. The author challenged the 
widely accepted opinion that security price changes 
in competitive security markets are inter-temporally 
interdependent. Castanias initiates my exploration of 
what factors influence the so called invisible hand that 
controls prices in the stock market.
This paper aims to explore the correlation 
between how some macroeconomic and microeconomic 
variables, especially the Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
predict stock performance.  CPI is an index measuring 
the price level of goods and services consumers buy, 
with social security benefits and inflation tied to this 
index (Little, 2012).  This study derives the expected 
return in the stock market as a result of fluctuations in 
percentage change in CPI, which is defined as inflation.  
Comincioli (1995) uses the stock market 
performance as a leading economic indicator. He 
explores the linkage between the leading economic 
indicator S&P 500 index in predicting the domestic 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and he uses the 
Granger-causality tests to prove there exists a causal 
relationship between stock prices and the economy. 
Comincioli and this study both try to determine the 
causality relationship between the overall economy 
and stock market, but the sequence in the causality 
relation is reversed for on this paper. This paper will 
aim to determine how the economy determines the 
stock market return rather than the other way around 
as described by Comincioli. Later, this paper elaborates 
on the effects of percentage change in CPI in stimulating 
the fluctuations in stock price, which is not covered by 
Comincioli.  It will be further explored in this paper how 
significant inflation is as an indicator of the economy 
and whether this key figure can be used by investors to 
determine whether to purchase stock. It is, therefore, 
hypothesized that inflation is a significant figure and 
negatively correlated to the stock return. 
From there, a theoretical foundation is created, 
which can potentially help prospective or current 
investors make their investment decisions. Investors 
are anxiously waiting for economic reports regarding 
some key economic factors every month or quarter 
in the hope of deriving the forecasts of stock return 
and deciding when to enter or exit the market. There 
is an old saying that exists, which states that an invisible 
hand in the economy controls the changes in the stock 
market. The purpose of this paper is to further explore 
the effect of inflation in moving this market over time. 
Hopefully that would shed some light upon how some 
key indicators like inflation, influence investor decisions 
concerning stocks.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
There are several existing theories  used in 
theoretical framework in order to support the research 
for exploring the factors influencing the stock price 
and to test my hypothesis that inflation and other 
macro- and micro-economic factors have a significant 
effect when predicting stock price. The following is a 
description and literature review for each of them:
A. Inflation Theory
Inflation is measured by percentage change in 
CPI as calculated below (The World Bank, 2012):
Inflation= (CPIt+1-CPIt)/CPI t *100
To take into effect the role of CPI in influencing 
stock performance, inflation is used.  Inflation can be a 
result of demand pull or cost push. The former possibility 
is a positive sign to the overall economy as the increasing 
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demand brings prosperity to the economy. The latter 
possibility is perceived as a negative because the cost 
push can be driven by an unnatural force, such as the 
Oil Crisis in the 1970s, which would take tremendous 
time and effort for the market to adjust from such 
negative effect. Beyond the two historical possibilities, 
the recent inflation can be simply as a result of the 
Federal Bank’s excessive printing of cash and flooding 
the market. Beyond the effects of the invisible hand 
behind inflation, inflation itself can send mixed signals 
to the stock market as well. Some companies are good 
at transferring the pricing pressure to customers, such 
as those in the consumer staple and energy industry. 
However companies compete in a global market and 
a discretionary sector may find it difficult to react to 
inflation. As a result, their investors end up paying more 
into their stocks but for less. 
Abdullah and Hayworth (1983) aim to examine 
the relative contributions of a set of variables in the 
fluctuations of stock prices, especially Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), and they found that inflation has a significant 
impact on stock return. Chatrath, Ramchander, and Song 
(1997) study the correlation between the stock price 
and inflation in the case of India. Despite a number of 
articles on the stock return and economy in Europe 
and North America, the authors choose to approach 
the subject from the angle of a developing country such 
as India. The article provides limited support regarding 
the linkage between the real economy activity and 
inflation. However, the authors bring up inflation as a 
determinant of the overall economy and this indicates 
the importance to apply data adjusted for inflation. 
Their finding informs me that in order to explore the 
relationship between inflation and stock return, I must 
have the data adjusted for inflation in case inflation is 
not embedded in the stock return composite. Chang, 
Yeung, and Yip (2000) aims to use employment, CPI, and 
housing statistics in determining the stock price indexes 
to provide some guidance to investors. Although Chang, 
Yeung and Yip’s regression model fails eventually in 
building a connection between the economic indicators 
like inflation and stock price index, it lends partial 
support to the hypothesis regarding the change in 
CPI variable in forecasting the investment return and 
it points out the practical use of the results from the 
research that confirms my research area.
In addition, Fama and Schwert (1977) estimate 
the extent to which various assets are hedges against the 
expected and unexpected components of the inflation 
rate within the period of 1953 to 1971. They extend the 
research from stock market to other income-producing 
assets and give us a comprehensive picture in the 
investment horizon. Fama and Schwert (1977) arrive 
at an “anomalous result” that common stock returns 
were negatively related to the expected component 
of the inflation rate. This finding demonstrates that the 
data used was adjusted for inflation to yield convincing 
results.
Overall, the inflation theory supports the 
hypothesis that inflation would have a negative impact 
on the stock return.
B. Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply Model
Continued from the Inflation Theory, aggregate 
demand and aggregate supply theory show that 
different types of inflation can have different effects on 
the real economy. For example, demand pull inflation 
is usually associated with an increase in real GDP. Cost 
push inflation, on the other hand, is often associated 
with decreases in real GDP. Cost push is shown by 
a leftward shift in the Aggregate Suppy (AS) curve 
while demand pull is shown by a rightward shift in the 
Aggregate Demand (AD) curve. Therefore, cost push 
inflation can be shown to cause output to fall. The 
prospect of recession should lead to a decline in the 
value of stocks.  A little bit of demand pull inflation, on 
the other hand, would result in a short term increase 
in production. Stock markets may act favorably to low 
levels of demand pull inflation. However, extremely rapid 
demand pull inflation can cause significant inefficiencies 
in the economy. These inefficiencies, in turn, could have 
an adverse effect on the value of stocks. This model is 
important as it brings to the hypothesis that there is a 
threshold beyond or above, which the effect of inflation 
would be virtually opposite.
Tobin (1965) aims to explore the roles of 
monetary factors in determining the capital intensity 
of an economy. Tobin (1965) uses the Cobb-Douglas 
model to determine the relationship between the 
capital production and rate of return.  This paper gives 
a good description of the Aggregate Demand of Money.
C. Capital Asset Pricing Model
Roll (1977) provides a critique on the works 
done on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
Below is the equation for the CAPM:
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Where:
rf = Risk free rate
ßa = Beta of the security
= Expected market return
CAPM measures the relationship between 
expected return and actual return of securities. From 
the equation listed above, the higher expected return 
and the higher actual return. The expected high return 
can possibly draw the investors away from engaging in 
the consumption market when investors are deciding 
how to allocate their limited resources to make the 
maximum return. We usually conceive the risk free rate 
as the rate of return on the one-year year treasury. This 
paper is unique in the sense that it concludes the only 
testable hypothesis is that the market portfolio is mean 
variant efficient. All other hypotheses tested to arrive 
at the model are merely mathematical exercise that 
does not serve any practical use. This paper provides 
a pessimistic view in considering whether there are 
any factors that are strong enough to predict the asset 
price, including stocks. However, it provides a useful 
theoretical framework of the asset pricing model.    
In addition, the risk free rate and the expected 
market return would reflect inflationary expectations. 
When Beta is different from 1, changes in inflationary 
expectations would affect the price of the security. 
CAPM alone emphasizes the importance of risk free 
rate, denoted by the one-year treasury rate in deciding 
the actual return. The empirical model of this paper 
incorporates the one-year treasury rate as a factor that 
influences the stock performance. For all these elements 
incorporated, CAPM proves to be an effective model 
to be used.
D. Time Value of Money (TVM)
When professional analysts calculate the net 
present value of expected future cash flow, they will 
always discount the cash flow expected to receive to 
the present value, assuming the economy is in a long-
run inflating stage. This is also why a majority of people 
prefer to receive the money today rather than in the 
future with the same amount, just as why people will be 
paid interest for having money in the savings account. 
Meanwhile this is what investors are considering when 
making their investment choices: whether to spend 
the money today in consumer products or invest it 
somewhere with a positive expected return. This is how 
behavior in finance comes into play. The Time in Value of 
Money (TVM) Theory is a continuation of the Inflation 
Theory as it suggests the higher inflation leads to the 
lower future value. Thus TVM Theory supports the 
hypothesis that inflation has a negative impact on the 
stock market. Below is the equation used to represent 
TVM and its effect on future value:
F = P (1 + i) n
Where:
F = future value
P = present value
i = reflects the time value of money including  
 anticipated inflation
n = number of periods
A counter argument to this is that if the time 
value of money increases, investors would prefer to 
hold assets like stocks instead of money. The increased 
demand for stock will increase their prices. The idea 
is that inflation causes shifts away from assets that 
are sure to lose value with inflation, like money held 
in savings or even treasuries and bond in some cases, 
to assets that have a chance of appreciating in value 
like stock. However, this paper uses the supporting side 
of inflation theory and to see to what extent it can 
support the hypothesis.
III. DATABASE AND EMPIRICAL MODEL
The database applied is from Robert Shiller’s 
United States stock price data for a time period from 
1871 to 2012. Robert Shiller is an American economist, 
who explored in depth the correlation between 
economic factors and stock performance since the 
early 1980s while Bulmash and Trivoli (1991) investigate 
the relationship between the stock price and the 
national economic indicators. The authors proved how 
the existence of the relationship will lead to the use of 
the stock price index as an indicator in overall economy. 
Bulmash and Trivoli apply a time series data in exploring 
the relationship between the performance of stock 
market and overall economy.
The database is obtained through the website 
of Yale University Economics Department originally in 
Excel format. I hereby provide the link to retrieve the 
data for your reference: www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/
data/chapt26.xls.  The data is appropriate as Shiller has 
traced the historical stock prices all the way to 1871, 
which is very rare and highly valuable for stock data and 
including both micro- and macroeconomic variables.  
An OLS regression is used in addition to the 
S&P composite index, calculated as an index of the 
stock (equity) prices of the weighted average market 
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capitalization to be my dependent variable.
Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (2001) study 
industrial production, interest rates, exchange rates, 
performance of the foreign stock market, oil prices, 
and stock returns to examine whether economic 
activity movements affect the performance of the 
stock market for Greece. This paper provides one of 
the most comprehensive lists of economic indicators 
listed that could potentially be the variables chosen in 
my research. Although this paper only examines the 
big picture of Greece, the indicators such as interest 
rate and industrial production shed some light on the 
situation of United States and also give me some insight 
in the choice of variables.
Inflation is calculated as a percentage change in 
CPI and use inflation as a key independent variable. A 
statistic description shows the possible convergence of 
the inflation and stock return graphs when combined 
together as their high and low points to some extent 
correspond.  
The one-year treasury rate and its P/E ratio 
would be crucial to the model as well as explained by 
the CAPM. Besides that, the ten-year bond return and 
its P/E ratio are used to find how investors are making 
the trade-off decision of whether investing in short-term 
or long-term investment products. P/E ratios in both 
cases are derived from past data and show investors’ 
expectation for future return. The higher the P/E, the 
higher expectation the investors have for its future 
return. It can also be argued that high P/E means certain 
investment product is overvalued and that tend to draw 
investors away from the treasury and bond and possibly 
bring investors back to the stock market. In that case, 
P/E ratios send mixed signals to the market. Additionally, 
all the variables, if necessary, are converted to 2005 
dollars to adjust for inflation to examine movements 
in real terms.  
In order to explore deeper into the effects of 
inflation, it is assumed that investors are smart enough 
to forecast the correct inflation and their predicted 
inflation for the next year is the actual inflation. In that 
way, inflation is incorporated for the next year as one 
independent variable which would help explain the 
stock performance. To better assess the change in the 
stock return, the dependent variable is changed to 
“Percentage Change in S&P Index”.
Beyond the original hypothesis, the correlation 
between the inflation and stock return might be a 
piecewise function where inflation within a different 
range would have a range of effects on stock return. 
Inflation is categorized into Deflation(i<0), Low 
Inflation(0<=i<=.05), Moderate Inflation(.05<=i<=.1), 
and Hyperinflation(i>.1). Each of them is coded as 
dummy variable with “1” means the individual year is in 
that inflation category and “0” means it is not.  This leads 
to Model B1.
Model A
Return on S&P Composite= ß0 + ß1 (Rate of 
Inflation)+ ß2 (Rate of Inflation for the next year) +  
ß3(One-year treasury return)+ ß4(P/E of one-year)+ 
ß5 (Return on Ten-year bond)+ ß6 (P/E of ten-year 
bond)+μ
Model B
Percentage Change on S&P Composite= ß0 + 
ß1 (Low Inflation)+ ß2 (Moderate Inflation) + 
ß3(Deflation)+ + ß3(Hyperinflation)+μ
IV. RESULTS
A. Model A
In the initial model, the Return on S&P Index 
is used as the dependent variable and is used to run 
the regression against one/ten-year interest rates, P/E 
ratio of one/ten-year interest rate, and inflation rates 
for current/the next year The adjusted R square is .571 
as shown in Table 1, indicating that this model explains 
more than half of the data variation. Below is the 
regression result for Model A1 in which the dependent 
variable is Return on S&P Composite Index.
Return on S&P Composite = -674.455+ 29.049 (Rate 
of Inflation)-14.019(Rate of Inflation for the next year) 
-55.721(One-year treasury return)+ ß4(P/E of one-
year)+ 93.579(Return on Ten-year bond)+ 36.139(P/E 
of ten-year bond)+μ
Just as hypothesized, the one-year interest rate 
has a negative impact on stock return.  This further 
supports the reasoning that treasury and stocks as 
investments go in opposite directions and investors 
have to make the trade-off choice. The result for ten-
year bond rate has a negative impact on stock return 
which goes against the original guess. The explanation 
for that is a ten-year bond as an investment might not 
share the same investor market as the stocks. In that 
case, ten-year bond serves only as an overall economic 
indicator, without competition for investors with stocks. 
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Results also show that P/Es of one/ten-year 
both have a positive impact on stock return.  This can 
be explained by the earlier reasoning that the value 
of P/E is in line with investors’ expectations regarding 
certain investments. In this case, the possible negative 
side of P/E on stocks is not demonstrated by the results. 
One thing to pay attention to is the P/E for one year 
is insignificant in explaining the stock return index. 
This could be a result of a combination of a negative 
correlation between one-year treasuries and stocks 
return plus a positive correlation between one-year 
treasury return and corresponding P/E.
Ironically, the key variables measured, the 
inflation for the current year and expected inflation for 
the next year, are found to be insignificant in explaining 
the stock return index. Moreover, Graph A with S&P 
Index against rate of inflation demonstrates clearly a 
positive linear relationship between the two. However, 
Graph B shows there is hardly a relationship between 
the S&P Index and the expected inflation for the next 
year assuming investors are smarts enough to predict 
accurately the inflation for the next year. The dots in 
Graph B end up all over the place. This can be explained 
by the prediction ability of investors are highly over-
estimated.
B. Model B
   The positive linear relationship demonstrated 
in Graph A goes against the hypothesis. In order to 
explore deeper the effects of inflation and focus on 
the relative changes rather than the absolute value, the 
“Percentage Change on S&P Composite Index” is used 
as the dependent variable. A comparison of the mean 
dummy variables of inflation ratios within different range 
extends my research on the effects of inflation on stock 
performance. Based upon the descriptive results, it is 
found that 41.8 percent of the years from 1871 to 2011 
have hyperinflation, where inflation is over 10 percent. 
Interestingly, the next largest group, those years with 
deflation, represents 37.6 percent of the entire 141 
years. The years which we considered having healthy 
inflation (Low/Moderate Inflation) merely represents 
20.6 percent.  The Descriptive Results are shown in 
Table 2 and the regression results for Model B1 and B2 
are in Table 3.  
Deflation (i<0)
Low Inflation (0<=i<=.05)
Moderate Inflation (.05<=i<=.1)
Hyperinflation (i>.1)
Model B1
Percentage Change on S&P Composite=.211-
.193(Low Inflation) -.142 (Moderate Inflation) 
-.343(Deflation) +μ
Model B2
Percentage Change on S&P Composite=.049 + .172 
(Hyperinflation)-.171 (Deflation) +μ
In Model B1, just as expected, deflation would be 
detrimental to the stock market. Declining prices, if they 
persist, generally create a series of negative events such 
as falling profits, closing factories, shrinking employment 
and incomes, and increasing defaults on loans. All 
these would lead to a stock return to go down. Low 
Inflation and Moderate Inflation also negatively impact 
stock performance. Although the common saying is 
that a slight and healthy inflation would be good to 
the economy, it does not work in the stock market 
in this case. A one-digit percentage inflation ratio can 
be detrimental to the stock market especially when 
the companies fail to transfer the pricing pressure to 
consumers and this is usually the case for companies in 
the discretionary sector. One thing to notice here is the 
variable Hyperinflation is automatically excluded when 
running this regression.  
 
 In order to find out the impacts of Hyperinflation 
on stock market, Model B2 is used to run the regression 
of only Hyperinflation and Deflation against the 
Percentage Change in S&P Index. Hyperinflation shows 
to be positively correlated to stock return. This can be 
explained by the inflation can be derived from the rapid 
demand pull that results in increasing supply of money. 
Over the past 141 years, Hyperinflation is overall 
beneficial to the stock market.  
 
 The original hypothesis that inflation negatively 
impacts stock return is partially correct from the results. 
The function between inflation and stock market is a 
piecewise function where inflation would have impacts 
of different magnitude and direction when the value of 
inflation changes. Inflation would have a positive impact 
on stock return when inflation exceeds 10 percent, 
otherwise inflation would be detrimental to the stock 
return.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to evaluate the 
inflation as a leading economic indicator and explore 
causal relationships inflation together with other 
economic variables and stock return.
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 The results indicated a concrete relationship 
between the inflation and stock market does exist. 
Inflation, whose value is within different ranges, would 
play different roles on stock market. Inflation exceeding 
10 percent would be a good sign to the stock market 
while inflation with other value would drag down the 
stock return.   
 
 The policy implication is to have dual standards 
when considering the impacts of inflation on stock 
market. Deflation, low, and moderation inflation would 
be detrimental to the stock market and they are 
potential warning signs to investors looking to either 
enter the stock market or increase weight of stocks in 
their portfolio. Hyperinflation, on the other hand, is a 
result of demand pull in most cases although exceptions 
arise when Federal Reserve meaninglessly print extra 
cash. Inflation figure above 10 percent is considered 
a good time for investors to either increase current 
holdings of stocks or enter the stock market. Compared 
to the interest rate of short-term treasury and long-
term bond, inflation is more effective in predicting 
stock return. This is demonstrated by the more than 
20 percent increase in adjusted R square. Therefore, 
the returns on alternative investments are more crucial 
figures investors should look at. Overall, inflation serves 
as supplemental information investors shall look at 
when making investment decisions.   
For future study, the third area should look at the 
reverse side of this research and explore the causality 
relationship between the stock return and various 
economic variables. The results in this paper show an 
overall good economy is no guarantee to equally good 
stock return. Can stock market and the overall economy 
be independent events without concrete relationship 
between the two?  Hopefully future studies in this area 
would shed some light on this question.
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VII.APPENDIX
Table 1: Regression Results, Dependent Variable is S&P Composite Index on Stock Return
Model A
Hypothesized Dependent Variable Beta Values
NA Constant -674.455 (-8.115) ***
- One-year interest rate -55.721 (-3.673) ***
- Ten-year interest rate 93.579 (5.176) ***
+ or - depending P/E of one-year 6.153 (1.140)
+ or - depending P/E of ten-year 36.139 (7.223) ***
+ or - depending Inflation of current year 29.049 (.228)
+ or - depending Inflation of next year (assuming the 
expected inflation-actual of next 
year)
-14.019 (-0.126)
Adjusted R2 0.571
F 29.791 ***
Sample Size 141
t-statistics in parentheses
*** Significance at the 0.01 level
Table 2: Descriptve Results of Inflation with Ranges
Deflation Low Inflation Moderate Inflation Hyperinflation
Standard Deviation 0.4860777 0.3267847 0.2800347 0.4950617
N 53 17 12 59
Table 3: Regression Results, Dependent Variable is Percentage Change on S&P Composite Index
Model B1 Model B2
Dependent Variables Beta Values Beta Values
Constant 0.211 (18.799) *** 0.049 (2.904) ***
Low Inflation -0.193 (-7.771) *** N/A
Moderate Inflation -0.142 (-4.974) *** N/A
Deflation -0.343 (-20.064) *** -0.171 (-8.152) ***
Hyperinflation Auto excluded 0.172 (8.366) ***
Adjusted R2 0.742 *** 0.739 ***
F 135.023 *** 199.626 ***
Sample Size 141 141
t-statistics in parentheses
* Signficance at the 0.1 level
** Significance at the 0.05 level
***Significance at the 0.01 level
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